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Short Term Forecasts from the Standard Growth Model

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Productivity and Fiscal Policy in Japan: 
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Selahattin İmrohoroğlu* and Nao Sudo**

Abstract
Japan is facing severe fiscal challenges. The aging of the population is projected to raise total pension and health expenditures. There is already a huge debt to output ratio which is the highest in advanced economies. In this paper we ask 'if the consumption tax rate is raised to 15%, will there be a primary surplus, and what factors are important in achieving a fiscal balance?' Using the standard growth model's simulations as 'modern back-of-the-envelope' calculations, the quantitative findings indicate the critical need to contain government expenditures. Even an annual growth rate of 3% in GDP over the next 20 years may be insufficient to turn consistent primary surpluses, combined with a new consumption tax rate of 15%, unless prudent expenditure policies are implemented.

Keywords: Primary Balance; Fiscal Policy; Productivity; Growth Theory  
JEL classification: E00, H20, H50

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## Introduction

Japan is facing significant demographic and fiscal challenges. As of year 2010, the immediate economic problem is the economic slowdown which started in the second quarter of 2008 and continued in the first quarter of 2009 when real GDP recorded the largest drop since World War II. However, output has recovered in 2009 QII and QIII, and the outlook is guardedly optimistic.

The ‘not-so-good-news’ is the future implications on government debt to GDP ratio which is already the highest among the OECD countries. In addition to the concerns regarding the aging of the population and the fiscal problems associated with it, there is also the issue of bringing the debt to GDP ratio at levels closer to those of the major developed countries. Japan now has the largest debt to GDP ratio among the developed countries. A large part of this debt was accumulated when Japan responded to the ‘lost decade’ of the 1990s by substantially increasing government purchases in the form of public works projects that were financed by new and large issues of debt. According to the Ministry of Finance, the gross debt of the Japanese government is projected to be about 200% of GDP at the end of 2010. This ratio is more than twice that in other developed countries such as France, Canada, Germany and the United States, as depicted in Figure (1).

![Gross Debt to GDP Ratio](image)

**Figure 1:** Gross Debt to GDP Ratio
Japan’s net debt to GDP ratio is also very large, about twice that of the developed countries mentioned above. Japan has overtaken Italy as the nation with the largest debt to output ratio on a net basis among the developed countries. Figure (2) shows the ratio of net government debt to GDP in a subset of OECD countries. The fiscal response to the lost decade has pushed this ratio from less than 20% in early 1990s to 104.6% projected for 2010.

![Net Debt to GDP Ratio](image)

Figure 2: Net Debt to GDP Ratio

In this paper, the standard growth theory is used to evaluate two counterfactual fiscal experiments that are designed to achieve a primary budget surplus in the near future, based on the data available in 2010. The consumption tax is raised from the current 5% value to 15% in two separate experiments. First, the tax is raised gradually, two percentage points per year, starting from 2010 and ending in 2014. Second, the consumption tax rate is raised in one step to 15% in 2010.¹

The simple growth framework of this paper follows Hayashi and Prescott (2002) that has studied the factors behind the lost decade in Japan. A related paper is Chen, İmrohoroglu, and İmrohoroglu (2006) that explores the economic and demographic reasons behind the

¹Our model focuses on the real economy where all of the variables including those related to the revenues and expenditures of general government are expressed in real terms.
secular patterns of the Japanese saving rate. This approach generates model simulations that match with actual data reasonably well and therefore provides a useful measuring device to evaluate government policy.\textsuperscript{2}

The model is populated by a representative household that faces complete markets and maximizes the sum of discounted period utilities subject to its present value budget. A stand-in firm uses a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production function to maximize its profits, producing equality between factor prices and their marginal productivities. There is a government that finances its exogenous stream of purchases, transfer payments and interest on government debt, by taxing factor incomes and consumption, and issuing new debt. We calibrate the model to the Japanese national income accounts, start from given initial conditions in 1981 and calculate the equilibrium transition path of the Japanese economy toward a steady-state in the far distant future. We equip the representative household with perfect foresight knowledge of exogenous variables in the model, such as total factor productivity and population growth rates, depreciation rates, tax rates on factor incomes and consumption.\textsuperscript{3} Our benchmark transition policy is to maintain the consumption tax rate at 5\% for a long time, our so-called ‘do-nothing’ policy. In addition, we characterize the equilibrium response of the economy to two different ways of dealing with the short-term fiscal imbalance. The first counterfactual experiment allows for a gradual increase in the consumption tax rate from 5\% to 15\% in 5 years starting in 2010. A second policy is to raise the tax rate from 5\% to 15\% in one year in 2010.

The quantitative results indicate the importance of three factors in achieving a fiscal balance in the near future. First, and most important, the Japanese government’s ability to contain government purchases of goods and services and transfer payments will be critical. If the projected increases in government expenditures related to the aging of the population are realized, then a primary surplus is almost impossible to occur without sharp increases in tax rates and fast economic growth. Second, the rate of growth of output will affect the tax base and therefore the outcome on the primary balance. The higher is the growth rate of output, the less difficult it is to obtain a primary surplus. Finally, raising the consumption tax rate in one step, rather than a gradual approach, leads to a primary balance earlier than otherwise and also makes the outcome a bit less dependent on the growth rate of output. We emphasize that the fiscal policy experiments are conducted in a general equilibrium model that takes into account the optimal response of the private sector to the tax increase and the related changes in the factor prices and their consequences on the government’s budget.

There is a large literature that studies the fiscal challenges faced by Japan.\textsuperscript{4} Most of this

\textsuperscript{2}For other interesting applications of the standard growth model to international recessions, see Kehoe and Prescott (2002).

\textsuperscript{3}We conduct a sensitivity analysis that relaxes the assumption of perfect foresight in a particular way. Our results turn out to be robust. Others in this literature have tried stochastic simulations instead of perfect foresight ones and the quantitative findings were very similar.

\textsuperscript{4}For example, Enomoto and Iwamoto (2008) estimate that the economic slowdown during the lost decade
research tries to evaluate the effects of social security reform. Some also study the role of government debt in the economy. Since there is no established theory of government debt, economists typically take the view that debt levels larger than what we have experienced in the past appear unsustainable. As a result, economic models are used to assess the impact on the economy from different levels of government debt, sometimes taking into account the transitional cost of reducing the debt to output ratio to ‘historical’ levels. Ihori, Kato, Kawade, and Bessho (2006) and Kotlikoff (2006) present simulations using general equilibrium, overlapping generations models to study the impact of aging and a large government debt on the Japanese economy. The focus of these papers is the long run, although they do calculate transitional paths. In contrast, our contribution is the use of the workhorse macro model as a simple way of producing ‘back-of-the-envelope’ calculations with a short-run focus that might provide insights for fiscal policy in the short-term.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Japanese fiscal conditions. Section 3 contains the model used in the paper. Measurement and calibration are discussed in Section 4. Numerical results are presented in Section 5 and concluding remarks are in Section 6.

2 Japanese Fiscal Conditions

According to ‘Current Japanese Fiscal Conditions and Issues to be Considered: 2008’, Ministry of Finance, successive Japanese governments have been working to restore fiscal balance by reforming both expenditures and revenues. The roadmap and targets of fiscal consolidation has three stages:

- Phase I (FY2001-FY2006): Reforms by the Koizumi Cabinet.
- Phase II (FY2007-early 2010s): Achieve primary surplus by 2011.
- Phase III (early 2010s-mid-2010s): Maintain primary surplus and start reducing debt/GDP.

An international comparison of the recent budget deficits of Japan and other OECD countries is given in Figure (3) below. Over the last decade or so, Japan has run much larger budget deficits than other developed countries, mostly due its aggressive fiscal expansions with the stated goal of stimulating the economy. In particular, Japanese fiscal authorities have added massive debt in the period from 1995 to 2005 and have added smaller amounts after 2005 until the recent financial crises and recession.

---

created an increase in the debt to GDP ratio by 26 points.
At the end of 2008, the government estimated that ¥16.5 trillion would be needed to achieve their target. Planned cuts in expenditures were between ¥11.4 to ¥14.3 trillion. This left about ¥2.2 to ¥5.1 trillion to be financed via an additional consumption tax. As of July 2010, there is a new fiscal authority in Japan, with a slightly different fiscal outlook. According to the highlights of the budget for 2010 published in December 2009, transfer payments (social security in particular) are expected to increase with a slight decline in government purchases. Our benchmark simulations will take into account these most recent fiscal plans and experiment with alternative fiscal paths as part of our sensitivity analysis.

3 The Standard Neoclassical Growth Model

The neoclassical growth model has been the workhorse of macroeconomics. It has been quite useful in explaining how economies evolve dynamically in response to shocks and policy. For example, Hayashi and Prescott (2002) use the standard theory to provide some insight into the lost decade of Japan. They argue that the decline in the workweek in the 1990s and the slowdown in the Japanese total factor productivity have been responsible for the drawn-out stagnation of real output. Chen, İmrohoroğlu, and İmrohoroğlu (2006, 2007) and Braun,
Ikeda, and Joines (2009) examine the factors responsible for the decline in the Japanese saving rate and argue that the secular decline in the TFP growth rate seems quantitatively important. More recently, Chen, İmrohoroglu, and İmrohoroglu (2009) analyze the secular decline in the U.S. current account balance and attribute it to the decline in the relative growth rates of TFP in the U.S. and its major trading partners.

This research suggests that the standard growth theory can be a valuable guide for government policy as it seems to be a useful measuring device. In this class of models, economic agents take into account the environment they are operating in such as the demographic structure, production technology, government’s policy and factor prices, and make informed choices for consumption, saving, and labor supply. When there is a change in government policy, they re-optimize and respond to the change in their environment in an optimal manner. After the benchmark model is characterized and its properties studied, this research conducts counterfactual policy experiments to provide some insight into the likely effects of different government policies.

3.1 Household’s Problem

The model economy is the standard growth theory under complete markets, which has been the workhorse of macroeconomics over the last three decades. A representative household with $N_t$ working-age members at date $t$, solves

$$\max_{\beta} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t N_t \log c_t$$

subject to

$$(1 + \tau_{c,t})C_t + K_{t+1} \leq [1 + (1 - \tau_{k,t})(\tau_t - \delta_t)]K_t + (1 - \tau_{h,t})w_t H_t + TR_t - N_t r_t + N_t \pi_t^p,$$

where $c_t = C_t/N_t$ is consumption per household member, $h_t = H_t/N_t$ is the fraction of hours worked per member of the household, $\beta$ is the subjective discount factor, $H_t$ is total hours worked by all working-age members of the household, $\tau_{h,t}$ and $\tau_{k,t}$ are tax rates on labor and capital income, respectively, at time $t$, $\tau_{c,t}$ is the consumption tax rate, $\tau_t$ is a per-capita lump-sum indirect tax distinct from the consumption tax, $w_t$ is the real wage, $TR_t$ is aggregate government transfers, $\pi_t^p$ is the per-member primary balance, $r_t$ is the rental rate of capital, and $\delta_t$ is the time-$t$ depreciation rate.\(^5\) Beginning of period $t$ assets are denoted by $K_t$. The size of the household evolves over time exogenously at the rate $n_t = N_t/N_{t-1}$. It is assumed that the representative household receives the interest earnings on the government debt. In addition, markets are complete.

\(^5\)When we refer to economy-wide aggregate quantities, we will use upper case letters.
3.2 Firm’s Problem

There is a representative firm with access to a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production function given by

\[ Y_t = A_t K_t^\theta H_t^{1-\theta}, \]

where \( \theta \) is the income share of capital and \( A_t \) is total factor productivity, which grows exogenously at the rate \( g_t = A_t / A_{t-1} \). Aggregate capital stock follows the law of motion

\[ K_{t+1} = (1 - \delta_t) K_t + X_t, \tag{1} \]

where \( X_t \) is gross investment at period \( t \), and \( \delta_t \) is the rate of depreciation of capital at time \( t \).

The stand-in firm maximizes its profits by choosing capital and labor. This produces the usual equilibrium conditions that equate factor prices to their marginal productivities.

3.3 Government Budget

There is a government that taxes consumption and income from labor and capital (net of depreciation) and uses the proceeds to finance exogenous streams of government purchases \( G_t \) and government transfer payments \( TR_t \). The (per-capita) budget balance \( \pi^b_t \) and primary balance \( \pi^p_t \) are defined implicitly as follows.

\[ G_t + TR_t + I_t = \tau_{h,t} w_t H_t + \tau_{k,t}(r_t - \delta_t) K_t + \tau_{c,t} C_t + N_t \tau_t - N_t \pi^b_t, \tag{2} \]

\[ G_t + TR_t = \tau_{h,t} w_t H_t + \tau_{k,t}(r_t - \delta_t) K_t + \tau_{c,t} C_t + N_t \tau_t - N_t \pi^p_t, \tag{3} \]

where \( I_t \) represents interest payments on government debt.\(^6\)

3.4 Competitive Equilibrium

Given the government’s fiscal policy \( \{ G_t, TR_t, I_t, \tau_{h,t}, \tau_{k,t}, \tau_{c,t}, \tau_t \}_{t=0}^\infty \), a competitive equilibrium consists of an allocation \( \{ C_t, X_t, H_t, K_{t+1}, Y_t \}_{t=0}^\infty \), a budget balance \( \pi^b_t \), a primary balance \( \pi^p_t \), and prices \( \{ w_t, r_t \} \) such that

- the allocation solves household’s problem,

\(^6\)In the current paper, we assume that government debt is held by domestic residents and interest payments are paid to them. Alternatively, we can assume that debt is held by foreigners and that the interest payments provide no utility to domestic residents. In this case, it is regarded as part of \( G_t \). Our numerical results are not affected by the residency specification of government bond holders since the interest payments on debt as a ratio of GNP is very small.
• the allocation solves the firm’s profit maximization problem with factor prices given by: \( w_t = (1 - \theta)A_tK_t^\theta H_t^{-\theta} \), and \( r_t = \theta A_tK_t^{\theta-1}H_t^{1-\theta} \),

• the government budget is satisfied,

• the goods market clears: \( C_t + X_t + G_t = Y_t \).

### 3.5 Equilibrium Conditions

The equilibrium conditions of the model can be combined and summarized in two equations below:

\[
\frac{(1 + \tau_{c,t+1})C_{t+1}}{N_{t+1}} = \frac{(1 + \tau_{c,t})C_t}{N_t} \beta \left\{ 1 + (1 - \tau_{k,t+1}) \left[ \theta A_{t+1}K_{t+1}^{\theta-1}H_{t+1}^{1-\theta} - \delta_{t+1} \right] \right\},
\]

\[
K_{t+1} = (1 - \delta_t)K_t + A_tK_t^{\theta}H_t^{1-\theta} - C_t - G_t.
\]

We consider a transition from given initial conditions to a balanced growth path at which per capita aggregate variables grow at the rate \( g_{t}^{1/(1-\theta)} \). For an aggregate variable \( z_t \), its detrended version is given by: \( \tilde{z}_t = z_t/A_t^{1/(1-\theta)} \). Applying this change of variables to (4) and (5), we obtain equations

\[
\tilde{c}_{t+1} = \frac{(1 + \tau_{c,t})}{(1 + \tau_{c,t+1})} \frac{\tilde{c}_t}{g_{t+1}} \beta \left\{ 1 + (1 - \tau_{k,t+1}) \left[ \theta x_{t+1}^{\theta-1} - \delta_{t+1} \right] \right\},
\]

\[
\tilde{k}_{t+1} = \frac{1}{g_{t+1} n_{t+1}} \left[ \left(1 - \delta_t\right) + (1 - \psi_t)x_t^{\theta-1} \right] \tilde{k}_t - \tilde{c}_t,
\]

where \( \psi_t \) is the ratio of government purchases to output, \( G_t/Y_t \), and \( x_t \) is detrended capital-labor ratio, \( (K_t/H_t)/A_t^{1/(1-\theta)} \).

Setting \( \tilde{z}_t = \tilde{z} \) for all \( t \), the steady-state for the model can be calculated by solving two equations

\[
1 = \frac{1}{g_{t}^{1/(1-\theta)}} \beta \left\{ 1 + (1 - \bar{\tau}_k) \left[ \theta x_{t}^{\theta-1} - \bar{\delta} \right] \right\},
\]

\[
\bar{k} = \frac{1}{g_{t}^{1/(1-\theta)n}} \left[ \left(1 - \tilde{\delta}\right) + (1 - \bar{\psi})x_t^{\theta-1} \right] \bar{k} - \tilde{c},
\]

which deliver the steady-state values of detrended capital and consumption where \( \bar{\tau}, \bar{\tau}_h, \) and \( \bar{\tau}_k \) are the steady-state depreciation rate, labor income tax rate and capital income tax rate, respectively.
4 Measurement and Calibration

In order for us to make predictions about the fiscal position of Japan in the near future, we want our model economy to generate aggregate behavior and fiscal outcomes that resemble their counterparts in the Japanese economy. First, we make adjustments to observed macro-economic aggregates so that data accounts are in line with our model accounts. Second, we make adjustments to government accounts and bring them closer to what a government does in the standard growth model. Third, we calibrate our model economy to generate certain targets from the Japanese economy. Below, we will describe these calibration issues.

4.1 Adjustments to National Accounts

In standard growth theory, government consumption and investment are expensed. Therefore, consumption in the model is the sum of private consumption and government purchases of goods and services for both consumption and investment purposes. Following Hayashi and Prescott (2002), Japanese national accounts are updated to include annual data on macro-economic indicators including those in 2009.

4.2 Adjustment to Government Accounts

This subsection describes how the General Government Accounts are arranged so that the government accounts in the data are in line with those in the model. In particular, itemized government revenues will be sorted out so they correspond to income from consumption and factor income taxation in the model. In addition, government spending items will be categorized. The aim is to have primary and budget balances in the data and model to align conceptually. The ultimate goal of the paper is to quantify how close the standard growth theory comes in generating observed budget balance figures and to use the model to deliver short run predictions on both the government accounts and national accounts.

4.2.1 Consumption Tax Revenue

- Consumption tax revenue in the model is given by

\[ \tau_{c,t} C_t. \]  

- Consumption tax revenue in the Japanese data corresponds to

\[ \text{Value added taxes (VAT)}. \]
4.2.2 Income Tax Revenue

- Factor income tax revenue in the model is given by

\[ \tau_{h,t} (1 - \theta) Y_t + \tau_{k,t} (\theta Y_t - \delta_t K_t) \]  \hspace{1cm} (8)

- In the data, this corresponds to the sum of four items:

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
\text{direct tax on nonfinancials, direct tax on financials,} \\
\text{direct tax on households, social security tax (gross)}
\end{pmatrix}
\]  \hspace{1cm} (9)

4.2.3 Budget Balance

- As we saw above, budget balance in the model is given by

\[ \tau_{c,t} C_t + \tau_{h,t} (1 - \theta) Y_t + \tau_{k,t} (\theta Y_t - \delta_t K_t) + N_t \tau_t - TR_t - G_t - I_t. \]

In Sections 5 and 6, primary balance figures compare “\((6) + (8) + N_t \tau_t - TR_t - G_t\)” (model) and “\((7) + (9) + N_t \tau_t - TR_t - G_t\)” (data), where variables \(TR_t\) and \(G_t\) are the series constructed from the data, according to the methodology provided below.

- Indirect tax revenue other than consumption tax, \(N_t \tau_t\), is calculated as the sum of the following items:

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
\text{+ Import duties} \\
\text{+ Others} \\
\text{+ Other taxes on production} \\
\text{− Subsidies, payable} \\
\text{− Capital transfers, payable} \\
\text{+ Capital transfers, receivable}
\end{pmatrix}
\]

- Transfer payments, \(TR_t\), are calculated as the sum of the following items:

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
\text{+ Social benefits other than social transfers in kind, payable} \\
\text{+ Other current transfers, payable} \\
\text{− Other current transfers, receivable}
\end{pmatrix}
\]
– Interest payments on government debt, \( I_t \), are calculated as the sum of the following items:

\[
\text{Property income, payable} - \text{Property income, receivable}
\]

– Government purchases of goods and services, \( G_t \), are calculated as the sum of the following items: ⁷:

\[
\begin{align*}
+ & \text{Final consumption expenditure} \\
+ & \text{Gross fixed capital formation} \\
- & \text{Consumption of fixed capital}
\end{align*}
\]

4.3 **Calibration of the Model**

The goal of calibrating the model is to place the economic agents in an environment to produce economic behavior similar to that of the Japanese economy. The starting point for the analysis is 1981 which is the first year when national accounts are reported using a consistent set of definitions. The last period for which we have data for some of the variables is 2008. Therefore, the model will take observed inputs as given for the 1981-2008 period, and some values for 2009, and will make assumption about the values of these exogenous input for 2009 and beyond. A steady state is assumed to be reached far into the future so that we have a two-point boundary problem, starting with given initial conditions in 1981, and ending at a steady state far into the future. Following Hayashi and Prescott (2002), we use a shooting algorithm to calculate an equilibrium transition path that connects these two boundary points. Since the steady state is reached far into the future, our assumptions about that steady state will have minimal effect on the immediate future along the transition path.

The following three subsections will present the calibration choices in detail. First, there are two parameters that are constant throughout the analysis. Second, there are exogenous inputs for which we have direct observations. And, third, assumptions need to be made for the values of these exogenous inputs for 2009 and beyond.

4.3.1 **Constant Parameters and Steady-State Calibration**

Table 1 shows the calibrated values of these and other parameters in the steady-state. The two parameters \( \theta \) and \( \beta \) are invariant throughout our analysis. Following Hayashi and Prescott (2002), we use the sample average for the income share of capital \( \theta \) in GNP from

---

⁷In our model, the government purchase of goods and services does not contain “Changes in inventories” and “Purchases of land, net” that are included in SNA. In the simulation, we add the actual values of these two series to both model and data so that budget balance and primary balance are consistent with those based on SNA.
1981 to 2008. The steady-state capital output ratio target is 2.0, which requires us to take a value of 0.97 for $\beta$. For $\delta$, we also follow Hayashi and Prescott (2002) and obtain a value of 0.08. We use a TFP growth rate of 2% and population growth rate of 0% in the steady state which is assumed to be reached far into the future and therefore does not affect our short-term predictions. These choices are summarized below.

| Table 1: Calibration in the Steady State |
|-----------------|-----------------|
| $\beta$         | 0.97            |
| $\theta$        | 0.377           |
| $\delta$        | 0.08            |
| $g - 1$         | 0.02            |
| $n - 1$         | 0.0             |
| $\tau_k$        | 0.398           |
| $\tau_h$        | 0.298           |
| $G/Y$           | 0.25            |
| Subjective Discount Factor | Output Share of Capital |
| Depreciation Rate | TFP Growth Rate |
| Population Growth Rate | Capital Income Tax Rate |
| Labor Income Tax Rate | Ratio of Government Purchases to GNP |

The parameters for fiscal policy for the steady state are chosen to equal their recent sample averages. This is discussed in more detail next.

4.3.2 Inputs for 1981-2008 and beyond

We start from given initial conditions in 1981 for two reasons. First, starting from an earlier year such as 1960, yields similar results for the period we are interested in. Second, and more important, national accounts are available in a consistent manner only from 1981. From 1981 until 2008, we use the observed values for the following exogenous variables: 

$\{G_l/Y_l, T R_l/Y_l, I_l/Y_l, \tau_{h,t}, \tau_{k,t}, \tau_{c,t}, \tau_{l,t}, \delta_t, N_t, n_t, H_t\}_{t=1981}^{2008}$

The main reason our data stop with year 2008 is the lack of data on the government’s budget and the tax rates. For 2009, we are able to use actual data for the growth rates of TFP and population, the share of government purchases in GNP, total hours worked, real GNP, real consumption expenditures and real investment expenditures. A detailed list of assumptions for various exogenous variables is given below.

- $\{G_l/Y_l, T R_l/Y_l\}_{t=1981}^{2008}$: Government purchases of goods and services and transfer payments, relative to GNP, are taken from the Japanese government and national accounts as described in the previous section. The data on $G_l/Y_l$ and $T R_l/Y_l$ for 2009 are approximated from the publicly available but preliminary data.\(^8\) For $G_l/Y_l$ in 2009 and

\(^8\)To construct $G_l$ for 2009, we extrapolate “Gross Fixed Capital Formation” by the growth rate of “Public
beyond, we set different time paths for each component of $G_t$, depending on its characteristics. The ratios of “Gross Fixed Capital Formation,” “Individual consumption expenditure,” and, “Transfers of individual non-market goods and services” to GNP are assumed to linearly increase to their respective sample averages from 1999 to 2008 in year 2050 and to remain constant at these 2050 levels forever. “Social transfers in kind, payable,” is assumed to linearly converge to 12% of GNP in year 2050, following the projections of Fukawa and Sato (2009), and to stay constant onward. Note that these expenditures are mainly for national health insurance which are age-independent plus the long term care for the elderly. As a result, $G_t/Y_t$ is assumed to converge from 20% in 2009 to 25% by 2050. $TR_t/Y_t$ is assumed to linearly converge from 13.5% in 2009 to 18% in year 2050 where we again rely on the estimates of Fukawa and Sato (2009). Note that the increase in the ratio of transfer payments to GNP represents the expected increase in total pension payments relative to the size of the economy. We assume that both items of government expenditures to GNP ratios stay constant after 2050. These projections introduce the fiscal pressures due to the expected aging of the Japanese population into our simple growth model. In Section 6.2, a sensitivity analysis will allow alternative paths for both purchases and transfer payments. In particular, we will explore the effects of “prudent” and “imprudent” policies that deviate by ±3 percentage points from the above benchmark ratios of 18% and 25% (for the year 2050) for $TR/Y$ and $G/Y$, respectively.

Figures (4) and (5) describe the benchmark paths of government expenditures, including the assumptions about their out-of-sample values.

\footnote{Investment” from 2008 to 2009. We assume that “Consumption of fixed capital” of 2009 equals that of 2008. We then add the two extended series to “Final consumption expenditure” of 2009.}
Figure 4: Population, Transfer Payments, Interest on Debt, and Government Purchases
\begin{itemize}
\item \{\delta_t, g_t, N_t, H_t\}_{t=1981}^{2008} : For the last three exogenous variables, 2009 values are available and used in the simulations. For the rate of depreciation of capital, \(\delta_t\), we set it equal to the value in 2008 for 2009 and onward. We extend \(N_t\) from 2010 to 2050 based on the medium-fertility and medium-mortality population projections made by the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, and assume that population remains unchanged after 2050. We set \(H_t\) equal to the average from 1999 to 2009 for year 2010 and onward. Our TFP is calculated as \(A_t = Y_t/K^\theta_t (H_t)^{1-\theta}\). The growth rate of TFP, \(g_t = A_t/A_{t-1}\) is a key exogenous variable that influences the growth of the tax base and therefore the size of the additional consumption tax needed to attain a primary surplus. The benchmark simulation assumes that the growth rate of TFP is 1\% for each year between 2010 and 2028, and that it then rises to 2\% and stays at this steady-state value forever. Since the paper focuses on the impact of fiscal policy on the Japanese macroeconomy, in the short term, this assumption about the steady-state growth rate will have little quantitative effect on the model’s predictions for the next ten years. However, our assumptions on the growth rate of TFP from
\end{itemize}
2010 through 2028 may have some implications on the size of the tax base. Therefore
we will also report the results of fiscal policies under two alternative assumptions on
the growth rate of TFP. In the ‘pessimistic’ case, the growth rate of TFP is zero for
the next 20 years. In the ‘optimistic’ case, TFP grows at 2% annually. In both cases,
TFP growth rate takes on its long run value of 2% in 2029 and beyond. Note that our
growth rate assumptions are on the conservative side. In Section 6.2 we will consider
the quantitative effects of a 3% rate of growth of TFP. Table 2 below summarizes the
assumptions on TFP growth rates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$g_t - 1$</th>
<th>TFP Growth Rate</th>
<th>0% for $2010 \leq t \leq 2028$</th>
<th>pessimistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TFP Growth Rate</td>
<td>1% for $2010 \leq t \leq 2028$</td>
<td>benchmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TFP Growth Rate</td>
<td>2% for $2010 \leq t \leq 2028$</td>
<td>optimistic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- $\{\tau_{h,t}, \tau_{k,t}\}_{t=1981}^{2006}$: The labor income tax rate series is an updated version of that cal-
culated by Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994). They use national accounts and gov-
ernment revenue statistics for large industrial countries to compute annual time series
of effective tax rates on factor incomes. The last year for which this tax data set is
updated is 2006, and we assume that $\tau_{h,2006} = 0.298$ for all years after 2006. The
capital income tax rate is constructed according to the methodology in Hayashi and
Prescott (2002). The last year for which we can construct this tax rate is 2008 and
we assume that $\tau_{k,2008} = 0.398$ remains unchanged forever. This way, we can trace
any changes in the model’s accounts to our assumptions on the consumption tax rate,
government expenditures and TFP growth rates.

- $\{\tau_{c,t}\}_{t=1981}^{2008}$ The consumption tax in the model is assumed to rise from zero to 3% in
1989, and to 5% in 1997. In the data, there are taxes that are typically classified as
consumption taxes such as import and excise taxes that existed before 1989. In the
model and data, we classify these as non-consumption (lump-sum) taxes so that we can
consider on the more recent and targeted consumption taxes. In the steady-state,
we assume that the consumption tax rate is 15% unless ‘do-nothing policy’ is employed
and 5% if ‘do-nothing’ policy is maintained. Since the steady-state is reached in the
far distant future, this assumption has no quantitative impact on our predictions in
the short run.

These three tax rates are displayed in Figure (6).
Figure (6) indicates a secular decrease in the tax on capital income (with a recent increase) and a slight and gradual increase in the labor income tax rate. The consumption tax rate follows a step function described above. Note that some categories of entities and goods may be exempt from taxes. Since the tax rates faced by the representative agent in the model are calculated from different sources, they will not produce model accounts that come close to the observed government accounts. As a result, an adjustment is necessary so that the tax revenues in the model and those in the data are reasonably aligned. For each time period $t$, we multiply the tax rate on consumption by a correction factor of 0.9, and the tax rates on labor and capital income are multiplied by constants 0.8 and 0.85, respectively. Note that this is only a level adjustment and aims to align the government accounts in the model and the data.

5 Quantitative Findings

This section presents the main numerical results. First, the simulations of the benchmark model under the assumption of continued fiscal policy of 5% consumption tax are displayed
and then two counterfactual experiments are conducted that target a positive primary balance in the budget.

5.1 Benchmark Results

Figure (7) displays consumption, investment, output and the capital-output ratio in the data and in the benchmark model where the consumption tax is assumed to remain at 5% for a long time until the economy reaches a steady-state when it becomes 15%.

Despite its simplicity, the standard growth model captures the salient movements in the national accounts, as Figure (7) indicates. The lower frequency movements in the model fit very well, consistent with the findings of Chen, İmrohoğlu, and İmrohoğlu (2006). Note that the calibrated model uses labor and capital income tax rates that are calculated using slightly different methodologies, and despite this difficulty the model performs very well in generating macroeconomic aggregates that are close to their data counterparts. The discrepancy between the model and the data is largest over the last few years, especially in investment and output, and therefore the capital-output ratio.

Figure (8) presents the government accounts in the model and the data. Here, the fit of the model and data accounts for government balances is quite remarkable. Over the entire
‘sample’ period of 1981-2008, the model economy seems to generate economic behavior that delivers a primary balance that is very close to that in the data. In other words, our simple growth model generates reasonable observations on government accounts and therefore it can provide some guidance to policy choices faced by the Japanese fiscal authority.

![Graphs showing tax revenue from consumption and income taxes, budget balance, and primary balance over time](image)

**Figure 8: Benchmark Model and Government Accounts**

### 5.2 Fiscal Policy Experiments

As of the middle of 2008, the goal of the Ministry of Finance was to have a positive primary balance by 2011. Unfortunately, the recent downturn in economic activity has rendered the original goals very difficult to attain. This subsection describes two counterfactual experiments that aim to produce a positive primary balance in the near future. The first counterfactual experiment assumes that the consumption tax rate is raised from 5% by 2 percentage points each year starting in 2010, until it reaches 15% in 2014.\(^9\) In the second experiment, the consumption tax is raised in one step to 15% in 2010. Both experiments

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\(^9\)Note that the adjustment constant 0.90 is also applied to the hypothetical raised values of the consumption tax.
are conducted as part of perfect foresight equilibria and the (eventual) new level of the consumption tax rate is maintained forever.

The previous section on calibration summarized our assumptions on fiscal variables for 2009 and beyond. To reiterate, for the future paths of the remaining fiscal variables, we assume that $G_t$ and $TR_t$ evolve such that the ratios of these expenditures to GNP are consistent with those projected for the Japanese economy by Fukawa and Sato (2009). It is assumed that the ratios at 2050, 25% and 18%, respectively, remain constant for the indefinite future. The tax rates on labor and capital income, $\{\tau_{h,t}, \tau_{k,t}\}_{t=2009}^\infty$, remain constant at their assumed or calculated values in 2008.

5.2.1 Benchmark Policy: Do Nothing

Figure (9) displays the response of the economy to the benchmark policy of keeping the consumption tax rate at 5% for a long time. In each frame, three different ‘growth’ scenarios are considered. The middle curve represents the benchmark value of the growth rate of TFP at 1% over the next 20 years. In addition, we display the responses of the aggregate variables under a pessimistic TFP growth rate of 0% and an optimistic value of 2%.

Starting from 2010, the economy follows increasingly different paths depending on the assumed rate of growth of TFP. For example, there is a slight increase in investment in the short run in the benchmark case. This reflects the added incentive to save and invest with a 1% TFP growth rate which is slightly over the average TFP growth rate over the last two decades. However, given our assumption that the TFP growth rate increases to its long run value of 2% starting in 2029, investment slows down until then to take advantage of the higher returns to capital income after 2029.

With zero TFP growth rate of the pessimistic case, economic activity declines as indicated by the declines in consumption, investment and output in Figure (9). The optimistic case shows an increase in all economic aggregates.
Regarding the impact on the primary balance of ‘doing nothing’, the implications of maintaining the consumption tax rate at 5% for a long time are independent from the assumed TFP growth rate. In all scenarios for growth, the primary balance is always negative from 2009 onward. Furthermore, it gets larger in absolute value due to our assumption of projected increases in aging related expenditures in pensions, health insurance and long term care for the elderly.

Therefore, ‘doing nothing’ is not a policy option for the Japanese government if the objective is to turn a positive primary balance in the near future. Some taxes must be raised, or expenditures must be cut severely. The next subsection will explore the implications of raising the consumption tax to 15% achieve the fiscal objective.

5.2.2 Policy 1: Gradual Rise of the Consumption Tax in 5 Years to 15% by 2014

Figure (10) shows the impact of a gradual 2-percentage point per year increase in the consumption tax, starting in 2010. Under this counterfactual experiment, the tax on consumption becomes 15% in year 2014 and remains at this level forever.

Under both the benchmark TFP growth rate of 1% and the optimistic growth rate of
2% over the next 20 years, the primary balance temporarily turns positive, but eventually becomes (increasingly) negative. With zero TFP growth rate, the primary balance is never positive. Put differently, even a reasonable growth rate of 2% over the next 20 years is not sufficient to permanently enlarge the tax base to deliver persistent primary surpluses, despite a gradual increase in the consumption tax rate to 15% in five years. Indeed, the primary surplus in this case is very short lived.

![Graphs showing consumption, investment, real GNP, and primary balance over GNP.](image)

Figure 10: Gradual Increase in Consumption Tax to 15%

### 5.2.3 Policy 2: Sudden Rise in the Consumption Tax Rate to 15% in 2010

Figure 11 shows the results of model simulations when the consumption tax is raised in one step in 2010 from 5% to 15%. Similar to our previous experiments, this policy change is also perfectly anticipated by economic agents.
Figure 11: Sudden Increase in Consumption Tax to 15%

According to Figure (11), a primary surplus can be obtained in 2010 easily if the consumption tax is raised in one step, regardless of the TFP growth rate. The scope for achieving a primary surplus is clearly larger with a sudden increase in the consumption tax rate. However, in any case, the primary balance becomes negative again very quickly. For the 1% growth case, primary balance is positive for only a few years, and for the 2% growth rate case, it is positive for about 7 years.

There is very little difference in the way the economy responds to the gradual versus the sudden increase in the consumption tax since the agents face complete markets and perfect foresight. As a result, the consumption tax base behaves quite similarly across these two fiscal policies. However, the government accounts improve more quickly, almost immediately, when the consumption tax rate is raised in one shot, whereas it improves very gradually, if at all, and is subject more to the additional effect of economic growth when the tax is raised gradually.

The take-away from the first two experiments is that even a 10-percentage point increase in the consumption tax rate, from 5% to 15%, is insufficient to yield a consistent stream of positive primary balances under the benchmark assumptions on government expenditures. There are three possible avenues for a more persistent improvement in government accounts:
i) economic growth faster than 2%, ii) containment of government expenditures with possible reductions in purchases or social security, and, iii) a larger tax increase. We consider some of these experiments in the next section.

6 Sensitivity Analysis

In this section, we explore the sensitivity of our results to various assumptions made in the previous analysis. First, we study a simple form of uncertainty in the counterfactual experiments. Next, we study the impact of other assumptions on government purchases and transfer payments on the outcome of the fiscal experiments.

6.1 Surprise TFP Growth Rates After 2009

In our policy experiments, the agents are assumed to have perfect foresight about the TFP growth rates for 2010 and beyond. In this subsection, we study if our assumption of perfect foresight is critical for the results. In particular, we now assume that the agents think that the TFP growth rate will be 1% in 2010 and beyond, act accordingly starting from 1981, but then are surprised to find a different TFP growth rate for 2010 and beyond. We consider two separate experiments; they find out in 2009 that the growth rate is either 0% or 2%. Figures (12)-(13) display the results of these experiments.
Figure 12: Aggregates with a Surprise TFP Growth Rate in 2009 and After

In terms of the behavior of the national accounts, this economy is very similar to the benchmark economy. Figure (12) shows that the fit of the model under a surprise change in the TFP growth rate in 2009 is very similar to that of the perfect foresight case.

Even the government accounts behave quite the same, as Figure (13) indicates.
In terms of the impact on policy, there are no differences, as depicted by Figure (14). If the Japanese government does not change the consumption tax rate from its current level of 5%, a primary balance is never achieved, regardless of the assumed TFP growth rate for 2010 and beyond.
Figure 14: No Change in Consumption Tax

Figures (15) and (16) replicate the two tax experiments in this non-perfect foresight environment. Once again, the results are nearly identical to the benchmark case of perfect foresight.
Figure 15: Gradual Increase in Consumption Tax to 15%
As a result, we conclude that our perfect foresight assumption regarding the TFP growth rate has no influence on the quantitative findings. This is consistent with a number of similar findings in the related literature.

### 6.2 Alternative Assumptions on $G_t$ and $TR_t$

In an evaluation of how tax policy affects the primary balance, assumptions on future government purchases and transfer payments, in addition to assumptions on growth that affect the tax base, are critical. In our previous results, we maintained the assumption that both the government purchases to GNP ratio and transfer payments to GNP ratio rise according to the estimates provided by Fukawa and Sato (2009). Briefly, these expenditure items are assumed to rise from their 2008 values of around 20% and 14% to 25% and 18%, respectively, by 2050. Note that these projected increases in government expenditures are due to the aging of the Japanese population and the resulting additional expenditures for retirement benefits, health expenditures and long term care for the elderly.

In the next set of experiments, two alternatives will be considered to these benchmark assumptions:
• A ‘prudent’ fiscal policy in which the eventual targets for these expenditure items are lower by 3 percentage points, relative to the benchmark case, with $G/Y$ and $TR/Y$ ending up at 22% and 15% by 2050.

• An ‘imprudent’ fiscal policy in which the eventual targets for these expenditure items are higher by 3 percentage points, relative to the benchmark case, with $G/Y$ and $TR/Y$ ending up at 28% and 21% by 2050.

In both cases, as in the benchmark case, the paths for fiscal policy variables linearly rise from the 2008 levels to the assumed 2050 levels.

![Graph showing the time paths of $G/Y$ and $TR/Y$ under different fiscal policies](image)

Figure 17: Alternative Assumptions on Government Expenditures

Figure (17) displays the time paths of the ratios of transfer payments and government purchases to GNP under the benchmark assumptions as well as the two alternatives described above. In the figures and tables below, we will display the effects of counterfactual consumption tax increases on the national accounts and on the primary balance under each expenditure scenario. In addition, we will present the quantitative results for growth rates that are more typical of the post World War II Japanese economy.
Figure 18: No Change in the Consumption Tax (5%)

Figure (18) depicts the results of ‘doing nothing’, just maintaining the consumption tax at the current 5% level. Under this benchmark policy, even if the ‘prudent’ fiscal policy of 22% and 15% for $G/Y$ and $TR/Y$ are realized along the path from 2009 to 2050, the primary balance is never positive. Furthermore, under a more ‘imprudent’ expenditure scenario of 28% and 21% for the expenditure ratios, the primary balance is increasingly negative toward unprecedented levels. As in the original case, some tax must be raised if the government wants to turn a positive primary balance in the face of uncontrolled expenditures.
Figure (19) displays the findings of a gradual increase in the consumption tax to 15% in 2014, starting in 2010. The benchmark assumption replicates the earlier results. The primary balance temporarily turns positive only for a few years but quickly becomes negative and continues to worsen. With the imprudent expenditure scenario, the primary balance never becomes positive despite the additional 10% consumption tax. Only with the prudent expenditure policy does the primary balance sustain a positive value for at least two decades. Even under these conditions, however, the primary balance is trending down and will eventually turn negative once again.
Figure 20: Sudden Increase in the Consumption Tax to 15%

When the consumption tax is raised in one step, from 5% to 15%, the primary balance becomes positive immediately, as Figure (20) shows. Despite this quick response, the behavior of the primary balance after this initial development is entirely dependent on the assumed paths for government expenditures. Similar to the case of a gradual increase in the consumption tax, the primary balance deteriorates, and the rate of worsening is faster with the imprudent policy. These counterfactual experiments indicate the critical role of the Japanese government’s expenditures in controlling the future path of its budget. Although this point is qualitatively obvious, it is the quantitative nature of our experiments that emphasizes to degree to which this statement is valid.

Would faster economic growth help achieve a primary balance and possibly maintain it for a long period of time? To address this question, we repeat the above experiments using TFP growth rates of 2% and 3%, in addition to the benchmark value of 1%, for all three government expenditure assumptions.

Tables 3-5 present the results under the two alternative government spending assumptions, together with the benchmark fiscal policy assumptions. These tables take successively higher TFP growth rates into account to see how growth interacts with various expenditure
assumptions. Note that in the tables below, we report the first year that the primary balance turns positive. A ‘−’ sign indicates that the primary balance remains negative throughout the ‘forecast’ period of 2009-2028. A second year inside the parentheses indicates that the primary balance turn negative again in that year and remains negative throughout.

According to Table 3, under the benchmark TFP growth rate assumption of 1% and under the ‘do-nothing’ policy of keeping the consumption tax at 5%, a primary surplus is never obtained. In other words, even under a prudent fiscal policy that achieves 3% lower ratios of government purchases and transfer payments to GNP by 2050, which goes against the projections of economists, a rise in the consumption tax seems necessary to achieve a primary surplus.

A gradual or a sudden rise in the consumption tax to 15% delivers a positive primary balance under all of the fiscal assumptions. However, these gains are temporary. In the imprudent policy case, even a gradual rise in the consumption tax does not deliver a positive primary balance. With a gradual policy, the primary balance eventually turns negative even with prudent expenditure policy. With a sudden rise in the consumption tax to 15%, gains are temporary; three to five years under the benchmark and imprudent expenditure policies, and about 24 years under the prudent policy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3: First Year Primary Balance Becomes Positive, γ = 1.01</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do Nothing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gradual Increase</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tables 4 and 5 take increasingly optimistic views on the growth rate of TFP which determines the pace with which the tax base will grow. The message in these tables is similar to that given above. However, faster economic growth certainly raises the tax base and helps the government achieve a primary surplus faster or maintain it longer. For example, with a 2% TFP growth rate, an increase in the consumption tax rate, gradual or sudden, generates a primary surplus under both the benchmark and prudent fiscal policies. Even under the imprudent fiscal policy, the primary surplus is maintained for a few years if the consumption tax rate is raised in one step. In all cases, the primary balance does deteriorate over time and eventually turns negative, emphasizing the importance of further fiscal discipline.
Table 4: First Year Primary Balance Becomes Positive, $\gamma = 1.02$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Prudent Policy</th>
<th>Benchmark Policy</th>
<th>Imprudent Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do Nothing</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gradual Increase</td>
<td>2013 (2036)</td>
<td>2013 (2018)</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 presents the numerical results of the same counterfactual experiments under the more optimistic TFP growth rate assumption of 3%. As before, a primary surplus is never achieved under the ‘do-nothing’ policy. Is higher economic growth critical in correcting the fiscal imbalance? Would growth-promoting policies pay dividends in the future? According to Table 5, slowing down the growth of government expenditures is far more important.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Prudent Policy</th>
<th>Benchmark Policy</th>
<th>Imprudent Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do Nothing</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This subsection has demonstrated the importance of containing government purchases and transfer payments as well as faster economic growth in producing a positive primary balance. If one takes the view that the government expenditures are mostly dictated by the projected aging of the Japanese population and therefore difficult to contain, then the fiscal authority is faced with the difficult task of either raising the consumption tax beyond 15% or implementing an increase in the labor income tax rate, unless the performance of the Japanese economy improves significantly. Of course, any increase in the labor income tax rate would have some distortionary consequences and harm economic growth, making the task of achieving a primary surplus that much more difficult.

### 6.3 Surprise Increases in the Consumption Tax rate

In order to study the role of our perfect foresight assumption regarding the increase in the consumption tax rate, this section presents the results from an experiment in which individuals are surprised by a tax increase announcement in 2009. In the experiment with a gradual increase, the government makes an unexpected announcement in 2009 that the consumption tax rate will be raised in 2010 by 2 percentage points and this raise will be replicated each year until it reaches 15% by 2014. In the alternative experiment, the government announces
in 2009 that the consumption tax will be increased from 5% to 15% in one step in 2010. In all cases, we use the benchmark assumptions on the growth of government expenditures.

Figure 21: Surprise Increase in Consumption Tax to 15%

Figure (21) shows that a primary surplus is achieved more quickly if the tax rate is raised in one step, but the primary balance worsens very quickly. By about 2016, the government is back to having a negative primary balance. These results are very similar to those in the perfect foresight case in which a primary surplus is never obtained in the ‘do-nothing’ rise case, and it is achieved only temporarily in the case of a rise in the consumption tax.

7 Conclusions

The Japanese government responded to the ‘lost decade’ in part by significantly increasing its spending and thereby raising its debt to output ratio to the highest level among advanced economies. This raised concerns about further fiscal issues and recent research has focused on the effects of fiscal policy on the Japanese economy and on the government’s primary balance.
This paper uses the standard growth model to measure the impact of a menu of fiscal policy choices available to the government on Japanese national and government accounts. The model is a general equilibrium model with complete markets and perfect foresight. A representative household and a stand-in firm take factor prices, demographics, and government expenditure and taxation policies as given, and maximize their objective functions with respect to their budget constraints. The government finances its exogenous spending with taxes on factor incomes and consumption.

Our quantitative findings suggest that the most important factor in obtaining a primary surplus in the near future and in maintaining it for many years is fiscal reform. The fiscal authority has to contain future government purchases and transfer payments. As a second factor, improved performance of the Japanese macroeconomy through faster productivity growth is also important. Put differently, increases in the tax base through economic growth will enable the Japanese government to reach a primary surplus sooner but in order to make these gains permanent, the government needs to slow down the growth of expenditures. In particular, projected increases in social security expenditures, driven by the aging of the society, point to a serious issue if the goal of policy is to reverse the recent trend of primary deficits that add to the already high public debt.

Our quantitative results are obtained in the most basic growth model that abstracts from potentially important economic factors. Allowing for endogenous labor and considering a wider array of fiscal policy choices are clearly desirable. These and other important extensions are left for future research.
References


