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Abstract

One of the purposes cited for establishing the Bank of Japan was to “facilitate finance” by promoting the nationwide integration of the regional financial markets, which until that point had been divided and functioned independently.

Nonetheless, there is still much that is unknown about Japanese financial transactions and the operations of the Bank of Japan during the Meiji Period, and we are still not sufficiently clear on what role the Bank of Japan played in the process of domestic financial market integration.

The purpose of this paper is to examine, using interest-rate data and documentary evidence of financial transactions, the role played by the Bank of Japan in the process of financial market integration in Meiji Period Japan.

The analysis finds that, from the perspective of reducing inter-regional interest-rate differences, there was indeed significant progress towards financial market integration in the latter half of the 1890s. It also finds that the Bank of Japan may have played a role in promoting financial market integration because the expansion of its networks (correspondent network with private-sector banks and branch office network) served to facilitate the movement of funds between regions through the funds transfer services it provided.

Keywords: Financial Market Integration; Payments Network; Bank of Japan; Correspondent Network Funds Transfers; Movement of Funds

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1. Introduction

It has been argued that one of the purposes for establishing the Bank of Japan was to promote the nationwide integration of the financial markets, which until that point had been divided and functioned independently. Regarding this point, Yamamura [1970] contains a quantitative analysis of interest rates in different prefectures between 1889 and 1925 and finds that there was significant progress in the integration of domestic Japanese financial markets up until about the end of the 19th century. In this regard, Tsurumi [1991] has performed a detailed documentary investigation mainly from the perspectives of payments and markets, and found that beginning around 1870 private financial institutions formed “spontaneous financial markets,” but with the establishment of the Bank of Japan in 1882, financial markets began to integrate and the Bank of Japan began to replace private financial networks. Nonetheless, there is still much that is unknown about Japanese financial transactions and the operations of the Bank of Japan during the Meiji Period, and we are still not sufficiently clear on what role the Bank of Japan played in the process of domestic financial market integration.

The purpose of this paper is to work from both the quantitative approach of Yamamura [1970] and the documentary analysis of Tsurumi [1991] to analyze from new perspectives the role of the Bank of Japan in the Meiji Period process of financial market integration. More specifically, this paper analyzes the interest-rate information that is commented upon in the descriptive sections of the Ministry of Finance’s “Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance” to expand the data analysis to the 1881-1888 period, which was not covered in Yamamura [1970] and to examine from the perspectives of both the interest-rate data and documentary evidence on financial transactions the role that the expanding Bank of Japan network played in facilitating inter-regional payments and alleviating the regional disadvantage in funding. In doing this, I consider the Bank of Japan network to consist of 1) the correspondent transactions between the Bank of Japan and private-sector financial institutions, and 2) the branches and local offices of the Bank. The analysis organizes and exploits data on prefectural interest rates and Bank of Japan correspondent transactions found in the “Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance,” the “Imperial Japan Statistics Yearbook” and the “Manuals and Rules of the Bank of Japan’s Operations.” In addition, I examine recently-released documents from the Bank of Japan Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies Archives and from the Mitsui Bunko archives.

The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 refers to prior research to discuss the integration of financial markets and the Bank of Japan’s involvement. Section 3 focuses on Bank of Japan correspondent transactions and the establishment of local branches and representative offices in rural areas to examine the process by which the finance and payments network expanded in the 1870s and beyond. Section 4 turns to local interest-rate trends to examine the process by which domestic financial markets integrated under this financial and payments network. It also considers the role played by the Bank of Japan network in domestic financial market integration.

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2 It would presumably be useful for an analysis of the financial market integration process to investigate the commodities markets as well because commodities distribution will provide important perspectives. However, this paper focuses only on the financial markets.
from a variety of vantage points. Section 5 summarizes the findings and identifies issues for the future researches.

2. Review of prior research on the relationship between financial markets and the Bank of Japan

Ishii [2001]³ discusses the research into Bank of Japan history done after the Second World War, when empirical studies of Japanese financial history were getting attention from scholars and its relevance to Japanese financial history studies as a whole. According to Ishii, the analytical perspectives were, in order of appearance: 1) the shift from the institutional to the functional approach,⁴ 2) the “history of industrial finance” approach,⁵ 3) the financial markets and payment system approach,⁶ and 4) the monetary policy history approach.⁷ He notes the need for research using the comparative and correlative history approach in future research.

Focusing on the “financial markets and payment system approach” that is deeply related to the fundamental objective of this paper, I analyze the impact on financial markets of the expansion in Bank of Japan’s networks in the form of its local representatives and correspondent transactions network. There are many studies that find the integration of financial markets⁸ to have taken place between the 1890s and early 1900s. Some of the studies also point out the importance of focusing on the development of the Bank of Japan’s correspondent transactions network and branch and local office network when investigating financial market integration.

To identify the period of nationwide integration of financial markets, Yamamura [1970] focuses on the period between 1889 and 1925 and performs a quantitative analysis that uses deposit and lending interest rates by prefecture. He finds that the interest-rate divergence among prefectures declined substantially by the end of the 19th century and concludes that during this time significant progress was made towards nationwide market integration.⁹ Okada [1966] analyzes the relationship during the latter half of the Meiji Period about from 1890 to 1912 between lending and deposit rates in Tokyo, Osaka and nationwide (in 20 major cities) and the Bank of Japan official discount rate. He concludes that the “integrated financial markets’ initial stage” was in the first decade of the 20th century when there was nationwide integration of the official discount rate.¹⁰ Okada [2001] focuses on the importance of the correspondent transaction network for private banks and concludes that “though in the initial stages, integrated, nationwide

³ See Ishii [2001], p. 4.
⁴ The shift that appeared in the 1950s from analysis of the institutional aspects of the Bank of Japan to its functional aspects of, for example, industrial finance (see Ishii [2001], pp. 4-5).
⁵ Research from the 1960s to the mid-70s that focused on the role of the Bank of Japan in supplying funding to industries (see Ishii [2001], pp. 5-8).
⁶ Research that began around the mid-1970s and focused on the importance of financial market functions (see Ishii [2001], pp. 8-10).
⁷ Research into Bank of Japan monetary policy that began to become more common in the 1980s (see Ishii [2001], pp. 10-12).
⁸ The scope of the analysis differs across studies in terms of the financial markets. For example, Tsurumi [1991] discusses the “integration period” in terms of the lending market, deposit market and call market, where Yamamura [1970] discusses it in terms of the lending market and deposit market only. In this paper, we analyze lending interest rates because data is available from a comparatively early period.
⁹ “The 1890s were the most important period in the process by which integrated capital markets emerged in Japan. Japan had extremely integrated, modern capital markets even prior to the end of the Russo-Japan war.” (Yamamura [1970], p. 67).
¹⁰ Okada [1966], p. 149.
financial markets were formed... at the beginning of the 1900s." Tsurumi [1991] indicates that there were "spontaneous private financial markets" that existed prior to the establishment of the Bank of Japan, but domestic Japanese financial markets were not linked to each other. Therefore when the Bank of Japan was established these “spontaneous private financial markets” were transformed into a single market with the Bank of Japan at its core. Turning to the integration of financial markets, he finds that the divisions between the Tokyo and Osaka financial markets had been more or less erased by the early 1890s, but “geographical separation” remained in other regions. In addition, Tsurumi [1981] refers to the rapid decline in interest rates that took place between 1907 and 1912 as the “interest rate revolution,” and notes that the previously wide differences in interest-rate levels between different regions of the country were reduced and flattened at this time. He points out that a wide-area funding network began to form between the cities and the rural areas, and this network could be termed a “nationwide financial market.”

Several scholars, however, also express reservations about Meiji Period financial market integration. One example is Asakura [1988], which provides an overview of financial history since the Meiji Period. His study finds large differences in interest rates between the cities and the rural areas in the period between 1897 and 1906. The tendency was still for rates to be lower in the major cities and higher in rural cities although interest-rate levels generally declined between 1907 and 1912. Teranishi [2003] finds a rapid decline in the coefficient of variation between prefectural minimum deposit interest rates between 1894 and 1898. However, while minimum rates converged around 1900, the differences in maximum deposit interest rates began to expand once again after a temporary convergence at around the same time and did not re-converge until the end of the 1930s. In light of the fact that minimum deposit interest rates were those charged by the major banks while maximum deposit interest rates were charged by the medium and small banks without nationwide network, Teranishi concludes, “While a nationwide market had formed among the major banks with nationwide funding networks by around 1900, in the rural areas financial markets retained their local character.” Okazaki [1993] uses data on the banking transactions of individual enterprises and people in seven Kanto-area prefectures to find that there were separations of transactions in terms of both geographical location and size of bank in 1917, indicating that little progress had been made in the integration of local financial markets.

To sum up prior research from the viewpoint of the factors that promoted the integration of financial markets, there is no consensus opinion on the factors that promote integration of financial markets so far. While factors stressed as the causes of market integration differ across

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11 Okada [2001], p. 68.
12 Tsurumi [1991] says, “The Bank of Japan...served as the nationwide monetary regulator and therefore established a broad domestic correspondent transaction network. The BoJ’s domestic funds transfer transactions were unique because of its position as a central bank. The domestic funds transfer market expanded and changed rapidly after the opening of ports, and the Bank came to serve literally as its backbone. The funds transfer clearinghouses in the three major cities had emerged as spontaneous organizations to provide adjustments on the back of the rapid expansion of domestic funds transfer transactions, but they were replaced by Bank of Japan correspondent transactions.” (p. 152)
13 Tsurumi [1991], p. 239. See p. 152 for a description of “geographical separation.” Tsurumi [1991] does not provide a clear description of when the integration of financial markets was completed.
14 Tsurumi [1981], pp. 6-8.
16 Teranishi [2003], p. 106.
studies, most underscore the importance of the contributions made by the expanding both public and private sectors’ financial and payments network to the integration of financial markets.\textsuperscript{18}

Okada [2001] focuses on networks in private-sectors and finds a clear correlation between the process by which the internal funds transfer arrangements developed into inter-bank transactions and the development of the branch bank system in the early Meiji Period. The development of the branch bank system,\textsuperscript{19} the expansion of funds transfer services and the increase in correspondent transaction contracts, he argues, made significant contributions to the improvement and enhancement of banking services in the middle and late Meiji Period. He insists, “The development of funds transfer services, in other words ‘the expansion of the correspondent transaction network’ was expected to alleviate the unconnected and unintegrated financial structure of the early Meiji Period, link what had so far been isolated national banks and spur the development of financial markets. In other words, it was to ‘facilitate finance.’”\textsuperscript{20} On the other hand, the early Meiji\textsuperscript{21} credit system was still “immature,” and “functions providing funds transfer services developed them as internal services between the head and branch offices.”\textsuperscript{22} Because of this, private bank funds transfer services primarily utilized internal network (branches) rather than transactions with other banks. Tsurumi [1991] emphasizes the role played by the private correspondent transaction networks: “Between 1877 and 1880, major urban banks built nationwide branch and correspondent networks due to the impetus provided by two factors, the handling of government funds and the distribution of commodities. This movement combined with efforts to create correspondent networks among major local banks in the trading centers for the distribution of old and new local specialty products led to building the foundation for a nationwide correspondent network.”\textsuperscript{23} Teranishi [1982] highlights the major contributions that better transportation and communications networks made to the development of the private correspondent transaction networks.\textsuperscript{24}

Turning to correspondent transactions between the Bank of Japan and private financial institutions, Okada [2001] states, “It is impossible to be clear and specific about the role played by correspondent contracts with the Bank of Japan in achieving the initial goal of facilitating finance this stage [the early Meiji Period].”\textsuperscript{25} By contrast, Tsurumi [1991] insists, “The Bank of Japan concentrated on building a correspondent transaction network that would tie together the national banks, which were spread out among the regions, and it did so in a way that did not compete with the national banks.”\textsuperscript{26} He recognizes that the Bank of Japan did indeed enhance the correspondent network with private banks and at the same time points to the limits inherent in the correspondent

\textsuperscript{18} “The Bank of Japan: The First Hundred Years” Editing Committee [1982] looks at the expansion of the Bank of Japan correspondent transaction network and the opening of BoJ branches since its establishment primarily in terms of the supply of funds through funds transfer services and bill discounting services.

\textsuperscript{19} For research into the significance of the development of the branch bank system, see Asai [1978].

\textsuperscript{20} Okada [2001], p. 68.

\textsuperscript{21} Okada [2001] does not provide a specific year.

\textsuperscript{22} Okada [2001], p. 4.

\textsuperscript{23} Tsurumi [1991], p. 107. With regards to “old and new local specialty products,” Tsurumi defines silk thread, tea and rice, etc.; however he does not provide a clear definition of which belongs to which.

\textsuperscript{24} See Teranishi [1982], pp. 214-219.

\textsuperscript{25} Okada [2001], p. 25. The author goes on to say, “The impact [ of the expansion of the Bank of Japan correspondent network] on the formation and expansion of financial markets, together with “joint transfers” [explained later], about which we still do not know much, remain issues that will require further verification.” (Okada [2001], p. 68)

\textsuperscript{26} Tsurumi [1991], p. 103.
network itself,"27 noting, “No matter how many domestic funds transfer systems operated by the
Bank of Japan were commonly used, they were not able to supplant the activities of local
representatives.”28

Tsurumi [1991] considers the role that the Bank of Japan local representatives played in the
integration of financial markets, taking the Osaka Branch as an example. Both the head office and
the Osaka Branch discounted and purchased bills between Tokyo and Osaka, which Tsurumi says
“virtually alleviated the remaining separations between the Tokyo and Osaka financial
markets.”29 Imuta [1980] and Ishii [1980] discuss slightly later analytical periods and also
emphasize the merits to local banks when there was a Bank of Japan local representative in the
same prefecture. For example, Imuta [1980] finds that the opening of a Bank of Japan local
representative in the same prefecture enabled the local banks to deal directly with the Bank of
Japan if they were allowed to make a contract with a Bank of Japan local representative. This, he
argues, facilitated the inflow and outflow of funds among regions reflecting the relative levels of
local financing demand and also increased the convenience to local banks of accepting Bank of
Japan credits.30 Ishii [1980] points out that whether or not there was a Bank of Japan local
representative in the same prefecture was a “decisive factor in having transactions with the Bank
of Japan”31 for comparatively small-scale local banks.

3. The financial and payments network and the role of the Bank of Japan

This section builds on the prior research overviewed in the previous section to examine the
expansion of the financial and payments network around the time of the establishment of the
Bank of Japan, the core focus of this paper, and to observe the role that it played in the integration
of financial markets.

The years immediately before and after the establishment of the Bank of Japan can be broken
down into three periods from the perspective of the enhancement of the financial and payments
network:

1) 1870s: Expansion of private financial institution networks
2) 1880s: Expansion of correspondent transactions between the Bank of Japan and
private financial institutions
3) 1890s: Expansion of Bank of Japan local representatives (branches, local offices
etc.)

27 Regarding the limits to the ineffectiveness of correspondent transactions in terms of enhancing financial market
integration, Tsurumi [1991] says, “While the Bank of Japan correspondent network was effective in facilitating
transfers between remote areas, banks located outside of Tokyo and Osaka were basically unable to avail themselves
of the Bank of Japan’s immediate bill re-discounting and current account overdraft services, creating the need to
open Bank of Japan local representatives” (Tsurumi [1991], p. 152).
28 Tsurumi [1991], p. 152.
29 Tsurumi [1991], pp. 238-239.
30 Imuta [1980] says that “the switch from correspondent transactions to current account overdrafts that resulted
from the opening of a Bank of Japan local representatives in the same prefecture presumably increased the convenience
with which Bank of Japan credits could be accepted.” (p. 52) He also emphasizes the importance to private banks of
transactions with the Bank of Japan not only for funds transfers but also to take advantage of the convenience of
current account overdrafts, etc. (see Imuta [1980], pp. 50-52).
Figure 1 illustrates trends for measurements of private financial institution and Bank of Japan networks. According to the figure, there was a rapid increase in the number of bank head and branch offices in the late 1870s, the impetus for which came from the 1876 amendments to the National Banks Ordinance that led to the establishment of a series of national banks. In addition to the head and branch office networks of national banks, etc., there was also a sharp rise in the number of correspondent transactions as represented by the funds transfer contract signed between these financial institutions. By 1880, the number of such contracts exceeded 1,000. When it was established in 1882, the Bank of Japan had two offices: the head office in Tokyo and the Osaka Branch. It focused on correspondent transactions with private financial institutions in the building of its network, and by around 1890 had signed 150 correspondent transaction contracts with private financial institutions. During the next decade, the Bank of Japan expanded its local branch and representative offices, etc., so that by 1900 it had 10 branches and local offices in seven prefectures.

I examine this history in more detail to confirm my hypothesis that the expansion of the Bank of Japan network and consequent facilitation of remote payments alleviated the regional disadvantage in funding.

(1) 1870s: Expansion of private financial institution networks

The dozen or so years between the Meiji Restoration in 1868 and the establishment of the Bank of Japan in 1882 are a time during which Japan conducted many experiments with the financial and payment systems, often referring to foreign systems, etc., as models. It was at this time that many of the core financial institutions were established, including the exchange firms, the national banks and the Yokohama Specie Bank, as well as a number of private banks.


33 National banks are based on National Law and private banks in fact. The government issued the “National Banks Ordinance” in 1872 for the purpose of establishing a system to collect and convert the large volumes of currency that had been issued. The ordinance also aimed to reinforce financial functions, particularly the supply of funding for industrial and commercial development. Banks established under this ordinance are referred to as “national banks.” There were initially four national banks established, and they issued currency that was convertible for gold. Amendments to the Ordinance in 1876, however, lifted the requirement of gold conversion, making it easier to establish national banks. The result was a sharp increase in the number of national banks and a corresponding increase in outstanding national bank notes (see “The Bank of Japan: The First Hundred Years” Editing Committee[1982], pp. 25-29).

34 The exchange firms were established in 1869 at the request of the government. Their primary business was exchange services and their funding came from investments by wealthy merchants and loans from the government. Exchange firms were established in Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, Yokohama, Kobe, Niigata, Otsu and Tsuruga. In addition to exchange services, they also issued convertible notes and made loans. The lack of requirements to maintain reserves against specie issues resulted in rampant over-issuing, and when the government began to impose reserve ratio requirements, results deteriorated and the exchange firms were disbanded (see Tamaki [1994], pp. 18-20; “The Bank of Japan: The First Hundred Years” Editing Committee [1982], pp. 12-16). Ishii [2003] examines the commonly held view that domestic funds transfers dwindled after the disbanding of the exchange firms and finds that in fact the exchange merchants who participated in the establishment of exchange firms were at the same time providing domestic funds transfer services that were separate from that of the exchange firms.
banks\textsuperscript{36} and quasi-banks.\textsuperscript{37} These new financial institutions began to form networks in order to adjust their mutual funding surpluses and shortfalls. The networks connecting private-sector financial institutions to each other developed rapidly after the National Banks Ordinance was amended in 1876 and substantially relaxed the conditions for establishing national banks. In 1880 there were 150 private-sector banks (including national banks and private banks, excluding quasi-banks) with 254 head and branch offices and 1,027 correspondent contracts between private-sector banks.\textsuperscript{38}

According to Tsurumi \textsuperscript{[1991]}, the postal funds transfer system that began in 1875 provided the first means of transferring funds between remote areas, but from around 1877 bank transfers became the primary means of doing so. Looking at the domestic funds transfer market in more detail, I find that between 1877 and 1880 branch office networks and correspondent networks were built between the major urban banks and the large regional banks, and these networks were used to provide funds transfer services.\textsuperscript{39} In Tokyo, Osaka and other centers, transfer clearinghouses began to be spontaneously organized by around 1879 and 1880, and served as a venue for trading transfers between banks.\textsuperscript{40} However, Tokyo-Osaka transfers were the focus of the correspondent network, and only a few of the largest regional banks were able to participate in the network at all, so some regions remained at a disadvantage. To reduce this bias, there was a “systematic attempt to link national and private banks in different areas of the country.”\textsuperscript{41} The result was the “joint transfer” project\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{36} The first private bank to be established was the “Mitsui Bank Private Company” in 1876. According to Asakura \textsuperscript{[1988]}, many applications were filed during the early Meiji Period for the establishment of banks, but the government did not permit private banks to be established because of its intention to establish national banks. Private bank establishment did not, therefore, begin in earnest until 1880, after the number of national banks had reached the ceiling in 1879. During the ten or so year period beginning with 1877, private banks were established by the money changers of the Edo Period Shogunate and by relatively wealthy merchants and landlords. Most of the private banks were initially established in major cities (Tokyo, Osaka), Yokohama and Kobe, where external trades were active or in areas like Niigata, Miyagi, Shizuoka, Fukushima and Nagano that produced commodities like rice, tea and silk thread. The highest capitalized private bank was the Mitsui Bank at ¥2 million; and the other end of the scale was numerous banks capitalized at around ¥10,000 (see Asakura \textsuperscript{[1988]}, pp. 51-52).

\textsuperscript{37} Quasi-banks refer to institutions that were established spontaneously beginning in the early Meiji Period and provided funds transfer, exchange, lending and deposit-taking services. Their average capital was extremely small compared to the national and private banks. These firms “were established in areas where national and private banks did not adequately supply funds; only three were established in Tokyo and Osaka combined” (Tamaki \textsuperscript{[1994]}, pp. 41-42). The Banking Ordinance that took effect in July 1893 forced bank-like companies to choose between going out of business, converting to banks or merging, and effectively put an end to these firms. One can observe a corresponding doubling of the number of banks in 1893 (see Asakura \textsuperscript{[1988]}, pp. 18-20, p. 56).


\textsuperscript{39} See Tsurumi \textsuperscript{[1991]}, pp. 117-118.

\textsuperscript{40} Little is known about transfer clearinghouses because of the paucity of documents remaining, but it is assumed that the Osaka transfer clearinghouse provided “trading in Tokyo transfers” and “inter-bank funds lending/borrowing” (see Tsurumi \textsuperscript{[1991]}, pp. 130-143). Tsurumi \textsuperscript{[1991]} focuses on the fact that domestic transfers were “traded” rather than “exchanged” to hypothesize that while the offsetting of transfers was the primary function of transfer clearinghouses, they also served as a means of short-term investment (see Tsurumi \textsuperscript{[1991]}, p. 135).

\textsuperscript{41} Tsurumi \textsuperscript{[1991]}, p. 107.

\textsuperscript{42} The “Osaka Bank Report” contains a description of this point that says, “Federation banks will have lead offices in Tokyo and Osaka and handling offices in Hakodate, Sendai, Niigata, Nagoya, Hiroshima, Nagasaki and other locations, and other banks will connect with these handling offices according to their region” (“Osaka Bank Report,” Bank of Japan Research Department \textsuperscript{[1957a]}, p. 1192-1203). The “joint transfer scheme” was proposed by Juhachi Bank (18th Bank), which was located in Nagasaki prefecture, as a “policy for expanding transfers” at the time the Kyushu Banking Federation was established in 1880. What the “policy” envisioned was a nationwide, centralized
that tried to build a multi-layer correspondent network led by the large regional banks. Under
the project, the Kyushu Banking Federation did in fact create a “joint transfer” system in
1880. Taking advantage of the centralized payment functions required expanding the scope
of participants from the regional to the national level, so in 1883, the Kyushu Banking
Federation requested the Bank of Japan, Tokyo Banking Association and Osaka Banking
Association to join it. The negotiations were unsuccessful, \(^43\) but joint transfer schemes
expanded to different parts of the country. In 1900 a mechanism was set up whereby the joint
exchange groups scattered around Japan were joined together by private correspondent
networks in Tokyo and Osaka.\(^44,45\) As can be seen from this discussion, these networks were
spontaneous, self-directed private-sector-level networks, and there were limits to the number
of participants they could attract and the functions they could deliver.

(2) 1880s: Expansion of correspondent transactions between the Bank of Japan and private
financial institutions

The momentum built for the establishment of the Bank of Japan between 1880 and 1881.
One of the chief purposes of establishing the Bank was to provide Japan with a conversion
system,\(^46\) but proponents also emphasized its duties to smooth out the supply of funds, to
reduce interest rates and to create uniform, nationwide financial markets. The “Proposal to
Establish the Bank of Japan” was submitted in 1882 in the name of Matsukata Masayoshi,
the Minister of Finance. According to the proposal and supporting documentation entitled
“Explanation of the Establishment of the Bank of Japan,”\(^47\) there were five objectives to the

\(^{43}\) According to the “Osaka Bank Report,” the banking association replied, “This proposal needs to be considered as an
exceedingly expedient means of linking finance throughout the country and expanding the collection and dispersion
of prices. However, given the exceeding importance of this matter, the question of whether it should be expanded
nationwide requires further deliberation.” The Bank of Japan responded, “This appears to be an exceedingly
expedient proposal and should be given a response after full deliberation once we have finished the press of business
for the amendment of the Banking Ordinance.” (“Osaka Bank Report,” Bank of Japan Research Department [1957a],
pp. 1192-1203). On this point, Tsurumi [1991] says that the opposition of the Tokyo and Osaka banking associations
was because “the lead branches in eastern and western Japan that would provide the payments axis and would profit
from the accumulation of large volumes of transfer funds, but would also see a concentration of complex and
time-consuming clerical work. What is more, the burdens for performing this work were considered to be natural
‘obligations’ that the branches undertook in return for this accumulation of funds, and the fees were kept low as a
result.” The Bank of Japan’s opposition stemmed from the fact that “it had a policy of building a nationwide
correspondent network between the Bank of Japan and major banks in the urban and outlying areas and controlling
these through its nationwide correspondent network created from the above private-sector transfer and payment
schemes, i.e. the regional ‘joint transfer’ networks, which separately spread in the east and west and the private
correspondent networks formed by major urban banks in Tokyo and Osaka.” (Tsurumi [1991], pp. 113-114)

\(^{44}\) See Tsurumi [1991], p. 113.

\(^{45}\) Okada [2001] says that the joint transfer scheme “extended only to Tohoku, Hokkaido, Chugoku, Shikoku and
Kyushu regions and lacked the centers of Tokyo and Osaka.” (Okada [2001], p. 34)

\(^{46}\) The Bank of Japan was not initially authorized to issue banknotes. The “Proposal to Establish the Bank of Japan”
allowed the Bank to consolidate on convertible banknotes, but there was a wide spread between the value of silver
coins and inconvertible banknotes and it was feared if the Bank of Japan were to issue notes convertible for specie,
they would be immediately converted and not circulate. It was therefore decided that the policy would be for the
Bank of Japan to accumulate reserves of specie and that specific rules regarding the issuing of convertible banknotes
would be formulated when issuing became possible (see “The Bank of Japan: The First Hundred Years” Editing
Committee [1982], p. 280).

\(^{47}\) Submitted to Prime Minister Sanjo Sanetomi, requesting “a speedy decision on the proposal to establish the Bank of
Japan and promulgation of the ordinance.” (See Bank of Japan Research Department [1958a], p. 990; “The Bank of
Japan: The First Hundred Years” Editing Committee [1982], p. 120.)
Bank’s establishment: 1) facilitation of finance, 2) enhancement of the funding of the financial institutions such as national banks, 3) reduction of interest rates, 4) treasury receipt and disbursement services and 5) discounting of foreign bills. Of these purposes, the first three were related to the enhancement of domestic financial intermediation functions and funds payment functions, and the first is particularly relevant to my discussion of the Bank of Japan network. According to the “Explanation of the Establishment of the Bank of Japan,” the first purpose, “facilitation of finance,” was based on a judgment that networks of private-sector financial institutions alone were insufficient to adjust funding surpluses and shortfalls between regions. It was therefore necessary for the central bank to sign correspondent contracts with national banks throughout the country so as to serve as the core for financial intermediation and to unify local financial markets into a single, nationwide market. As can be seen from this point, the use of correspondent transactions to build a network between the Bank of Japan and private-sector financial institutions was considered to be a powerful tool for the achievement of the initial objectives behind the Bank’s establishment.

The details of the correspondent system is observed in the boilerplate for a correspondent transaction found in Collection 1 Volume 2 of the “Manuals and Rules of the Bank of Japan’s Operations.” This contract was to be signed between the Bank of Japan and private-sector financial institutions (excerpts below).

- The Bank of Japan engages in transfer transactions, commercial bill transactions, collection services and temporary lending services with banks with which it has signed correspondent contracts (Article 1).
- The Bank of Japan establishes ceiling amounts for loans to individual banks in order to engage in transfer transactions, commercial bill transactions, collection services and temporary lending services (Article 2).
- Individual banks shall deposit security with the Bank of Japan (Article 3).
- The value of the bills issued by individual banks through the Bank of Japan shall be no more than the individual bank’s credit balance (Article 4).
- Funds transfers shall be payable on sight (Article 8).

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48 The “Explanation of the Establishment of the Bank of Japan” says, “Regarding the present status of national banks, they stand in geographical confrontation to one another and have little desire to communicate or coordinate. Indeed, they move in opposition to one another and check one another. Should one bank have a surplus, it is not able to use that surplus to cover shortfalls in another bank.” (See Bank of Japan Research Department [1958a], p. 993.)

49 The “Explanation of the Establishment of the Bank of Japan” says, “The establishment of a central bank at this time would enable the sound national banks in various regions to be treated as Bank of Japan’s local representatives, with ‘correspondence’ contracts signed so as to open the first nationwide channels for the circulation of money... A central bank would play a key role in providing financial channels, observing the degree of activity of nationwide commerce and money transfers so that money surplus in one region could be transferred to the financial needs of another region, and the money surplus of that region could be lent for the financial needs of the first region. This movement and circulation would be akin to the heart pumping blood through the arteries to the limbs to enable them to move. Doing this would, for the first time, enable the volume of money to be smoothed out so that the national finances would no longer suffer from clogging and blockage.” (See Bank of Japan Research Department [1958a], p. 994.)

50 The material titled as “The Bank of Japan and xxx Bank sign this contract in witness of a good-faith decision of both parties to enter into ‘correspondence’ transactions pursuant to Article 2 of the Bank of Japan Charter and with the permission of the Minister of Finance.” (“Manuals and Rules of the Bank of Japan’s Operations,” Collection 1 Volume 2, pp. 675-679)
• In the event that a bank requests a temporary loan, the Bank of Japan may, at its discretion, loan an amount up to one third the lending ceiling (Article 10).
• Credit and debit accounts shall be settled on the last days of May and November (Article 12).

The Bank of Japan required permission from the Minister of Finance prior to signing correspondent transactions with a private-sector financial institution.51

From the contract boilerplate described above, it can be seen that private-sector banks that signed correspondent transactions were able to use the Bank of Japan to transfer funds and collect bills to and from remote locations and were also able to enjoy temporary loans from the Bank of Japan provided that collateral had been put up.52

The Bank of Japan began to sign correspondent transactions with private-sector banks in June 1883, opening up a means of transferring funds through the Bank of Japan in addition to private payment systems. Kasuya [2000] comments that “going through the Bank of Japan helped to smooth out the movement of funds between remote locations.”53 On the other hand, the initiation of Bank of Japan correspondent transactions also had the effect of reducing handling volumes of the transfer clearinghouses that served as the fund payment vehicles for the private sector.54

Collection 1 Volume 2 of the “Manuals and Rules of the Bank of Japan’s Operations” contains a list55 of private-sector banks’ offices that had signed contracts with the Bank of Japan for “correspondence” transactions together with the years in which correspondent contracts began and ended for each individual office. I can calculate the number of correspondent contracts during the years 1883-1909 from this list (Figure 1). I can see that there was a sharp rise immediately after the Bank of Japan began to sign correspondent contracts in June 1883,56 with the number of contracts going from 55 in 1883 to 133 in 1884. Later, from the latter half of the 1880s to the early part of the 1890s, the number hovered at around 150. Then when the Banking Ordinance57 took effect in 1893, there was a rise in the number of private-sector banks which in turn fueled an increase in the number of correspondent contracts in the late 1890s. Contracts peaked at 239 in 1900.

52 Correspondent contracts were signed on a branch office basis, not on a financial institution basis. For example, in 1883 the Mitsui Bank had seven branch offices in Hachioji, Odawara, Nagoya, Aomori and other locations that signed contracts with the Bank of Japan head office, while its Otsu office signed a contract with the Bank of Japan Osaka Branch. In other words, at this point in time, the Mitsui Bank had eight correspondent contracts with the Bank of Japan (see “The Bank of Japan: The First Hundred Years” Editing Committee [1982], p. 329).
54 “Bank of Japan correspondent transactions certainly had a negative impact on the activities of the transfer clearinghouses ...The functions of the transfer clearinghouses were gradually swallowed up and replaced by the expansion of BoJ correspondent transfers.” (Tsurumi [1991], p. 151).
56 Banks (national banks, private banks) at the time did not have a large number of branch offices, and indeed there are some that had no branch offices at all. Throughout the Meiji Period the average was approximately one branch office per bank.
57 Article 1 of the Banking Ordinance provides this definition: “Any entity that engages in the discounting of securities, funds transfer services, or has both deposit-taking services and lending services as a business in publicly-opened offices shall be deemed a bank regardless of the name under which said services are provided.” (Meiji Period Fiscal History Editing Committee [1905], pp. 594-597)
However, as will be discussed below, the records of the times indicate that even in the late 1880s when significant progress had been made in the erection of a correspondent network between the Bank of Japan and private-sector financial institutions, there had still been little headway made on the nationwide integration of financial markets.

(3) 1890s: Expansion of local Bank of Japan local representatives

(a) Policies of Ministry of Finance and Bank of Japan on the establishment of Bank of Japan local representatives

As discussed above, in the 1880s the emphasis was on the correspondent network aspect of the Bank of Japan network, but in the 1890s the focus shifted to the expansion of local services in the form of either branch or local office. One of the factors behind this was presumably a change in the Ministry of Finance policy regarding the Bank of Japan network during this period of time.

The Bank of Japan’s network was seen as a means of “facilitating finance,” but at the time of the Bank’s establishment the Ministry of Finance was concerned that “the establishment of Bank of Japan’s local representatives may ‘impair the operations of local ordinary banks,’ and the Bank of Japan should therefore ‘initially’ sign correspondent contracts rather than establishing branch offices.” 59 This was presumably why the Bank of Japan began by developing a nationwide correspondent network as a channel for circulating funds. 60 However, the Ministry of Finance’s policy appears to have changed in the latter half of the 1880s. According to documents in the Bank of Japan Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies Archives, Bank of Japan Governor Yoshihara Shigetoshi applied to Minister of Finance Matsukata Masayoshi to establish new branches on June 16, 1886. 61 The application begins by noting the need to closely monitor conditions in local areas: “There has been a significant increase in the Bank’s operations with respect to its duties of handling treasury receipts and disbursements, issuing convertible banknotes and providing ‘correspondence’ services, and these services now extend throughout the country. I therefore believe it is necessary and urgent to more closely monitor local conditions and circumstances.” Having done this, the application notes, “However, the Bank only has one branch office in Osaka and engages in ‘correspondence’ financial transactions with national and private banks in other parts of the country and must rely on their communications through correspondent transactions to confirm the ebbs and flows of local commerce and finance to report to the Bank of Japan’s head office.” In other words, correspondent transactions with private-sector financial institutions are, according to the application, insufficient for

58 The Bank of Japan’s offices consist of head office, branches, local offices, representative offices, and agencies. The head office, branches, and local office were established and run by the Bank of Japan. The representative offices and agencies are private-sector banks, which were commissioned to serve as the Bank of Japan. I call offices located in local areas altogether “local representatives”.


60 “The Bank of Japan did not have a local representatives’ network where there was fear of encroaching upon the base of operations for national banks. Instead, it signed correspondent contracts with powerful local banks, enabling it to overcome the isolation of the national banks and achieve nationwide control.” (Tsurumi [1991], p. 114)

61 “Application to the Minister of Finance to Increase Branches” (Bank of Japan Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies Archives, Document A3681).
responding to changes in local financial and economic circumstances. It then argues that
the establishment of “branch offices in local centers” would “facilitate finance and
balance interest rates.” Minister of Finance Matsukata Masayoshi approved the
application on June 23, which led to a series of branch and local offices being opened
by the Bank of Japan in the 1890s.

On July 30, 1889, seven years after the drafting of “Explanation of the Establishment
of the Bank of Japan,” by Matsukata Masayoshi, a memorandum which was preserved
by Matsuo Shigeyoshi, then the head of the Receipts and Disbursements Bureau of the
Ministry of Finance, noted that the Ministry of Finance acknowledged the need to
expand the Bank of Japan’s local representatives network in order to facilitate finance.
In other words, the primary duty of the Bank of Japan was, according to the “central
bank” heading in this memorandum, “to provide a means of funds transfers throughout
the country and to facilitate market finance.” This emphasis on promoting funds
transfers was more or less the same as Matsukata Masayoshi had argued for in the
“Proposal to Establish the Bank of Japan,” and the Ministry of Finance also comments
on the need to establish branches and agencies in order to achieve these objectives.

Table 1 contains an overview of the establishment of branches and local offices
between 1882 and 1909. The Osaka Branch was established in December 1882,
virtually simultaneous to the opening of the head office, because of Osaka’s position as
a “center of commerce,” but no other branches were established immediately

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62 When the Bank of Japan was established, Matsukata Masayoshi commented in “Explanation of the Establishment of
the Bank of Japan” on both the alleviation of regional disparities in interest rates and the alleviation of seasonal
fluctuations, as the purpose of opening Bank of Japan’s local representatives. However, “Balance interest rates” is
not clearly defined and we are not sure which he means.

63 Other important purposes for local representatives were funds payments and settlement, treasury receipts and
disbursements and banknote issuing.

64 Matsukata wrote his response at the bottom of the Bank of Japan’s application form.

65 The first application was made on April 19, 1886, but due to inadequate content (lack of branch bylaws) the Bank of
Japan reapplied on June 16. The draft application of April 19 (the actual application is not in the Bank of Japan
archives, only the draft remains) lists eight centers for the establishment of branches or local offices: Nagasaki,
Hakodate, Niigata, Kobe, Yokohama, Akamagaseki (now Shimonoseki), Nagoya and Sendai. The application notes
that they “will not be established all at the same time” but does not comment specifically on the order of
establishment. The application of June 16 (which remains in the Bank of Japan archives) contains Matsukata
Masayoshi’s signature and a note that says, “Quickly investigate the locations of branch offices and their operational
bylaws and submit additionally.”

66 Matsuo Shigeyoshi papers. Writer unknown. Uses Ministry of Finance stationery. The document explains the
functions of the Yokohama Specie Bank and Bank of Japan and is entitled “Proposal for the Bank of Japan to Use the
Specie Bank as a Liable Agency to Perform Foreign Exchange Services” (Bank of Japan Research Department
[1958a], pp. 1441-1453).

67 Below are the other duties it lists: “Rediscounting and purchasing of commercial bills and promissory bills so as to
enhance the funding of banks, etc.,” “regulating the ebbs and flows of finance and maintaining converged interest
rates,” “discounting foreign funds transfer bills so as to enhance the convenience of domestic and foreign trade” and
“planning the recovery of specie.”

68 At the bottom of the page on “providing a means of funds transfers throughout the country and facilitating market
finance,” the Ministry of Finance notes, “The Bank of Japan is the central bank of Japan and at the center of
monetary circulation in the Japanese financial economy. It should open a series of branches, local offices,
representative offices, and agencies around the country so as to communicate and coordinate with financial
companies around the country. It should provide a significant means of funds transfers so as to alleviate the
congestion and clogging in finance by averaging the relative demand for money, for example, allowing money
surplus in one region to be transferred to serve the financial needs of another region, and a money surplus in the
second region to be lent for the financial needs of the first region.

69 On October 20, 1882, Vice Governor Tomita Tetsunosuke acting on behalf of the governor of the Bank of Japan,
submitted an “Application to Establish an Osaka Branch” to Minister of Finance Matsukata Masayoshi (Bank of
Japan Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies Archives, Document A3681). His reasons for needing a branch
thereafter. The first two local offices were in Gifu and Wakayama in 1891 and then three were established in Hokkaido in 1893. The second branch to be established was the Saibu(Kyushu) Branch, which came in 1893, 10 years after the opening of the Osaka Branch. Branches and local offices were established at a steady pace thereafter. In 1909, there were branches and local offices in most of the major financial centers and Hokkaido: Osaka (1882), Saibu, Sapporo, Hakodate, Nemuro (1893), Kyoto (1894), Nagoya, Otaru (1897), Fukushima (1899), Hiroshima (1905), and Kanazawa (1909). Thus for the first decade after its establishment, the Bank of Japan had only two branches, in Tokyo and Osaka, but by 1900 it had 10 offices in seven prefectures.

(b) Differences between head office, branches, local offices and representative offices in transactions with private-sector banks

There were three forms of local Bank of Japan offices at the time: branches, local offices and representative offices. Documentary evidence allows us to observe the role that they played in the integration of financial markets. From my perspective of considering how the facilitation of remote funds transfers and payments enabled the integration of financial markets, the most important point is whether these offices provided funds transfer services. My information comes from Collection 1 Volume 1 of “Manuals and Rules of the Bank of Japan’s Operations,” which describes the operations of the Osaka Branch, Gifu Local Office and Wakayama Local Office. According to the records, from the time the branch and local offices were established, they provided funds transfer services in addition to receipt and disbursement of banknotes, treasury receipt and disbursement services, and government bond services. By contrast,
representative offices were head offices and branch offices of private-sector banks that were commissioned with a part of Bank of Japan services. While there is much that is unknown regarding the details of their duties and services, the Branch Representative Office Bylaws of 1897 authorized them to perform “treasury services” (receipts, disbursement and custody services for treasury funds under the supervision of the Bank of Japan) and “government bond services.” One can also see that the work of representative offices focused on government bonds and treasury services from the following documents: notifications of transfers and transfer items list issued in conjunction with a change of consignees for the clerical processing at the Fukuchiyama and Ayabe representative offices in 1905 and also from the “Representative Office Succession Procedures” that served as general rules and bylaws (1908). This point is consistent with the fact that representative office transactions are not included in the “account for transfer bills handled by the head office, branch offices and local offices” listed in the “Bank of Japan Business Report” during the Meiji Period. I can therefore conclude that while the head office, branch offices and local offices played a significant role in the integration of financial markets by providing funds transfer services, the role of the representative offices was limited.

There are also provisions covering representative offices in the Bank of Japan Internal Bylaws that took effect in 1899 (Manuals and Rules of the Bank of Japan’s Operations, Collection 1 Volume 1 pp. 361-362), which state that the head office, branches or local offices may send staff to handle treasury services and public bond services (Chapter 8, Part 3 “Representative Offices,” Article 214), and “The expenses of representative offices shall be paid by the office with jurisdiction” (Chapter 8, Part 3 “Representative Offices,” Article 217). There were also “agencies” that served as representatives of the Bank of Japan. Like representative offices, agencies were private-sector banks commissioned to handle a part of the Bank of Japan’s services. According to the Internal Bylaws, “Agencies may handle all or a part of treasury services, public bond services, treasury deposit interest payment services, and bill and damaged convertible banknote exchange services” (Chapter 9 “Agencies” Article 218) and “Agencies shall be paid a set commission for their services and shall bear all costs associated therewith...” (Chapter 9 “Agencies” Article 220). Note that funds transfer services are not included. The list of agencies found on pp. 569-607 of Collection 1 Volume 4 of “Manuals and Rules of the Bank of Japan’s Operations” contains: Mitsui Bank, Kawasaki Bank and Daiichi Kokuritsu Bank.

There were some representative offices in Hokkaido that were allowed to handle funds transfer services as an exception to the rule (“Manuals and Rules of the Bank of Japan’s Operations” Collection 1 Volume 1, p. 603, pp. 608-609, 615-617, p. 619).

When transferring services from one consignee to another or from the consignee to the Bank of Japan, the consignee had to provide government bond principal and interest deposits, government bond certificates and interest coupons, ledgers, statement of total amount of income tax and official seals, etc. While the details are not known about how representative offices were selected or the time period for the contract, but documents in the Bank of Japan Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies Archives do contain the few examples of consignees being changed (Bank of Japan Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies Archives, Documents 7687, 7700).

When transferring services from one representative office to another, the Bank of Japan would provide a list of the consignee’s obligations and the amount of money. These obligations included the government bond principal and interest deposits, government bond certificates and interest coupons, ledgers, statement of total amount of income tax and official seals, etc. While the details are not known about how representative offices were selected or the time period for the contract, but documents in the Bank of Japan Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies Archives do contain the few examples of consignees being changed (Bank of Japan Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies Archives, Document 7752).
Example of private-sector bank handling: The Mitsui Bank

Now I turn to documents from the private-sector banks to examine how funds transfers were accomplished using the Bank of Japan’s network. The Meiji Period books and ledgers of the Mitsui Bank contain evidence of funds transfers made between the bank’s head and branch offices over the Bank of Japan’s network. The ledgers for 1898 and 1899 (Tokyo Head Office Ledger of Accounts (1898) 143; Osaka Branch Office Ledger of Accounts (1899) 144; Kyoto Branch Office Ledger of Accounts (1899) 145) contain many entries indicating that funds were circulating through Bank of Japan telegraphic transfers. In 1898, the Tokyo Head Office received funds from Bakan (Shimonoseki), Osaka, Hakodate, and Otaru and made transfers to Osaka. In 1899, there are entries for transfers to the Osaka Branch from Tokyo, Kyoto and Bakan. The Kyoto Branch shows transfers from the Osaka Branch. In all cases, the transfers were accomplished by using the head office, branches, and local offices (network) of the Bank of Japan. The Mitsui Bank provides one example of a bank making use of the BOJ network at the end of the 1890s.

4. The role of the Bank of Japan network in the integration of financial markets

This section examines how the financial and payments networks, discussed in the previous section, served to integrate domestic financial markets in the Meiji Period.

(1) The integration of domestic financial markets as shown by regional interest rates

(a) The integration of domestic financial markets as seen from the “Financial status” section of the “Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance”

The “Financial Status” section of the “Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance” hereafter “Annual Report” contains many entries indicating a lack of financial market integration up until the late 1880s. For example, the “10th Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance” (1887) demonstrates that there were still large regional gaps in interest rates: “Tokyo and Osaka are the national centers of commerce and their interest rates contain sufficient information to infer general trends in nationwide finance. However, market conditions are independent for

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83 In the archives of Mitsui Bunko.
84 According to Mitsui Bunko [1980], the “Reform Order” (1886) was issued when the Mitsui Bank resigned its handling of government funds. The order calls for the bank to “expand current account deposit-taking services. When deposits are in excess compared to the demand of funds in that office, allocate one third to payment reserves and send the remaining two thirds to the head or other branch offices” and “Facilitate the circulation of private industrial funding with close coordination among head and branch offices.” The presence of these items indicates that information on financial conditions in different regions was being exchanged and funds may have been moving between the branch and head offices based on that information. (Mitsui Bunko [1980], pp. 344-345).
85 Telegraphic transfers involve telegraphing the recipient office regarding the transfer of funds. Katano [1956] (p. 457) explains that this method of transfer was “fast, simple and easy.”
86 There are also entries for “cash transfers,” which were relatively short (within a city) distance transfers, according to the documents, from Fukagawa to the Tokyo Head Office.
87 There are also several “cash transfer” entries in short distance which the documents indicate were from Kobe and Wakayama.
88 The Mitsui Bank books and ledgers are only available for a limited period. It was not possible to use ledgers from other periods of time to compare transfers.
each region as are relative levels of financial demand, and there are therefore differences in interest-rate levels.\textsuperscript{89}

There were also many indications that interest rates were higher in rural regions than in the urban centers:\textsuperscript{90} “The reason that regional interest rates tend to be extremely high is because regional commerce is generally small in scale and the relative accumulation or dispersion of money necessarily has an impact on finance” (1887);\textsuperscript{91} “Traditionally, interest rates in Japan have been lower in the cities and higher in the rural areas” (1888);\textsuperscript{92} and “Interest rates are always lower in the urban areas where there are highly developed financial institutions and higher in rural areas that lack these institutions; this is a generally accepted economic principle” (1889).\textsuperscript{93}

However, even in Tokyo and Osaka, which had relatively low interest rates, interest-rate levels differed until the end of the 1880s; Osaka’s interest rates were higher than Tokyo’s. For example: “Interest rates at Osaka branches are normally high in comparison with Tokyo” (1888)\textsuperscript{94} and “Many years of observation indicate that interest rates at Osaka branches are always slightly higher than at Tokyo branches” (1889).\textsuperscript{95,96} I should also note that around the middle of the 1890s, when the Bank of Japan began to expand its regional network, the “Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance” ceased to include comments on the regional gaps in interest rates and indeed contained entries that pointed to the gradual formation of integrated financial markets. The “18th Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance” (1894) says, “While there were many events for the financial markets this year, the markets were fortunately able to overcome them without upheaval,” and then goes on to note, “This is because financial institutions have come to be situated as intermediaries

\textsuperscript{90} Okada [1966] says that the reason why interest rates were relatively high in outlying areas was that smaller banks had to compete with larger urban banks for deposits in local markets and therefore were required to pay high interest rates. These high deposit rates lead to higher lending rates. In addition, borrowers were often ultra-small enterprises or small-scale merchants and the amounts borrowed were tiny in comparison to the loans made by major urban banks. Interest rates are higher on small-value loans because of the management costs and risks involved. One of the distinguishing features of regional finance was that conditions were vulnerable to trends in single major industry, resulting in large seasonal sways in the demand for funds and financing. (Okada [1966], pp. 115-149).
\textsuperscript{91} “10th Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance” (1887), pp. 46-47.
\textsuperscript{93} “12th Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance” (1889), p. 61. As examples, interest rates in commercial areas like Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto and Kanagawa were the lowest in the country.
\textsuperscript{96} Monthly lending rate data is available for Tokyo and Osaka in the “Collected Japanese Economic Statistics” (source is “Financial Reference”). In the first half of the 1880s, there appears to have been little linkage between the interest rates in the two cities (Figure 2, Figure 3). In coefficients of correlation for Tokyo and Osaka lending rates during the period from the 1880s through 1909, a general rising trend can be observed, moving from 0.1 in the first half of the 1880s (1882-1885) to 0.86 in the latter half of the 1880s (1886-1890), 0.89 in the first half of the 1890s (1891-1895), 0.90 in the latter half of the 1890s (1896-1900) and remaining high after the turn of the century (0.94 for the 1900-1909 period). The spread between Tokyo and Osaka lending rates also contracted from 2.15 percentage points average in 1880 to 0.23 percentage points in 1890. The increased linkage of interest rates and the contraction of the spread coincide with the startup of operations at the Bank of Japan head office and Osaka Branch, and it is conceivable that the establishment of Bank of Japan offices in the two centers of Tokyo and Osaka helped to alleviate the separation of the two markets. It is also conceivable that the startup of banknote issuing by the Bank of Japan in 1885 played a role as this allowed banknotes to be supplied more flexibly. For further information on the functions of the Bank of Japan Osaka Branch at the time of its establishment see “The Bank of Japan: The First Hundred Years” Editing Committee [1982], pp. 250-258 and Tsurumi [1991], pp. 222-287.
as credit transactions have developed. They are able to take measures as the situation demands so as to successfully coordinate their efforts.”\(^{97}\) The indication was that financial markets were functioning effectively at this time. Likewise, in the “21st Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance” (1896) it says, “Interest-rate trends in different regions are virtually the same,”\(^{98}\) an indication that interest rates across regions had indeed become co-moved.

What can be observed from these comments is that while there was little progress on the nationwide integration of financial markets during the 1870s, when private-sector financial institution networks developed, and during the 1880s, when the Bank of Japan was putting in place in its correspondent networks with private-sector financial institutions. By contrast there were indeed advances in integration in the 1890s, when the Bank of Japan expanded its local representatives’ network.\(^{99}\)

(b) The integration of domestic financial markets as shown by prefectural interest rates

Section 3 examined the documentary evidence to see that the expansion of the Bank of Japan’ network facilitated funds transfers with remote areas. I will now consider the extent to which this function helped to achieve the “facilitation of finance” that was advocated as one of the objectives of establishing the Bank of Japan in “Explanation of the Establishment of the Bank of Japan” with a quantitative analysis. More specifically, since it is natural to assume that the smoothing out of funds surpluses and shortfalls between regions could alleviate regional differences in interest rates, I can use standard deviation and coefficient of variation\(^{100}\) to measure the differences in lending interest rates on a prefecture-by-prefecture basis during the period between the 1880s and the 1900s (Figure 4, Figure 5). For data, I will use the lending interest rates found in “Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance” and “Collected Japanese Economic Statistics.”\(^{101}\) Yamamura [1970] analyzes the convergence of


\(^{99}\) As will be discussed below, the standard deviation and coefficient of variation for prefectural interest rates was declining as early as 1884 (Figure 4, Figure 5). Further study will be required in order to evaluate the degree of integration in the financial markets during this period.

\(^{100}\) Coefficient of variation is standard deviation divided by average.

\(^{101}\) The left-side interest rates (1881-1889) shown with the dotted line in the figure come from “Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance;” the right-side interest rates (1889-1909) from “Collected Japanese Economic Statistics.” I am unable to obtain information on interest rates from 1881 to 1883 from statistical documents, but the “Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance” in its general commentary includes comments on economic and financial market trends as well as lending interest rates in several regions. I have therefore tabulated regional interest rates for the 1881-1883 period from the general commentary in the 4th, 5th and 6th Annual Reports. More specifically, I used the regional lending interest rates mentioned in the general commentary to arrive at an arithmetical average of prefectural interest rates. This leads to a small sample for the 1881-1883 period (26 in 1881, 19 in 1882 and 14 in 1883). For the 1884-1889 period, I use the “Table of Regional Interest-Rate Highs and Lows,” “Regional Table of Lending Interest-Rate Highs and Lows” found in the general commentary etc. of the “Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance.” For 1884 and 1885 only the high and low rates are available for the first and second halves, so we use the average of the high and low rates for the second half. For 1886, there are high and low interest rates for the July-December period; for 1887-1889, there are monthly high and low rates, so I use an annual average adjusted for average monthly highs and arbitrage rates. The right side of the dotted line was created from the “Table of Prefectural Interest Rates” in “Collected Japanese Economic Statistics” for 1889 and beyond. The prefectural interest rates in this statistical document record only the December, or in some cases the June and the December,
interest rates between 1889 and 1925 using lending and deposit rates recorded in the “Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance” as found in “Materials on Japanese Monetary History.” Yamamura [1970] does not analyze the period prior to 1889 because the data in “Materials on Japanese Monetary History” begins with that year. This paper works from the foundation laid by Yamamura [1970], but also prepares new data based on the lending interest rate commentary in the “Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance” for the 1881-1888 period, enabling us to analyze the financial market integration process from an earlier point in time.

The prefectural interest-rate differences are greatest for the first half of the 1880s, right around the time that the Bank of Japan was established. In 1882, the standard deviation was 6.36 and the coefficient of variation in 1883 was 0.41, the two peak figures for the 1881-1909 period that I analyzed. After those points in time, both the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation fell rapidly, reaching 2.31 and 0.17 respectively in 1884. This downtrend continued until 1889. What I do find is that both the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation were flat between 1889 and 1893, declined in 1894, rose in 1895, declined in 1896 and then gradually declined for the rest of the 1890s, although there were some variations within this. This decline in prefectural interest-rate differences backs up what I have seen from the documentary evidence, that there was progress on the integration of financial markets in the latter half of the 1890s.

Figure 6 provides more detail on regional interest-rate trends, and it can be seen that there were differences from region to region in the deviation from the national average. For example, at the end of the 1880s and in the first half of the 1890s, Hokkaido, Tohoku and Kyushu regions had interest rates higher than the national average, while Tokai, Kinki, Tozan (Yamanashi, Nagano, Gifu) regions had lower. In the latter half of the 1890s, the deviation from the national average tended to contract for all regions and interest-rate gaps moved in the direction of convergence. A certain degree of regional difference remained even after the 1890s.

One can also observe the convergence of regional interest rates from the Bank of Japan official discount rate. For a while after its establishment, the Bank of Japan did not have a uniform official discount rate for its offices. Different rates were applied in...
Tokyo and Osaka,\textsuperscript{105} and also at other offices,\textsuperscript{106} until 1906.\textsuperscript{107} However, the divergence between the official discount rates at the head office and Osaka Branch (Figure 7) that were seen in the 1880s had virtually disappeared by the early 1890s.

(2) \textit{The role played by the Bank of Japan network}

(a) Existence of local representatives and its impact on local interest rates (statistical investigation)

In this sub-section I examine from a statistical perspective the contribution made by the expansion of the Bank of Japan network to the contraction of interest-rate differences.

My first step is to identify changes in interest rates before and after the opening of the Bank of Japan office. I did this by looking at the nine prefectures in which the Bank of Japan opened offices between 1882 and 1909, examining two terms before and after the opening of the office and comparing how the prefectures’ interest rates diverged from the national average. In eight of the prefectures in which the Bank of Japan opened offices, excluding Osaka, there was a contraction in interest-rate deviation after the office opened compared to before (Table 2).\textsuperscript{108,109} Of this number, Fukuoka, Kyoto, Aichi and Fukushima prefectures showed a significant difference in deviation from the average before and after the opening of the office. I next compared the deviation from the national average interest rate for prefectures that had Bank of Japan offices and prefectures that did not for the period after 1900, when the number of offices was more

\textsuperscript{105} Comments on the process of determining the Bank of Japan official discount rate indicate that in the 1880s the Osaka Branch frequently used different “local commercial bill discount rates” and “public bond-secured lending rates” than the head office. The “Osaka Branch Temporary Bylaws” approved by the Minister of Finance in 1882 restricted the branch from setting its own rates without the permission of the head office, but that did not mean that Osaka merely followed the interest rates charged by the head office. Rather, it was able to set bill discount rates and lending rates that it determined to be appropriate and to request the head office to make changes. There is correspondence beginning about July 1884 between Osaka Branch Manager Toyama Yuzo and Bank of Japan Governor Yoshihara and Vice Governor Tomita from which can be gauged the process of changing the official discount rate to adjust for financial demand. Among the correspondence is a disagreement between the head office, which wanted Osaka to raise its official discount rate, and the Osaka Branch, which was reluctant to do so because it wanted to encourage use of its bill discounting services. While the Osaka Branch eventually acquiesced, it appears that it did not easily give in to instructions from the head office to change its official discount rate (see “The Bank of Japan: The First Hundred Years” Editing Committee [1982], pp. 250-258).

\textsuperscript{106} The head office, Osaka Branch, Hokkaido Branch, Saibu Branch and Fukushima Local Office all had their own official discount rates. The Sapporo Local Office and Otaru Local Office used the same rates as the Hokkaido Branch; the Kyoto Local Office used the same rates as the Osaka Branch; and the Nagoya Branch and Hiroshima Local Office the same rates as the head office (see “The Bank of Japan: The First Hundred Years” Editing Committee [1986], pp. 350-375).

\textsuperscript{107} In 1906, the Bank of Japan reformed its interest rate systems, including the application of a uniform official discount rate (“Bank of Japan Interest Rates System Reforms;” “Tokyo Bank Report;” “Conversations with Mr. Kimura Seishiro, Director, Operations Department, Bank of Japan; found in Bank of Japan Research Department [1957a], pp. 1096-1098). The main points of these reforms were to: 1) eliminate the transfer premium (charged to customers for transfers between offices), 2) unify interest rates (apply the same interest rates at all offices), and 3) more effective usage of interest rates (use the official discount rate as the standard interest rate, but also establish a maximum interest rate depending upon the type of the loan and apply interest rates between the two). An analysis of the 1906 interest rate system reforms is beyond the scope of this paper.

\textsuperscript{108} We should note that interest-rate data is only available for one year prior to the opening of the Tokyo and Osaka Branches and only one year after the opening of the Kanazawa Local Office (Ishikawa prefecture). We have also excluded the Gifu Local Office and Wakayama Local Office because they did not remain open.

\textsuperscript{109} As we will see in the panel analysis that follows, we have reservations about what can be interpreted from this data as the deviation between prefectural and national average interest rates was already in an overall contraction trend during this period.
or less unchanged (Table 3). I found that over a ten-year period, in every year except 1909, the deviation from the average was lower for prefectures that had Bank of Japan offices than for those that did not. I also confirmed a significant difference in the average of the differences for prefectures with and without Bank of Japan offices for the years 1900, 1901, 1903 in 1905.

The next step is to perform a panel estimation for the period 1889-1909, the period for which interest-rate data could be obtained from a single source. For this estimation, I use the interest rates differences from a national average for 47 prefectures as the dependent variable. Independent variables are the branch dummy which equals 1, where a Bank of Japan office exists, which is set based on office openings as shown in Table 1 and the number of correspondent contracts between private-sector banks and the Bank of Japan. (The results are in Table 4.) One-year lag for the “whether a Bank of Japan office exists or not” are used because new offices were not necessarily opened at the beginning of the year and the interest-rate converging effects were assumed to be more prominent in the year after the office was opened. Regarding coefficient signs, it is expected that they will be negative because interest-rate deviation should be smaller the greater the number of Bank of Japan offices and correspondent banks. The results of the estimate with a single regression indicate that both the coefficients of the branch dummy and the number of correspondent contracts between private-sector banks and the Bank of Japan had negative signs and were significant at the 5% level. Even the estimation using two independent variables found negative signs for the coefficients of the branch dummy and the number of correspondent contracts between private-sector banks and the Bank of Japan are significant at the 5% level. I further refined this estimation by adding a trend term (coefficient sign assumed to be negative) to take into account of the converging of interest rates over time due to enhancements in the transportation and communications networks during this period. The estimations indicate that the coefficients of the branch dummy; the number of private-sector correspondent banks and the trend term are significant at the 5% level, 1% level, 1% level, respectively.

These results indicate that the local offices of the Bank of Japan and the Bank of Japan correspondent network with private-sector banks can be assumed to have contributed to the converging of local interest rates.

(b) Functions of local representatives: The Saibu Branch

To this point I have observed the roll over time played by the private-sector bank network, correspondent network between the Bank of Japan and private-sector banks, and Bank of Japan branches and local offices network. Comparing these developments against trends in prefectural interest rates indicates that the creation of the Bank of Japan network, and particularly the branch and local office network, played a significant role in the integration of financial markets through the funds transfer services provided. Here I take an individual case study to examine from the perspectives of funds transfer services and interest rates the role played by a local Bank of Japan office in the
integration of financial markets. Specifically, I examine the functions of the Bank of Japan Saibu Branch.

The Saibu Branch was opened in 1893, making it the Bank of Japan’s second branch after Osaka. It was initially established in Akamagaseki (now Shimonoseki) in Yamaguchi Prefecture, but in 1898 was moved to Moji (now Kitakyushu) in Fukuoka Prefecture. The major industries in this region were coal mining and rice production, and this region was known for its active financial dealings with Osaka, which served as the trade center of such industries.

The financial situation in this region prior to the opening of the Saibu Branch is described as “about ¥10 million a year in rice, coal and other industrial sales outside of Kyushu with very little commodities sold other than these. In other words, it was always one-sided funds transfers. Even offsetting payments to the treasury in Kyushu, it was still necessary to send ¥4-5 million in cash every year from Osaka. Therefore, interest rates were ¥0.02-0.03 per day higher than Osaka.” The transfer of funds was not sufficient because transfers of cash were both onerous and risky and it can be assumed that there was insufficient interest rate arbitrage with other regions. By contrast, after the opening of the Saibu Branch, funds transfers could be made over the Bank of Japan network, which presumably facilitated the transfer of funds.

The details of funds transfers can be found in the “Bank of Japan Business Report” (Table 5). While there were changes over time in the direction of funds inflows and outflows, the volume increased fairly consistently, which indicates that there were more and more movements of funds over the Bank of Japan network each year. Factors in the increased inflows include the fact that coal production in Kyushu increased all the way through the 1887-1906 period, and private-sector banks with nationwide networks can be assumed to have collected funds from other regions and sent them to Kyushu to respond to the booming demand for funding in the coal industry. A prime reason in the increased outflows would be the mergers and acquisitions of smaller coal mines by the zaibatsu conglomerates, so that local sales became probably transferred to the zaibatsu head office in Osaka or Tokyo. Kasuya [1991] says that by 1902 the Moji

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10 For Bank of Japan funds transfers, Tsurumi [1991] uses the period from the latter half of 1883 to the first half of 1888, during which time the activities of the transfer clearinghouses declined. His analysis distinguishes between government transfers and civil transfers for transfers between Bank of Japan offices and between the Bank of Japan and private-sector banks (see Tsurumi [1991], pp. 144-151).

11 The territory of the Saibu Branch as its opening was the Chugoku region of west of Hiroshima and the entire Kyushu region. See Mukai [2000], p. 990.

12 Tokyo and Osaka account for the large majority of the total funds transfers of all Bank of Japan offices (Figure 8).

13 Takahashi [1976], p. 35. Takahashi Korekiyo was the first manager of the Saibu Branch.

14 In Bank of Japan Research Department [1957b], [1958b]. The first “Bank of Japan Business Report” was issued in 1888.

15 Looking at the regional breakdown of the Saibu Branch’s flow of funds, in most years the Saibu Branch had a small net inflow of funds vis-a-vis the head office, while for Kyoto, Nagoya and Fukushima (listed in aggregate as “others” in the table) Saibu had fairly consistent net outflows. By contrast, vis-a-vis the Osaka Branch there were net inflows until 1895, but this reversed in 1896 and there were large, consistent net outflows thereafter.

16 For example, Sumiya [1968], pp. 220-221, p. 295.

17 Mukai [1989] says, “Supported by expanding markets, the Chikuhou region coal industry began to quickly modernize its quarrying equipment and increase the size of its operations in 1887. The development of the coal industry required large amounts of operating capital to fund quarrying and transportation and also large amounts of fixed capital to pay for mining rights, startup costs and mechanical facilities.” (P50)
Branch of the Mitsui Bank was “receiving enormous sums of funds over the Bank of Japan telegraphic transfers network from the head office and Osaka Branch.”\footnote{\textsuperscript{118,119}} Mukai\cite{Mukai2000} says that “during the Meiji Period, even the zaibatsu-affiliated city banks used the Bank of Japan branch and local office network for transfers of funds from the head office.”\footnote{\textsuperscript{120}} This indicates the important role played by the Bank of Japan network in funds transfers.

As I have seen, more active inflows and outflows of funds through the Saibu Branch substantially closed the deviation between Fukuoka lending rates and those in other parts of the country in comparison with before the opening of the Saibu Branch (Figure 9). Presumably, the Saibu Branch’s facilitation of funds transfers between private-sector banks in different regions also enabled greater interest rate arbitrage.

This sub-section has looked at the Saibu Branch as an example of the role that Bank of Japan offices played in inter-regional funds adjustments, though further study will be needed to see how this example fits with developments at other Bank of Japan locations. Suffice it to note that “The Bank of Japan and Funds Transfers”\footnote{\textsuperscript{121}} found in the “Osaka Bank Report” of 1907 provides documentary evidence that the flow of funds was substantially smoother in regions that had Bank of Japan offices than in those that did not. This document says, “The benefits to be enjoyed by banks when transferring funds depend entirely upon whether they or the counterparty bank are located in areas where there are Bank of Japan offices.” In other words, having a Bank of Japan office benefited the funds transfers of local private-sector financial institutions. This document indicates that the expansion of the Bank of Japan network helped to alleviate the regional funding disadvantage through payments-side funds transfers between remote regions.

5. Conclusions

This paper has used documents and data to observe the role played by the Bank of Japan network in the process of financial market integration in Meiji Period Japan. I have demonstrated that regional differences in interest rates contracted in the late 1890s and, at least from the perspective of interest rates, significant progress had been made in financial market integration by the latter half of the decade. This is consistent with the analyses of Tsurumi \cite{Tsurumi1991} and Yamamura \cite{Yamamura1970}.

I also examined the role that the Bank of Japan played in financial market integration and found that the Bank of Japan network, and more specifically the correspondent transactions...
between the Bank of Japan and private-sector financial institutions and the local Bank of Japan offices, served to activate inter-regional movements of funds through the funds transfer services provided. These analytical findings are consistent with the arguments made by Tsurumi [1991].

Nonetheless, there were still some differences in regional interest rates even after the 1890s. One topic for future analysis is a longer-term perspective on the process by which financial market integration was deepened after the turn of the century. The focus of this paper was on the alleviation of funding disadvantage and interest rate differences through the facilitation of funds transfers between remote areas. Other important points to consider in any analysis of financial market integration would include the other major services of Bank of Japan offices: credit functions (lending, discounting, etc.), issuing of banknotes, and treasury services. These too are topics for further study.
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Cabinet Statistics Bureau, “Teikoku Tokei Nenkan (Imperial Statistics Yearbook)”


—,—, “Ishinki Tokyo no Kokunai Kawase Torihiki – Ryogae Sho to Kawase Kaisha (Domestic Money Transfer during the Meiji Restoration Period – Money Exchangers and Exchange Firms),” Chiho Kin’yushi Kenkyukai, Chiho Kin’yushi Kenkyu No. 34 (Research on


———, “Chiho Ginko Shiron (History of Regional Banks),” Nihon Keizai Hyoronsha, 2001(in Japanese)


Figure 1 The number of correspondent transactions of BoJ and private banks


Note: The numbers of correspondent contracts between private banks are available only for 1877, 1879, and 1880.

Table 1 Opening of the Bank of Japan's branches and local offices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Head office</th>
<th>Branches</th>
<th>Local offices</th>
<th>Places of Bank of Japan other than Tokyo head office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Osaka branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1883</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Osaka branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Osaka branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Osaka branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Osaka branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1887</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Osaka branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Osaka branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Osaka branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Osaka branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Osaka branch, Mito office, Wada office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Osaka branch, Mito office, Wada office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Osaka branch, Mito office, Wada office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Osaka branch, Saito branch, Sapporo office, Hakodate branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Osaka branch, Saito branch, Sapporo office, Hakodate branch, Sapporo office, Kyoto office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Osaka branch, Mito branch, Saito branch, Sapporo office, Hakodate branch, Sapporo office, Kyoto office, Osaka branch, Mito branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Osaka branch, Saito branch, Sapporo office, Hakodate branch, Sapporo office, Kyoto office, Osaka branch, Mito branch, Saito branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Osaka branch, Saito branch, Sapporo office, Hakodate branch, Sapporo office, Kyoto office, Osaka branch, Mito branch, Saito branch, Sapporo office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Osaka branch, Saito branch, Sapporo office, Hakodate branch, Sapporo office, Kyoto office, Osaka branch, Mito branch, Saito branch, Sapporo office, Hakodate branch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Osaka branch, Saito branch, Sapporo office, Hakodate branch, Sapporo office, Kyoto office, Osaka branch, Mito branch, Saito branch, Sapporo office, Hakodate branch, Sapporo office, Kyoto office, Osaka branch</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Bank of Japan: First Hundred Years-Materials [1986]
Figure 2 Averages of Lending rates (Tokyo/Osaka/Monthly)

Note: Monthly averages in the tables were used. In cases where monthly averages were not available, averages were calculated by using the high and low of each month. Original rates are daily rates that have been converted into annual rates.

Figure 3 Averages of Lending rates (Tokyo/Osaka/Annual)

Note: Monthly averages in the tables were used. In cases where monthly averages were not available, averages were calculated by using the high and low of each month. Original rates are daily rates that have been converted into annual rates.
Figure 4 Averages of prefectural interest rates and standard deviation

Source: Data for 1881-1889 (left side of the dotted line) are from Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance, data for 1889-1909 (right side of the dotted line) are from Imperial Statistics Yearbook.

Figure 5 Coefficient of variation of prefectural interest rates

Source: Data for 1881-1889 (left side of the dotted line) are from Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance, data for 1889-1909 (right side of the dotted line) are from Imperial Statistics Yearbook.
Figure 6 Regional averages of differences between each prefecture's interest rate and national average%

Source: Data for 1881-1889 (left side of the dotted line) are from Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance, data for 1889-1909 (right side of the dotted line) are from Imperial Statistics Yearbook.

Note: Tozan consists of Yamanashi, Nagano, and Gifu prefectures.

Figure 7 Bank of Japan's official interest rate

Source: The Bank of Japan: The First Hundred Years-Materials [1986]
Table 2 Differences between the prefectural rates where Bank of Japan was present and the national average

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average of the whole period (1881-1909)</th>
<th>Test for the average of differences of deviation before and after the opening of the BoJ (t-Test)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Before opening of the BoJ</td>
<td>After opening of the BoJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>4.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osaka</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukuoka</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>3.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hokkaido</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>1.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyoto</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>1.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aichi</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>2.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukushima</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiroshima</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ishikawa</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>1.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data for 1881-1889 are from Annual Report of the Banking Bureau of the Ministry of Finance, data for 1889-1909 are from Imperial Statistics Year book.

Note: Regarding the test, *** stands for 1% significance, ** stands for 5% significance, * stands for 10% significance.

Since data of sufficient duration are not available for Tokyo, Osaka, and Ishikawa, the t-test was not conducted for these three prefectures.

Table 3 Differences between prefectural rates and the national average during 1900-1909

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average of differences between prefectural rates and national average</th>
<th>Average of differences between rates of prefectures with BoJ presence and national average (A)</th>
<th>Average of differences between rates of prefectures without BoJ presence and national average (B)</th>
<th>Test for differences of averages of deviation of (A) and (B) (t-Test)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>1.218</td>
<td>0.622</td>
<td>1.323</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>1.333</td>
<td>0.695</td>
<td>1.444</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>1.510</td>
<td>0.806</td>
<td>1.615</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>1.996</td>
<td>1.212</td>
<td>2.133</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>1.380</td>
<td>0.795</td>
<td>1.482</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>1.170</td>
<td>0.784</td>
<td>1.249</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>1.507</td>
<td>1.075</td>
<td>1.595</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>1.206</td>
<td>1.163</td>
<td>1.215</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>0.940</td>
<td>0.913</td>
<td>0.946</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>1.442</td>
<td>1.463</td>
<td>1.437</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: For t-Test, ** stands for 5% significance, * stands for 10% significance.
Table 4 Panel analysis of differences between each prefecture's lending interest rate and national average, existence of a BOJ branch, and correspondent relationships between the BoJ and private banks

Equations (1) $S_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta X_{it-1} + u_{it}$

(2) $S_{it} = \alpha_i + \gamma Y_{it} + u_{it}$

(3) $S_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta X_{it-1} + \gamma Y_{it} + \delta T_{it} + u_{it}$

$S_{it}$=Deviation of lending interest rates of each prefecture (differences between each prefecture's rate and the national average; annual, absolute figure)

$X_{it}$=branch dummy which equals 1, where a Bank of Japan office exists

$Y_{it}$=The number of correspondent relationships between the BoJ and private banks

$T_{it}$=Trend

Estimates period 1889-1909

The results of the panel analysis for the 47 prefectures (fixed effect model)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$\beta$ (Bank of Japan branch dummy)</th>
<th>$\gamma$ (The number of correspondent relationships between the BOJ and the private banks)</th>
<th>$\delta$ (Trend)</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
<th>DM</th>
<th>The number of samples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>-0.498 (-2.143)**</td>
<td>-0.044 (-2.289)**</td>
<td>0.358</td>
<td>1.264</td>
<td></td>
<td>912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>-0.563 (-2.391)**</td>
<td>-0.062 (-3.343)***</td>
<td>0.307</td>
<td>1.254</td>
<td></td>
<td>958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>-0.098 (-2.289)**</td>
<td>-0.038 (-3.954)***</td>
<td>0.283</td>
<td>1.304</td>
<td></td>
<td>912</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Figures in parenthese are t-values. ***, ** indicate that estimations are significant at the 1%, the 5% level, respectively.

Test: P values regarding null hypothesis "Acceptance of random effect model." are 0.151 for equation (1), 0.010 for equation (2), and 0.013 for equation (3) respectively. Therefore, the fixed effect model was adopted.

Sources: Interest rates of each prefecture are from the "Imperial Statistics Yearbook", the number of the BOJ's branches is from "The Bank of Japan: The First Hundred Years-Materials", the number of the correspondent relationships between the Bank of Japan and private banks is based on "Manuals and Rules of the Bank of Japan's Operations" Collection 1 Volume 2.
Table 5 Transaction volume of money transfers of the Saibu Branch

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1893</th>
<th>1894</th>
<th>1895</th>
<th>1896</th>
<th>1897</th>
<th>1898</th>
<th>1899</th>
<th>1900</th>
<th>1901</th>
<th>1902</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inflow</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>2,378</td>
<td>2,095</td>
<td>2,616</td>
<td>2,238</td>
<td>4,441</td>
<td>6,180</td>
<td>7,261</td>
<td>14,906</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>1,073</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>917</td>
<td>884</td>
<td>1,636</td>
<td>3,002</td>
<td>4,122</td>
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Source: Bank of Japan Business Report

Figure 8 Ratio of transaction volumes of money transfers of Bank of Japan

Source: Bank of Japan Business Report
Figure 9 Difference in interest rates between Fukuoka Prefecture and the national average

%/$/point

Source: Imperial Statistics Year book