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Asymmetric Shocks and Regional Risk Sharing: Evidence from Japan

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Abstract
We use the methodology of Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen, and Yosha (2003) to calculate the degree of insurance among Japanese prefectures. Prefectural-level data for the fiscal years 1975 to 1999 are used to analyze the impact of idiosyncratic shocks to regional income. The results indicate that about 20% of idiosyncratic shocks to regional income are absorbed by interregional income insurance through the capital market, about 10% is absorbed by the national government through the interregional tax transfer system, and about 60% is absorbed as a result of changes in saving and dissaving.

Key words: regional shocks, risk sharing.
JEL classification: F15, F41

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I. Introduction

Even after the successful launch of the euro on January 1, 1999 and the circulation of euro-denominated banknotes and coins in January 2002, many economists and policy makers are still concerned with a difficult question: exactly how should a central bank react to region-specific shocks within a monetary union? In response, economists have conducted numerous empirical analyses regarding the necessity of central fiscal policy to guard against asymmetric shocks, particularly using state-level data in the United States (see Kletzer and von Hagen [2000] and section 1 of Mélitz [2004] for a recent review). These studies have generally indicated that fiscal transfers may be significant in some existing monetary unions, but it is nevertheless difficult to conclude how important it is in practice for the stabilization of the regional economies.

As part of this body of work, Asdrubali, Sørensen, and Yosha (1996) (hereafter, ASY [1996]) propose a straightforward method for estimating the degree of regional income and consumption smoothing via insurance and credit. Their method essentially comprises the decomposition of cross-sectional variance in gross U.S. state product into four parts: fractions of shocks to gross state product smoothed via capital markets, fractions of shocks to gross state product smoothed by the federal fiscal system, fractions of shocks to gross state product smoothed by credit markets, and an unsmoothed residual fraction. According to ASY (1996), over the period 1963–1990, 39% of shocks to gross state products are smoothed via capital markets, 13% are
smoothed by the federal government, and 23% are smoothed by credit markets. The
remaining 25% are unsmoothed.

Mélitz and Zumer (1999) propose some modifications to the methods by ASY
(1996), but U.S. data from 1964 to 1990 yield similar results to ASY (1996). Likewise,
pooling estimates based on Canadian data from 1962 to 1994 also support the findings
of ASY (1996): 30% of shocks to gross province products are smoothed via capital
markets, 8% are smoothed by the federal government, and 25% are smoothed by credit
markets. However, the pooling estimates using U.K. data from 1972 to 1996 and
Italian data from 1984 to 1992 do not yield statistically significant estimates of shocks
smoothed neither by the federal government nor by credit markets.

Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen, and Yosha (2003) (hereafter KSY [2003]) go one step
further to investigate the empirical relation between risk sharing and specialization in
production (i.e., the supply side of the economy). KSY (2003) consider various groups
of regions and countries (U.S. states, Japanese prefectures, European Community
countries), and: (i) calculate the degree of insurance among members of the group, (ii)
compute an index of industrial specialization for each region within the group, and (iii)
check whether a high degree of insurance within a group is associated with high
specialization of regions. They find that there is more risk sharing among regions
within countries than among countries, and that regions within countries are more
specialized than countries as a whole. Regarding Japan, KSY (2003) use Japanese data
from 1975 to 1993 and find that 21.6% of shocks to gross prefecture products are smoothed via capital markets and only 2.7% are unsmoothed. KSY (2004) provide a summary of the literature and report updates based on the data up until 1999. Mélitz (2004) also includes a useful survey of the literature, especially regarding evidence from European economies.

In this paper, we employ the methodology of KSY (2003) to calculate the degree of insurance among Japanese prefectures.¹ Our contribution is novel by virtue of: (i) using the more recent data up to 2001 to update their results, (ii) trying to use various combinations of macroeconomic variables used for estimation, (iii) examining the subsample properties of estimates of the shocks smoothed via capital markets and by the national government and credit markets, and (iv) using more detailed data to provide new estimates of fractions of shocks to gross prefectural product smoothed by the national government in Japan, with which KSY[2003] do not provide.

In addition, we also believe our study is important for at least three reasons. First, as suggested by Mélitz and Zumer (1999, 2002) and Mélitz (2004), the analysis in this framework might not be robust to the choice of monetary union and macroeconomic variables. It is then useful to examine their methods based on more detailed Japanese data sets. Second, Japanese macroeconomic data show the slowdown of the growth

¹ See Asdrubali and Kim (2004) for further improvement on methodology using a structural VAR model.
rate after the collapse of the bubble economy in the early 1990s. It is then necessary to investigate to what extent the analysis of KSY (2003) is robust to the choice of sample period. Finally, recent political debate in Japan stresses the need for more independent regional governments in terms of both regional fiscal policy and tax base. This debate requires a reasonable understanding of the current situation of risk sharing across prefectures, especially by nationwide fiscal policy. However, to the best of our knowledge, no one has compared the degree of income smoothing in Japan by national fiscal policy and other mechanisms such as capital markets and credit markets. For example, is the fraction of shocks to Japanese gross prefectural product smoothed via capital markets and credit markets higher or lower than those smoothed by the national government? Unfortunately, KSY (2003) do not examine this owing to data limitations. In the following discussion, we address this important point.

Importantly, we do not claim that our study is the first to examine Japanese cross-regional risk sharing, consumption smoothing, or even the correlation between saving and investment, since there are many studies that deal with these questions based on different methodologies. For example, van Wincoop (1995) examines the cross-correlation of consumption and output across Japanese prefectures in the period between 1970 and 1989. Iwamoto and van Wincoop (2000) analyze saving and investment relationships within Japanese regions from 1975 to 1990, by employing the framework of Feldstein and Horioka (1980), and find that the correlation is
significant lower than that for OECD countries. However, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to apply KSY’s (2003) methodology to more recent Japanese data.

The paper itself is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the model first proposed by ASY (1996) and the recent KSY (2003) model. Section 3 discusses the data sets used in our study. Section 4 reports the results of the analysis based on our main data set. Section 5 reports the results of sensitivity testing of the choice of macroeconomic variables. Section 6 summarizes our findings and discusses some policy implications. Section 7 concludes.

II. Model

KSY (2003) use two measures of regional risk sharing. Their method follows pioneering work by ASY (1996), which proposes a measure to decompose the cross-sectional variance into the variations smoothed by the capital market, by the federal tax system, and by credit markets. The decomposition of period-by-period, cross-sectional variance in regional income is as below. We define that $Y_1$ is regional income without any smoothing, such as regional GDP. We assume that $Y_1$ is homogenous nondurable goods, and that there is no capital gain and capital loss. We define that $Y_2$ is regional income smoothed only through capital markets, such as regional GNP that includes

\footnote{Yamori (1995) and Dekle (1996) also apply the methods proposed by Feldstein and Horioka (1980) to Japanese regional data.}
dividend, interest and rental income from other regions. We define that \( Y_3 \) is regional income smoothed through the national government as well as capital markets, something like disposable income, i.e. regional income net of tax and transfer across regions. Finally, let \( C \) be regional consumption.

Consider the identity,

\[
Y_{1i} = \frac{Y_{1i}}{Y_{2i}} \frac{Y_{3i}}{C_i},
\]

where subscript \( t \) denotes time, and subscript \( i \) denotes the region. Taking logs and differences, multiplying both sides by \( \Delta \ln Y_{1i} \) and taking expectations, we obtain the following decomposition of cross-sectional variance in \( \Delta \ln Y_{1i} \) for fixed \( t \).

\[
Var(\Delta \ln Y_{1i}) = Cov(\Delta \ln Y_{1i}, \Delta \ln Y_{1i} - \Delta \ln Y_{2i}) + Cov(\Delta \ln Y_{1i}, \Delta \ln Y_{2i} - \Delta \ln Y_{3i}) + Cov(\Delta \ln Y_{2i}, \Delta \ln C_i). \tag{2}
\]

Dividing both sides of the equation by the variance of \( \Delta \ln Y_{1i} \), we obtain an identity:

\[
1 = \beta_\kappa + \beta_\tau + \beta_C + \beta_U, \tag{3}
\]

where \( \beta_\kappa \) is the ordinary least square (OLS) estimates of the slope in the regression of \( \Delta \ln Y_{1i} - \Delta \ln Y_{2i} \) on \( \Delta \ln Y_{1i} \), \( \beta_\tau \) is the OLS estimates of the slope in the regression of \( \Delta \ln Y_{2i} - \Delta \ln Y_{3i} \) on \( \Delta \ln Y_{1i} \), \( \beta_C \) is the OLS estimates of the slope in the regression of
\[ \Delta \ln Y_{3it} - \Delta \ln C_{it} \text{ on } \Delta \ln Y_{1it}, \text{ and } \beta_U \text{ is the OLS estimates of the slope in the regression of } \Delta \ln C_{it} \text{ on } \Delta \ln Y_{1it}. \]

To measure these four fractions, ASY (1996) suggest the following panel regression:

\[ \Delta \ln Y_{1it} - \Delta \ln Y_{2it} = v_K + \beta_K \cdot \Delta \ln Y_{1it} + \epsilon_{Kiit}, \]  

(4)

\[ \Delta \ln Y_{2it} - \Delta \ln Y_{3it} = v_T + \beta_T \cdot \Delta \ln Y_{1it} + \epsilon_{Titi}, \]  

(5)

\[ \Delta \ln Y_{3it} - \Delta \ln C_{it} = v_C + \beta_C \cdot \Delta \ln Y_{1it} + \epsilon_{Citi}, \]  

(6)

\[ \Delta \ln C_{it} = v_U + \beta_U \cdot \Delta \ln Y_{1it} + \epsilon_{Uiti}, \]  

(7)

where \( v_j \) is a time-fixed effect that captures the undiversifiable fluctuations of within group (\( j = K, T, C, \) and \( U \)). To estimate equations (4)–(7), ASY (1996) employ regional GDP per capita for \( Y_1 \) and market-price regional income per capita for \( Y_2 \), market-price regional disposal income per capita for \( Y_3 \) and regional retail sales per capita for \( C \) (hereafter we use all the variables in constant-price basis deflated by CPI, and per capita basis without any special notation).

Following ASY (1996), KSY (2003) estimate equation (4) using regional GDP for \( Y_1 \) and regional personal income for \( Y_2 \). Suppose that \( Y_1 \) is an exogenous variable, and that it is composed of homogenous nondurable goods. If the idiosyncratic part of
fluctuations in $Y_2$ is *ex ante* perfectly insured within the group, say, by the cross-holding of assets among regions through the capital market, each region’s $Y_2$ should not be affected by the idiosyncratic fluctuations of $Y_1$, and $Y_2$ should be equal to some constant value captured by $\nu_t$. Thus, $\beta_K$ in equation (4) must equal unity. Suppose then that $Y_2$ is not perfectly insured within the group. If there is no insurance in $Y_2$, $Y_2$ and $Y_1$ must co-move perfectly, and thus $\beta_K$ will be zero. In this way, the fraction of idiosyncratic shocks to $Y_1$ that is absorbed by interregional income insurance through capital markets is measured by $\beta_K$.

KSY (2000) consider the second panel regression, which is not analyzed in KSY (2003), across the regions that constitute a risk sharing group:

$$\Delta \ln Y_{1it} - \Delta \ln Y_{2it} = \nu_{K+T,t} + \beta_{K+T} \cdot \Delta \ln Y_{1it} + \varepsilon_{K+T,it}, \tag{8}$$

where $Y_3$ indicates income smoothed through the national (federal) government as well as capital markets, and $\nu_{K+T,t}$ is time-fixed effect. In practice, KSY (2000) use personal disposable income for $Y_3$. The coefficient $\beta_{K+T}$ in equation (8) measures the fraction of idiosyncratic shocks to $Y_1$ absorbed not only by capital markets, but also by the national government; that is, the interregional tax transfer system. Since equation (8) is obtained by summing equation (4) and (5), $\beta_T = \beta_{K+T} - \beta_K$ measures the insurance through the national government. KSY (2000) do not estimate equation (8) for Japan because of the lack of suitable data series, but we will attempt the estimation of this
equation armed with detailed data sets of prefectural SNA statistics and our own estimates of personal disposable income and personal income.

KSY (2003) consider another measure of regional risk sharing. Suppose that the representative consumer in each region is risk averse and maximizes his/her lifetime expected utility from consumption. If the utility function is constant relative risk aversion, and all regions have the same discount factor, perfect \textit{ex ante} risk sharing of income (namely, consumption equals to income) implies that regional consumption and income is proportional to aggregate consumption and aggregate income. If full risk sharing is achieved \textit{only after} income insurance and consumption smoothing, then regional consumption is proportional to aggregate consumption. Reason further that income insurance through capital markets and the national government and consumption smoothing are perfect. Then, regional consumption must co-move with group-wide $Y_1$ as well as group-wide $Y_2$, and each region’s consumption should not be affected with the idiosyncratic fluctuations of $Y_1$, and each region’s consumption should be equal to $\nu_{K+T+C,t}$, a time-fixed effect that captures the nondiversifiable fluctuations of within group $Y_1$. Thus, $\beta_{K+T+C}$ must be unity in the following regression equation (9), if there is perfect interregional overall income and consumption smoothing:

$$
\Delta \ln Y_{i,t} - \Delta \ln C_{i,t} = \nu_{K+T+C,t} + \beta_{K+T+C} \cdot \Delta \ln Y_{i,t} + \epsilon_{K+T+C,i,t},
$$

(9)
where $C$ is consumption and $v_{K+T+C, t}$ is a time-fixed effect that captures the undiversifiable fluctuations of within group $Y_t$. On the other hand, $\beta_{K+T+C}$ will be zero with no income and consumption smoothing. Since equation (9) is the sum of equations (4), (5) and (6), it is easy to compute the fraction of idiosyncratic shock smoothed by the changes in saving and dissaving typically instigated by the credit markets after the realization of idiosyncratic shock once we recognize the role of government by $\beta_C = \beta_{K+T+C} - \beta_T - \beta_K$.

Let us summarize the relationship with other studies on consumption before moving on to the details of data (See section 2 of KSY (2004) for an extensive literature review). First, we rearrange equation (9) and obtain the following:

$$-\Delta \ln C_{it} = v_{K+T+C,i} + (\beta_{K+T+C} - 1) \cdot \Delta \ln Y_{1it} + \epsilon_{K+T+C, it}. \tag{10}$$

Note that equation (10) is almost the same as Cochrane’s (1991) empirical model, which assumes full risk sharing, such that $(\beta_{K+T+C} - 1)$ is zero. Cochrane (1991) measures whether the consumption of economies responds only to aggregate shocks or not. The focus here is the measurement of fraction of region-specific $Y_{1}$ shocks absorbed through the various channels of interregional insurance. Second, if we add the real interest rate to the right-hand side of equation (10) instead of time-fixed effects, the empirical model is the same as that found in Campbell and Mankiw (1989) with the

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3 To be precise, Cochrane (1991) used various data series other than income data for the right-hand side variable, primarily because he regarded income as endogenous.
“rule-of-thumb” consumers subject to a liquidity constraint. However, Campbell and Mankiw’s (1989) main motivation is to verify the permanent income hypothesis and accordingly they emphasize the time series direction of the regression, while our analysis places more emphasis on its cross-sectional direction. Moreover, the coefficient $\beta_{K+T+C}$ measures all interregional income insurance through capital markets and the national government as well as the credit market. In this way, we interpret the degree of overall income and consumption smoothing against idiosyncratic regional shock to $Y_t$ as measured by three sources: first, the fraction of idiosyncratic shock smoothed by cross-holding of financial assets (ex ante insurance) measured by $\beta_K$; second, the fraction of idiosyncratic shock smoothed by net interregional transfer made by the national government (instigated after the realization of idiosyncratic shock) measured by $\beta_T$; and third, the fraction of idiosyncratic shock smoothed by the changes in savings and dissavings typically instigated by the credit markets after the realization of idiosyncratic shock once we recognize the role of government, measured by $\beta_C$. We believe that the estimates of the degree of overall income and consumption smoothing against idiosyncratic regional shock will help us to measure the effectiveness of interregional consumption and income smoothing in the Japanese monetary union. We hope that these results will then assist the quantitative evaluation of the status quo before the debate on the need for more independent fiscal policies by Japanese regional governments.
III. Data

In this section, we explain the details of the data series used in our study. We require data on income without any smoothing ($Y_1$), income smoothed only through capital markets ($Y_2$), income smoothed through capital markets and the national government ($Y_3$), and consumption ($C$). We use four sets of proxy variables for $Y_1$, $Y_2$, and $Y_3$. Our preferred statistic to obtain the effects of income smoothing is net market-price base variables. Market-price base data are measured by the market price, while factor cost base data is market-price base data minus net indirect tax (indirect tax on products less subsidies). Net base data and gross base data differ in their valuations of depreciation cost.

We prefer net market-price basis data because the proxy variables for $Y_1$, $Y_2$, and $Y_3$ exclude depreciation cost in a consistent manner for our analytical requirement. Our preference is based not on any economic model, but only on the consistency between statistical definitions of Japanese Prefectural SNA statistics, which might affect the estimates of $\beta_K$, $\beta_T$, and $\beta_C$.

The remaining three data sets include the variables suggested by ASY (1996) and KSY (2000, 2003). These data sets have some shortcomings in light of the

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4 The accounting item that makes the difference between the gross base data and net base data is “consumption of fixed capital”. In practice, valuation with depreciation (including consumption of fixed capital) is gross base data and valuation net of depreciation (excluding consumption of fixed capital) is net base data.
consistency of construction of statistics, and we use them in sensitivity checks. More specifically, the second data set includes regional GDP and market-price regional income as suggested by ASY (1996). The third data set collects gross market-price base variables proposed in KSY (2003). The fourth data set is for the replication of the results reported by KSY (2003).

A. Benchmark Data: Data based on net market-price basis data

We first construct benchmark data: net market-price data. We begin by defining \( C \) and \( Y_3 \). Then we subtract accounting items which reflect income transfer by central government and capital markets to construct \( Y_2 \) and \( Y_1 \). We use two consistent annual data series on prefectural SNA statistics compiled by the Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office of Japan. The data series are the prefecture-level counterpart of the national income account. The first series is available from the 1990 fiscal year (hereafter we use all the words year as Japanese fiscal year, from the April to the March in the next year) to 2001, and is based on the 1993 system of national account methods. The second series is from 1975 to 1999, and is based on the 1968 system of national account methods.

Regarding consumption data, we use total final consumption expenditure (the sum of private final consumption expenditure and government final consumption expenditure) for \( C \), because we make the assumption that each prefecture is an
economic agent. Data series on total final consumption expenditure is available in the prefectural SNA statistics.

As for data on $Y_3$, we use prefectural disposable income data for $Y_3$, because prefectural disposable income is income data smoothed through the capital markets as well as the federal tax and transfer. In practice, we use disposable income in the prefectural SNA statistics for prefectural disposable income data.

$Y_2$ is prefectural disposable income, $Y_3$, less the national government’s income transfers, which specifically are ‘other net transfers’ in the SNA statistics. Because, as the first and second rows in the upper panel of the Figure 1 show, prefectural disposable income is the sum of ‘other net transfer’ and market-price prefectural income, market-price prefectural income is $Y_2$, income smoothed through capital markets.

$Y_1$ is $Y_2$ less income transfer through the capital market, which latter is ‘net factor income transfer from outside the prefecture’ in SNA statistics. Because, as the second and third rows in the upper panel of Figure 1 show, the sum of market-price prefectural

\footnote{Net factor income transfer from outside the prefecture includes not only capital income, but also labor income transfer. Around big city area, it is quite plausible that a worker might earn earnings from a business in the neighboring prefecture. Therefore, estimates of $\beta_K$ based on this data may not reflect just the smoothing of income through capital markets.

We aggregate the prefectures around the large economic centers to cope with this problem. We regard greater Tokyo area (Tokyo, Kanagawa, Chiba, Saitama), Tokai area (Aichi, Gifu, Mie) and Kansai area (Osaka, Kyoto, Hyogo, Shiga, Wakayama, Nara) as three large prefectures. However, estimation results are not so much different from the ones obtained from our original data set. Therefore, commuters’ effect seems to be negligibly small.}
income $Y_2$ and ‘net factor income transfer from outside the prefecture’ is prefectural Net Domestic Product (NDP), $Y_1$. In practice, we estimate NDP by subtracting consumption of fixed capital from prefectural GDP, as the fourth row of the upper panel of the Figure 1 shows. The upper panel of Figure 1 shows that the three data series in our benchmark dataset consistently include the effect of net indirect tax and consistently exclude consumption of fixed capital. Based on this consistency, we consider that these market-price basis data give us reasonable estimates of $\beta_K$, $\beta_T$, and $\beta_C$.

Following KSY (2003), we use prefectural CPI as the deflator to obtain constant values. In addition, all of these data series are adjusted to a per capita basis, using population data provided in prefectural SNA statistics.

**B. Data based on GDP and market-price prefectural income**

ASY (1996) suggest the use of prefectural GDP and market-price regional income to estimate $\beta_K$. To follow this suggestion, we make one change in our choice of variable compared with our baseline data set. Regarding $Y_1$, we use prefectural GDP, rather than prefectural NDP. We use market-price prefectural income for $Y_2$, prefectural disposable income for $Y_3$ and consumption data as our benchmark data set does.

We point out one shortcoming in this data set. As the middle panel of the Figure 1 shows, the estimates of $\beta_K$ based on this data set include not only the effect of net factor income transferred from outside the prefecture, but also the effect of the
consumption of fixed capital. This is because prefectural GDP contains consumption of fixed capital, while market-price prefectural income does not. This point is clearly demonstrated in the middle panel of Figure 1.

C. Data based on gross market-price basis data

We consider another set of income data to follow the suggestion of KSY (2003). We make two changes in our choice of variables compared with our baseline data set. Regarding $Y_1$, we use prefectural GDP, rather than prefectural NDP. As regards $Y_2$, we use prefectural GNP for $Y_2$, rather than market-price prefectural income.\(^6\)

This data set has similar shortcoming to that of the previous section. As the bottom panel of Figure 1 shows, both prefectural GDP and prefectural GNP include consumption of fixed capital, while prefectural disposable income does not. Thus, $\beta_{K+T}$ measures the effect of consumption of fixed capital in addition to other net transfer and net factor income transfer from outside the prefecture.

D. Data to replicate Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen, and Yoshia (2003)

To replicate KSY (2003), we use prefectural GDP for $Y_1$, prefectural personal income for $Y_2$ and prefectural personal disposable income for $Y_3$. Note that KSY (2003) suggest using alternative macroeconomic variables, given their limitation of data as we have seen in the previous sections. Thus, the replication is for the sake of comparison only.

\(^6\) In practice, we use GNE data series in the prefectural SNA statistics for prefectural GNP data.
On the subject of $Y_2$, prefectural personal income roughly corresponds to market-price prefectural income distributed to households and private nonprofit institutions serving households. In practice, we estimate the data series on prefectural personal income because prefectural personal income is not reported in prefectural SNA statistics. Appendix explains the estimation method in detail. With $Y_3$, prefectural personal disposable income corresponds to prefectural disposable income distributed to households and private nonprofit institutions serving households minus employer contributions for social insurance. In practice, as prefectural personal disposable income is not reported in prefectural SNA statistics, we have to estimate this data series. The appendix also explains the estimation method in detail.

E. Summary Statistics

The discussion above shows that our statistically consistent and preferred data set is net market-price basis data. The other two data sets are quite likely to yield biased

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7 Prefectural personal income differs from prefectural income in three respects. First, prefectural personal income covers only households and private nonprofit institutions serving households, while prefectural income covers all the economic agents consisting of non-financial corporations, financial corporations, and government in addition to households and private nonprofit institutions serving households. Second, prefectural personal income does not include employer contributions for social insurance, which is included in prefectural income. Third, prefectural personal income includes transfer payments to persons less personal contributions for social insurance, which can be considered as “other net transfer” other than payment of direct tax.

8 KSY (2003) use prefectural GDP for $Y_1$, prefectural personal income for $Y_2$, and prefectural total consumption for $C$, obtained from National Accounts Japanese Prefectural Data (Sinfonica) in estimating equations (4) and (9) using the sample from 1975 to 1993. However, as mentioned above,
estimates. Before moving on to the regression analyses, Table 1 and Table 2 provide summary statistics for the data. All data series are on a per capita constant price basis, with annual changes in percentage points. Table 1 shows the summary statistics of changes in these variables based on 1968 SNA. Table 2 shows the summary statistics based on 1993 SNA. Tables 3 and Table 4 report the correlation matrix based on 1968 SNA and 1993 SNA. Data series within the groups of $Y_1$, $Y_2$, $Y_3$ and $C$ are positively correlated. However, the sizes of correlation coefficients are not uniformly high even within the group, depending on the choice of accounting methods, such as net or gross, or focusing on whole prefecture or subset of economic agents in a prefecture, and so forth. These results casually suggest that the choice of macroeconomic variables affects the results of the following econometric exercise. We will see the details in the following sections.

IV. Main Results

This section first discusses the details of the empirical estimation. Then it presents the main results based on net market-price basis data: prefectural NDP for $Y_1$, market-price prefectural income for $Y_2$, and prefectural disposable income for $Y_3$. Finally, this section reports the subsample properties of our estimates.

KSY (2003) do not estimate equation (8) for Japan because they do not have personal disposable income, which could be used for $Y_3$. 
A. Methods of estimations

Our estimations are constructed as below. First, based on the whole sample, we estimate equation (4),

$$\Delta \ln Y_{1it} - \Delta \ln Y_{2it} = v_{Ki} + \beta_K \cdot \Delta \ln Y_{1it} + \epsilon_{Kit},$$

and obtain the estimates of (100*β_K). Second, we estimate equation (9),

$$\Delta \ln Y_{1it} - \Delta \ln C_{it} = v_{K+T+C,\beta} + \beta_{K+T+C} \cdot \Delta \ln Y_{1it} + \epsilon_{K+T+C,\beta},$$

and obtain the estimates of (100*β_{K+T+C}).

Since the data limitation on prefectural disposable income forces us to reduce the number of observations available for the analysis, we repeat the analysis using the observations with prefectural disposable income. For those prefectures, we begin by estimating equation (4),

$$\Delta \ln Y_{1it} - \Delta \ln Y_{2it} = v_{Ki} + \beta_K \cdot \Delta \ln Y_{1it} + \epsilon_{Kit},$$

and obtain the estimates of (100*β_K). Second, we estimate equation (8),

$$\Delta \ln Y_{1it} - \Delta \ln Y_{3it} = v_{K+T,\beta} + \beta_{K+T} \cdot \Delta \ln Y_{1it} + \epsilon_{K+T,\beta},$$

and obtain the estimates of (100*β_{K+T}). Finally, we estimate equation (9),

$$\Delta \ln Y_{1it} - \Delta \ln C_{it} = v_{K+T+C,\beta} + \beta_{K+T+C} \cdot \Delta \ln Y_{1it} + \epsilon_{K+T+C,\beta},$$
and obtain the estimates of \((100*\beta_{K+T+C})\). Using the relationship that 
\((100*\beta_{K+T+C}) - (100*\beta_{K+T}) = (100*\beta_{C})\) and 
\((100*\beta_{K+T}) - (100*\beta_{K}) = (100*\beta_{T})\), we compute the 
individual components of risk sharing.

We estimate equations (4), (8), and (9) in two steps to take the heteroskedasticity in 
the error terms into consideration. In the first step, we begin by estimating each 
equation separately by OLS, including fixed time effects into the regressor. We then 
estimate the variance of the error term in each prefecture from the residuals obtained 
from each equation. Armed with those estimates of variance, in the second step, we 
correct the heteroskedasticity in the error term of each prefecture. Specifically, we 
estimate each equation by weighted least square (WLS) with fixed time effects. We 
call this method “WLS1”.

Note that the regressors in the three equations are not common in WLS1, because 
the regressors are scaled by the size of variance obtained in each equation. Thus, the 
identity of variance decomposition expressed in equation (2) does not hold for WLS1.⁹

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⁹ To cope with this problem, we try to correct correlations in the error terms among prefectures and 
equations, and autocorrelations in the error terms as suggested by ASY (1996) as follows. First, we 
estimate the matrix \(\Omega\) of correlation between equations, covariance matrix of prefectures \(\Gamma\), and 
the matrix of time series autocorrelation \(\mathbf{R}\) (assuming auto regressive order of one process) using OLS 
residuals. Second, we estimate the covariance matrix of error terms assuming that its structure is 
expressed by \(\Sigma = \Omega \otimes \Gamma \otimes \mathbf{R}\), and adjusting the size to meet our unbalanced observations to conduct the 
generalized least square estimation. However, our estimate of \(\Sigma\) turns out to be non-positive-definite, 
and our estimate of \(\Sigma\) does not satisfy the necessary condition for a valid estimate for a variance–
covariance matrix. This problem may occur because the size of sample in each prefecture is too small to 
estimate precise \(\Gamma\), as pointed out by ASY (1996).
To cure this problem, we also estimate the three equations based on a common variance estimate for each prefecture obtained from the OLS residuals of the three equations (4), (8), and (9). In this method, the identity of variance decomposition holds. We call this “WLS2”.

**B. Results based on full sample**

We present the results based on net market-price basis data: prefectural NDP for $Y_1$, market-price prefectural income for $Y_2$, and prefectural disposable income for $Y_3$. The fourth and fifth rows of Table 5 show the results based on 1968 base SNA estimated by WSL1. We find the estimate of $(100*\beta_k)$ to be 23.9%, or 22.0% based on the sample from 1975 to 1999, which is close to the result reported by KSY (2003) (21.6%, 1975-1993 data). The estimates of $(100*\beta_{K+T+C}$, 91.3% or 92.4%) are also similar to that of KSY (2003) (97.3%, 1975-1993 data) based on 1968 base SNA data. As showed in ninth and tenth rows of Table 5, WLS2 also provides almost the same estimates.

To assess the effects of choice of definition of SNA statistics and sample period, we compare the estimates based on 1968 SNA and 1993 SNA, focusing on individual magnitude of $(100*\beta_k)$, $(100*\beta_T)$, and $(100*\beta_C)$ estimated based on WLS2. In the eleventh and twelfth rows of Table 5, $(100*\beta_k)$ takes only smaller values based on 1993 base SNA data than based on 1968 SNA. However, the estimates of $(100*\beta_C)$ based on 1993 SNA data take smaller values around 55.4% than those based on 1968 SNA data (61.7%).
Does \((100*\beta_c)\) really fall in the 1990s, or does \((100*\beta_c)\) fall in the 1990s because of the changes in statistical measures from 1968 SNA to 1993 SNA? We will examine the robustness of those findings using subsample periods, rather than using whole sample periods for estimation for both 1968 SNA data and 1993 SNA data.

C. Subsample

To examine whether the decrease in the values of \((100*\beta_c)\) in the 1990s is a statistical artifact due to the change from 1968 SNA data to 1993 SNA data or not, we compute the values of \((100*\beta_k)\), \((100*\beta_l)\), and \((100*\beta_c)\) in equations (4) to (7) using the five-year sample periods by WLS2. Regarding the 1968 SNA data, our sample periods are 1976–1980, 1977–1981, …, and 1995–1999. Regarding the 1993 SNA data, our sample periods are 1991–1995, 1992–1996, …, and 1997–2001.

Figure 2 summarizes the results. The upper figure uses 1968 SNA data, and the lower figure uses 1993 SNA data. The numbers in the horizontal axis represent the middle year of the sample periods. For example, “1996” means the results based on the sample from 1994 to 1998. The upper figure shows that in the early 1990s, there seems to be a substantial decrease in the size of \((100*\beta_c)\), and overall effects of income insurance and smoothing. The lower figure confirms that the size of \((100*\beta_c)\) is relatively small in the early sample, and increases somewhat as we move on to the sample close to 2001. The upper figure also suggests that the size of \((100*\beta_l)\) and
(100*\(\beta_k\)) increased somewhat during the period in which we observe the decrease in (100*\(\beta_C\)). Figure 3 plots the cross-sectional standard deviation of each variable. Cross-sectional standard deviations of consumption seem to be of the same order as those of prefectural NDP in early 1990s. That is why, we expect, the degree of overall risk sharing measured by (100*\(\beta_{K+T+C}\)) decreases. Given the small increase in (100*\(\beta_{K+T}\)) in those periods, we find lower values of (100*\(\beta_C\)).

V. Sensitivity on the Choice of Macroeconomic Variables

This section presents our results based on GDP and market-price prefectural income data, gross market-price data, and replication of KSY (2003). Since the estimation methods are essentially the same as those in the previous sections, we merely present the results. We only mention the results based on WLS 2 because the results are similar whether based on WLS1 or WLS2.

A. Results based on GDP and market-price prefectural income

The ninth and eleventh rows of Table 6 show that based on 1968 base SNA, we get (100*\(\beta_k\)) to be 17.6% or 16.6%, which is smaller than that of KSY (2003) (21.6%). The estimates of (100*\(\beta_{K+T+C}\), 88.9% or 90.1%) are also close to that of KSY (2003) (97.3%) based on 1968 base SNA data. However, our finding is not robust to the choice of definition of SNA statistics and/or sample period. As the eleventh and
twelfth row of Table 6 shows, \((100*\beta_k)\) and \((100*\beta_c)\) take even smaller values based on 1993 base SNA data.

Figure 4 summarizes the results using subsample period. The upper figure shows that in the early 1990s, there seems to be a substantial decrease in the size of \((100*\beta_c)\), and overall effects of income insurance and smoothing. The lower figure also confirms that the size of \((100*\beta_c)\) is relatively small in the early sample, and increases somewhat as we move on to the sample close to 2001. The upper figure also suggests that the size of \((100*\beta_T)\) and \((100*\beta_k)\) increased somewhat during the period in which we observe the decrease in \((100*\beta_c)\).

There is a statistical inconsistency in this data set because the data set includes both gross and net base data; \(Y_1\) is gross while \(Y_2\) and \(Y_3\) are net. The statistical inconsistency seems to explain the relatively smaller values of \((100*\beta_k)\) for this data set than those of our benchmark data set. Nonetheless, estimates obtained from this data set do not vary much from those obtained from our baseline data set.

**B. Results based on gross market-price basis data**

Following KSY’s (2003) argument that the best estimate of \(Y_2\) is regional-level GNP, we present the results based on gross market-price basis data: prefectural GDP for \(Y_1\), prefectural GNP for \(Y_2\), and prefectural disposable income for \(Y_3\).
From the ninth and tenth rows of Table 7 based on 1968 base SNA, we obtain larger values of $\left(100\beta_K\right)$, 23.1% or 21.3% based on the sample from 1975 to 1999, than those reported in Table 6, and close to the result reported by KSY (2003) (21.6%). The estimates of $\left(100\beta_{K+T+C}\right)$, 90.1% or 90.3% are similar to that of KSY (2003) (97.3%) based on 1968 base SNA data. Our findings again are not robust to the choice of sample period. As the eleventh and twelfth row of Table 7 show, $\left(100\beta_K\right)$ and $\left(100\beta_C\right)$ takes only smaller values based on 1993 base SNA data.

Figure 5 summarizes the results using subsamples. We confirm that the size of $\left(100\beta_K\right)$ is not robust to the choice of subsample periods in both 1968 SNA and 1993 SNA. We also find the same decline in the size of $\left(100\beta_C\right)$ around the late 1980s and early 1990s.

There is a statistical inconsistency in this data set because it includes both gross and net base data; $Y_1$ and $Y_2$ are gross data while $Y_3$ is net. Nonetheless, sizes and trends of estimates obtained from this data set do not vary much from those obtained from our baseline data set.

C. Replication of Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen, and Yosha (2003)

Table 8 shows the results and our replication of KSY (2003) based on 1968 SNA (ninth row), and sensitivity tests using a new data series from 1990 to 2001 (tenth row). We point out an important feature.
Our estimates of \((100*\beta_k)\) are very different from those obtained by KSY (2003). The twelfth row of Table 8 shows that the estimate of \((100*\beta_k)\) takes a quite high value \((55.4\%)\) compared with the Japanese estimate of KSY (2003) \((21.6\%,\) the third row\), rather close to the U.S. estimate \((63.5\%)\) reported by KSY (2003). The estimate of \((100*\beta_{k+t+c}, 88.2\%)\) is similar to that of KSY (2003) \((97.3\%)\) based on 1968 base SNA data.

Since our estimate of \((100*\beta_{k+t})\) is \(58.9\%,\) we infer that \((100*\beta_t)\) is \(3.5\%\) and \((100*\beta_C)\) is \(29.3\%). The role played by \((100*\beta_t)\) of our estimate in Japan is a little smaller magnitude as estimated in the U.S. by KSY (2000), \(5.6\%). The thirteenth row of Table 8 shows the estimates of \((100*\beta_k), (100*\beta_{k+t})\) and \((100*\beta_{k+t+c})\) using 1993 base SNA data from 1990 to 2001. Compared with the estimate based on 1968 SNA data, \((100*\beta_k)\) takes a slightly higher value. One can easily verify that \((100*\beta_t)\) is only \(2.2\%\) and \((100*\beta_C)\) is \(13.7\%\).

The difference between our estimate of \((100*\beta_k)\) and KSY (2003) comes from the data employed in each study. KSY (2003) collect their data from Sinfonica, while we estimate our own data. Since a large part of income transfer is already reflected in personal income, the size of the estimates of \((100*\beta_k)\) based on prefectural personal income for \(Y_2\) shown in Table 8 must be greater than those based on prefectural GNP for \(Y_2\) by construction. However, the third row of Table 8 shows that the size of \((100*\beta_k)\) using prefectural personal income from Sinfonica by KSY [2003] to be
21.6%, whose size is not so much different from those based on prefectural GNP for $Y_2$, which seems to be implausible, considering the definition of statistical series.\(^\text{10}\) We, therefore, prefer our estimate.

VI. Discussion

A. Summary of results

Overall, our results show that the findings reported by KSY (2003) are not very sensitive to choice of macroeconomic variables, as long as we use the three data sets described in Figure 1. However, the choice of prefectural GDP and prefectural personal income provides a much higher estimate of \((100*\beta_k)\), which could misrepresent the magnitude of risk sharing. We summarize our estimates of \((100*\beta_k)\), \((100*\beta_T)\), and \((100*\beta_C)\) in Table 9.

In addition, individual insurance and smoothing effects of income vary significantly depending on the sample period. Regarding the estimates of \((100*\beta_k)\),

\(^{10}\) Note that the difference of economic agents as well as transferred items could affect the estimates. Regarding the estimates of \((100*\beta_T)\), Mélitz and Zumer (2002) examine the effects of choice of economic agents between personal economic agent (households and private nonprofit institutions serving households) and all the economic agents (non-financial corporations, financial corporations, and government in addition to households and private nonprofit institutions serving households) using Canadian data and the U.S. data. As for the personal economic agents, given $Y_3$ as personal disposable income and $Y_2$ as personal income, \((100*\beta_T)\) based on the U.S. data is 20.0% (p. 280, table 3, row 4) and \((100*\beta_T)\) based on the Canadian data is 20.9% (p. 280, table 3, row 9). Regarding all the economic agents, given $Y_3$ as disposable regional income and $Y_2$ as regional GNP, \((100*\beta_T)\) based on the U.S. data is 11.8% (p. 282, table 4, row 4) and \((100*\beta_T)\) based on the Canadian data is 12.6% (p. 282, table 4, row 9).
results reported in Figure 2 suggest that the plausible range is 14–36% in 1968 SNA and 15–23% in 1993 SNA and that this is sensitive to the choice of sample period. Concerning \(100\beta_T\), the results in Figure 2 show that the plausible size of \(100\beta_T\) is 3–18% in 1968 SNA and 3–15% in 1993 SNA. As for the estimates of \(100\beta_C\), plausible range is 23–80% in 1968 SNA and 49–66% in 93 SNA. Moreover, the degree of income smoothing instigated by the changes in savings and dissavings, \(100\beta_C\), seems to have fallen dramatically in the 1990s. The results of subsample estimation show that the reduction in \(100\beta_C\) measured by the 1993 SNA data is not the result of statistical discrepancy.

In full sample period estimation, our estimates suggests that in Japan, plausible estimates of \(100\beta_K\) is 22.4%, \(100\beta_T\) is 8.1%, and \(100\beta_C\) is 61.8% based on 1968 SNA data from 1975 to 1999. Our plausible estimate of \(100\beta_K\) is 19.1%, \(100\beta_T\) is about 12.8%, and \(100\beta_C\) is 55.4% based on 1993 SNA data.

**B. Interpretations**

First, regarding the magnitude of \(100\beta_K\), our estimates based on prefectural GDP and market-price prefectural income are consistently smaller than those in ASY (1996) (39%), which is based on the same U.S. state data set. Although the analysis used is not based on any structural models, one item of evidence supporting these results is the fact that Japanese households allocate only 7% of their financial assets to stocks and
investment trusts according to the 2001 flow-of-funds statistics, while U.S. households allocate 46% of their financial assets to stocks and investment trusts.

One may want hypothesize that the dominance of bank deposits and cash in Japanese household assets (54% in Japan, 11% in the U.S.), explains the relatively weak effects of \((100\beta_k)\) across regions in Japan. The small value of \((100\beta_k)\) seems to reject the idea that a household chooses to hold the stocks whose returns are negatively correlated with the regions that the household locates. One might cast doubt on such a nice risk hedge by a household. Nonetheless, one may still conjecture that the bank lending to the out-of-prefecture firms hedges risk for the household; thus, the household may not need to rely on capital markets.

One problem of this hypothesis is that, according to KSY (2003), the estimates of \((100\beta_k)\) based on twenty Italian regions from 1983 to 1992 is 76.4%, and eleven British regions is 41.6% based on data from 1978 to 1993. The ratio of bank deposits and cash in Italian households in 2001 is 17%, and that of British households is 23%. Those data does not support the hypothesis above.

Another hypothesis that explains the cross country difference of \((100\beta_k)\) is that one country has a stream of regional incomes whose cross-correlations are strong and thus the role of capital markets in smoothing cross regional income variations is weak (as in Japan), while the other country has a stream of regional incomes whose cross-
correlations are weak and the role of capital markets in smoothing cross regional income variations is strong.

Concerning the estimates based on euro-area data, KSY (2004) reports that their estimates of $(100*\beta_K)$ using GDP and GNP in eight E.U. economies is 11% and their estimates of $(100*\beta_K)$ in euro-area economies is 9% based on the data for 1993–2000, while the estimates of $(100*\beta_K)$ based on the data for 1972–1992 are small and even negative. The integration of European financial markets appear to have increased the level of $(100*\beta_K)$, but not close to the Japanese estimates of 21.3%, using GDP and GNP.

Second, regarding the size of $(100*\beta_T)$, the sizes are consistent with the results based on U.S. data (10–13%) such as ASY (1996), KSY (2003), and Mélitz and Zumer (2002). Although Kletzer and von Hagen (2000) argue that the evidence regarding the stabilization effects based on fiscal transfer is mixed, it is noteworthy that within the framework following ASY (1996) and KSY (2003), U.S. and Japanese idiosyncratic shocks to regional GDP absorbed by the national government (interregional tax transfer system) are of the same magnitude. There are other studies arguing that Japanese fiscal policy has strong distributional effects across regions (see Higo and Nakagawa (2001)), and that the sustainability of such a distribution from rich to poor prefectures is dubious. Note that this paper simply measures the fraction of idiosyncratic shocks to regional GDP absorbed by the national government, and does
not conclude anything about the distributional effects of regional fiscal policy or the welfare consequences of these policies.

Regarding the distributional effects of regional fiscal policy based on income transfer, the statistical methods employed in this paper include public investment allocated by the central government in the raw data, $Y_1$, and thus does not measure the distributional effects of fiscal policy through central government public investment. Regarding the welfare consequence of the policy, the national government may not regard the average prefectural income as the policy target variable to be smoothed. Therefore, the evidence in this paper should not be taken as policy advice based on welfare evaluations.

Third, regarding the decline of $(100*β_c)$ around the late 1980s and early 1990s followed by the shift down in the 1990s, one may conjecture that something happened to the pattern of household saving and dissaving by credit markets. This might be related to the asset price bubbles in that period, which widened the dispersion of income across prefectures. For example, a shock during the bubble period might have increased income and consumption simultaneously, motivated by the consumption of luxury goods. Another interpretation is that there are strong regional shocks asymmetric to the regions in the 1990s, and thus the overall degrees of risk sharing across regions decreased.
VII. Summary

We used the methodology of KSY (2003) to calculate the degree of insurance among Japanese prefectures. Our plausible estimate of the fraction of idiosyncratic shocks to prefectual NDP absorbed by interregional income insurance through capital markets, \((100*\beta_k)\), is 22.4% based on 1968 SNA data from 1975 to 1999. The fraction of idiosyncratic shocks to market price regional prefectural income absorbed by the national government via interregional tax transfer system, \((100*\beta_f)\), is 8.1% based on 1968 SNA data from 1975 to 1999. The fraction of idiosyncratic shocks to market price regional prefectural income absorbed by the changes in savings and dissavings typically instigated by the credit markets after the realization of idiosyncratic shock, \((100*\beta_c)\), is 61.8% based on 1968 SNA data from 1975 to 1999. Our plausible estimates of \((100*\beta_k)\) are in the range of 19.1%, \((100*\beta_f)\) is 12.8%, and \((100*\beta_c)\) is around 55.4% based on 1993 SNA data.

References


Appendix: Construction of data series on personal disposable income and personal income

Prefectural SNA statistics in Japan do not report prefectural personal income and prefectural disposable income. We utilize some data series in *Family Income and Expenditure Survey* (hereafter FIES) compiled by the Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, and Post and Telecommunications to estimate prefectural personal income and prefectural personal disposable income. One may wonder if we can conduct the whole study using the data on consumption from FIES, rather than prefectural SNA statistics. We choose not to do that because prefectural SNA statistics are more complete and well accepted data for most studies. Indeed, the consumption data in FIES is supplemented by the other regional statistics and yields the estimates of consumption data series in prefectural SNA statistics.

We assume that the following three data series in prefectural SNA Statistics and FIES are equal throughout our estimation: (1) prefectural income distributed to households and private nonprofit institutions serving households (hereafter personal economic agents) minus employer contributions for social insurance in prefectural SNA statistics, (2) income minus social security benefits in FIES, and (3) prefectural income minus “other net transfers” to personal economic agents other than payment of direct taxes. We begin by estimating prefectural personal disposable income, and then proceed to the estimation of prefectural personal income.
**Prefectural personal disposable income**

By definition, prefectural personal disposable income is equivalent to prefectural disposable income distributed to personal economic agents minus employer contributions for social insurance. We should be able to obtain a consistent data series on prefectural personal disposable income by the following equation: 

\[
\text{(prefectural personal disposable income)} = \text{(prefectural disposable income [households])} + \text{(prefectural disposable income [private nonprofit institutions serving households])} - \text{(employer contributions for social insurance)}.
\]

However, prefectural SNA statistics have many missing observations in the data series of employer contributions for social insurance. We cannot estimate the data on prefectural personal disposable income using the definition explained above.

To cope with this problem, we estimate prefectural personal disposable income utilizing some data series in FIES. First, we estimate prefectural personal disposable income under an additional assumption that the definition of disposable income in both prefectural SNA statistics and FIES are roughly consistent. Under this additional assumption, we estimate the ratio of (prefectural income distributed to personal economic agents minus employer contributions for social insurance; \(Y^{\text{pnw}}\)) to (prefectural disposable income distributed to personal economic agents minus employer contributions for social insurance; \(D^{\text{pnw}}\)) in prefectural SNA statistics by the ratio of (income minus social security benefits; \(Y^{\text{H}}\)) to (disposable income; \(D^{\text{H}}\)) in FIES.
Since the latter ratio is easily available from FIES, we estimate $D_{spa}$ in terms of prefectural SNA statistics by the following formula:

$$D_{spa} = Y_{spa} \times \frac{D_{H}}{Y_{H}},$$

where subscript $t$ and $i$ denote time and region, respectively.

Second, we make an additional adjustment to our $D_{spa}$ series following Ito and Watanabe (2004). As the FIES covers workers’ households only, the ratio of $Y_{H}$ to $D_{H}$ might to be biased from the ratio of all households in each prefecture. Therefore, $D_{spa}$ estimated above might also be biased. To cope with this bias, we utilize data from national SNA statistics to adjust the average bias based on the following formula:

$$adjusted\ D_{spa} = D_{spa} \times \frac{D_{sna} / Y_{sna}}{\sum \frac{D_{spa}}{\sum Y_{spa}}},$$

where $Y_{sna}$ and $D_{sna}$ denote the national counterparts of $Y_{spa}$ and $D_{spa}$ in the national SNA statistics, respectively. In this adjustment, averaged bias in $D_{spa} / Y_{spa}$ derived from bias in $D_{H} / Y_{H}$ is corrected by the national counterpart. We use data series on adjusted $D_{spa}$ for our estimate of prefectural personal disposable income.

**Prefectural personal income**

By definition, prefectural personal income is equivalent to prefectural income distributed to personal economic agents minus employer contributions for social
insurance plus “other net transfer” to personal economic agents other than payment of taxes. We should be able to obtain consistent data series on prefectural personal income based on the following formula: (prefectural personal income) = (prefectural income [households]) + (prefectural income [private nonprofit institutions serving households]) – (employer contributions for social insurance) + (“other net transfer” to personal economic agents other than payment of taxes).

However, since prefectural SNA statistics do not report the data series on “other net transfer” and “payment of taxes” for personal economic agents, we cannot use the above formula to estimate prefectural personal income. To cope with this problem, we estimate prefectural personal income based on the following relationship: (prefectural personal income) = (prefectural personal disposable income) + (payment of direct taxes by personal economic agents). Specifically, we first estimate the payment of direct taxes by personal economic agents using data series in FIES. We add that series to our own estimates of prefectural personal disposable income to obtain prefectural personal income.

Specifically, we first estimate payment of direct taxes by personal economic agents under the assumption that the payment of direct taxes in both prefectural SNA statistics and FIES are consistent. Under this additional assumption, we estimate the ratio of \( Y^{psa} \) to (payment of direct taxes by households; \( T^{emu} \) in prefectural SNA statistics, and the
ratio of $Y^d$ to (direct taxes; $T^d$) by the ratio reported in FIES. We estimate $T_{spa}^*$ by the following equation:

$$T_{spa}^* = Y_{spa}^* \times \frac{T^H \_u}{Y^H \_u}.$$ 

We also make an adjustment proposed by Ito and Watanabe (2004):

$$adjusted \ T_{spa}^* = T_{spa}^* \times \frac{T_{spa}^{\text{na}} \_u / Y_{spa}^{\text{na}} \_u}{\sum_i T_{spa}^{\text{na}} \_u / \sum_i Y_{spa}^{\text{na}} \_u},$$

where $T_{spa}^{\text{na}}$ denotes payment of direct taxes by households in national SNA statistics.

Second, we add our estimates of payment of direct taxes by personal economic agents to the estimated prefectural personal disposable income to obtain our own estimates of personal income ($PI$):

$$PI \_u = adjusted \ D_{spa}^* + adjusted \ T_{spa}^*. $$
### Table 1: Data description: 68SNA

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**Note:** All the figures are computed based on the change rate of real and per capita data series, and all the figures except for NOB are on a percentage basis. NOB and S.D. in the first row denote number of observation and standard deviation, respectively.
Table 2: Data description: 93SNA

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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>-8.02</td>
<td>6.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>-6.46</td>
<td>6.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Y_2$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market-price prefectural income</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>-6.80</td>
<td>6.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>-5.87</td>
<td>6.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefectural personal income</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>-9.97</td>
<td>19.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Y_3$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefectural disposable income</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>-8.26</td>
<td>10.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefectural personal disposable income</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>-10.51</td>
<td>9.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>-6.45</td>
<td>7.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All the figures are computed based on the change rate of real and per capita data series, and all the figures except for NOB are on a percentage basis. NOB and S.D. in the first row denote number of observation and standard deviation, respectively.
### Table 3: Correlation matrix: 68 SNA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$Y_1$</th>
<th>$Y_2$</th>
<th>$Y_3$</th>
<th>C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>(d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Y_1$</td>
<td>NDP (a)</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GDP (b)</td>
<td>0.986 1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Y_2$</td>
<td>Market-price</td>
<td>0.888 0.881</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>prefectural</td>
<td>(c)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>income (d)</td>
<td>0.877 0.892</td>
<td>0.986 1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GNP (e)</td>
<td>0.570 0.586</td>
<td>0.679 0.696</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Y_3$</td>
<td>Prefectural</td>
<td>0.798 0.795</td>
<td>0.905 0.891</td>
<td>0.603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>disposable</td>
<td>(f)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>income (g)</td>
<td>0.504 0.520</td>
<td>0.611 0.624</td>
<td>0.937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.429 0.461</td>
<td>0.448 0.467</td>
<td>0.351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>consumption</td>
<td>(h)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Correlation coefficients are based on the change rate of real and per capita data series.
Table 4: Correlation matrix: 93 SNA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$Y_1$</th>
<th>$Y_2$</th>
<th>$Y_3$</th>
<th>$C$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>(d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Y_1$</td>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Market-price prefectural income</td>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>0.891</td>
<td>0.891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>0.882</td>
<td>0.910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prefectural personal income</td>
<td>(e)</td>
<td>0.520</td>
<td>0.533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Y_2$</td>
<td>Prefectural disposable income</td>
<td>(f)</td>
<td>0.797</td>
<td>0.797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prefectural personal disposable income</td>
<td>(g)</td>
<td>0.481</td>
<td>0.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C$</td>
<td>Total consumption</td>
<td>(h)</td>
<td>0.404</td>
<td>0.445</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Correlation coefficients are based on the change rate of real and per capita data series.
Table 5: Estimation based on net market-price basis data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Regions</th>
<th>Capital Markets $100\beta_x$</th>
<th>Capital Markets and National Government $100\beta_{x+r}$</th>
<th>Overall Income and Consumption Smoothing $100\beta_{x+r+c}$</th>
<th>Consumption Smoothing $100\beta_c$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$Y_1$ NDP</td>
<td>$Y_2$ Prefectural income (market-price)</td>
<td>$Y_3$ Prefectural disposable income</td>
<td>C Total consumption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WLS1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968 SNA (1) (1975–1999)</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>23.9 (1.5)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>91.3 (1.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968 SNA (2) (1975–1999)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>22.0 (1.6)</td>
<td>30.6 (2.0)</td>
<td>92.4 (1.8)</td>
<td>61.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 SNA (1) (1990–2001)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>19.8 (1.9)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>87.3 (2.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 SNA (2) (1990–2001)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>19.4 (1.9)</td>
<td>33.0 (2.5)</td>
<td>87.5 (2.5)</td>
<td>54.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WLS2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968 SNA (1) (1975–1999)</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>23.5 (1.7)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>91.0 (1.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968 SNA (2) (1975–1999)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>22.4 (2.0)</td>
<td>30.5 (2.0)</td>
<td>92.3 (2.0)</td>
<td>61.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 SNA (1) (1990–2001)</td>
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<td>20.1 (2.4)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>86.6 (2.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 SNA (2) (1990–2001)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>19.1 (2.6)</td>
<td>31.9 (2.6)</td>
<td>87.3 (2.6)</td>
<td>55.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Numbers in parentheses show the standard errors for the parameters. Estimates for 1968 SNA (1) are based on 898 unbalanced observations, while estimates for 1968 SNA (2) are based on 788 unbalanced observations, reduced owing to the lack of prefectural disposable income data. Correspondingly, estimates for 1993 SNA (1) are based on 506 balanced observations, while estimates for 1993 SNA (2) are based on 495 balanced observations. The balanced observations indicate that all the regions have the same number of observations, while the unbalanced observations indicate that at least one region does not have the same number of observations.
Table 6: Estimation with GDP and market-price prefectural income data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Regions</th>
<th>Capital Markets $100\beta_k$</th>
<th>Capital Markets and National Government $100\beta_{k,t}$</th>
<th>Overall Income and Consumption Smoothing $100\beta_{k,t+1}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$Y_1$ GDP</td>
<td>$Y_2$ Prefectural income (market-price)</td>
<td>$Y_3$ Personal disposable income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WLS1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968 SNA (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1975–1999)</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>18.0 (1.8)</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968 SNA (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1975–1999)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>15.5 (1.8)</td>
<td>24.6 (2.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 SNA (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1990–2001)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>12.4 (2.1)</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 SNA (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1990–2001)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>12.1 (2.1)</td>
<td>25.3 (2.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WLS2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968 SNA (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1975–1999)</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>17.6 (2.0)</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968 SNA (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1975–1999)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>16.6 (2.2)</td>
<td>25.5 (2.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 SNA (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1990–2001)</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>11.8 (2.7)</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 SNA (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1990–2001)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>10.4 (2.9)</td>
<td>24.6 (2.9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers in parentheses show the standard errors for parameters. Estimates for 1968 SNA (1) are based on 913 unbalanced observations, while estimates for 1968 SNA (2) are based on 788 unbalanced observations, reduced owing to the lack of prefectural disposable income data. Correspondingly, estimates for 1993 SNA (1) are based on 506 balanced observations, while estimates for 1993 SNA (2) are based on 495 balanced observations. The balanced observations indicate that all the regions have the same number of observations, while the unbalanced observations indicate that at least one region does not have the same number of observations.
Table 7: Estimation based on gross market-price basis data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Regions</th>
<th>Capital Markets $100*\beta_k$</th>
<th>Capital Markets and National Government $100*\beta_{k+T}$</th>
<th>Overall Income and Consumption Smoothing $100*\beta_{k+T+C}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$Y_1$ GDP</td>
<td>$Y_2$ GNP</td>
<td>$Y_3$ Prefectural disposable income</td>
<td>C Total consumption</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

WLS1

| 1968 SNA (1) (1975–1999) | 47 | 22.3 (1.4) | – | 90.4 (1.7) |
| 1968 SNA (2) (1975–1999) | 41 | 19.8 (1.5) | 26.1 (2.4) | 90.8 (2.0) |
| 1993 SNA (1) (1990–2001) | 47 | 16.3 (1.7) | – | 83.6 (2.7) |
| 1993 SNA (2) (1990–2001) | 45 | 16.3 (1.2) | 25.3 (2.8) | 83.4 (2.8) |

WLS2

| 1968 SNA (1) (1975–1999) | 47 | 23.1 (1.7) | – | 90.1 (1.7) |
| 1968 SNA (2) (1975–1999) | 41 | 21.3 (2.1) | 25.0 (2.1) | 90.3 (2.1) |
| 1993 SNA (1) (1990–2001) | 47 | 16.5 (2.5) | – | 83.2 (2.5) |
| 1993 SNA (2) (1990–2001) | 45 | 16.3 (2.8) | 24.5 (2.8) | 83.6 (2.8) |

Note: Numbers in parentheses show the standard errors for parameters. Estimates for 1968 SNA (1) are based on 1128 balanced observations, while estimates for 1968 SNA (2) are based on 788 unbalanced observations, reduced owing to the lack of prefectural disposable income data. Correspondingly, estimates for 1993 SNA (1) are based on 517 balanced observations, while estimates for 1993 SNA (2) are based on 495 balanced observations. The balanced observations indicate that all the regions have the same number of observations, while the unbalanced observations indicate that at least one region does not have the same number of observations.
### Table 8: Replication of KSY (2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number of Regions</th>
<th>Capital Markets 100*β_k</th>
<th>Capital Markets and National Government 100*β_k+T</th>
<th>Overall Income and Consumption Smoothing 100*β_k+T+C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>KSY (2003)</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Y_1 GDP</td>
<td>Y_2 Personal income</td>
<td>Y_3</td>
<td>C Retail sales and total consumption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S. data</strong></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>63.5 (1.8)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>77.6 (4.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1977–1994)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Japanese data</strong></td>
<td>47</td>
<td>21.6 (2.2)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>97.3 (3.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1975–1993)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>KSY (2000)</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Y_1 GDP</td>
<td>Y_2 Personal income</td>
<td>Y_3 Personal disposable income</td>
<td>C Retail sales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S. data</strong></td>
<td>–</td>
<td>59.2 (1.5)</td>
<td>64.8 (1.6)</td>
<td>67.5 (4.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1977–1994)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Japanese estimates</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WLS1</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968 SNA (1975–1999)</td>
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<td>56.0 (2.8)</td>
<td>58.2 (3.2)</td>
<td>90.5 (1.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 SNA (1990–2001)</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>58.6 (5.9)</td>
<td>63.2 (6.4)</td>
<td>83.7 (2.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WLS2</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968 SNA (1975–1999)</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>55.4 (2.8)</td>
<td>58.9 (2.8)</td>
<td>88.2 (2.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 SNA (1990–2001)</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>60.6 (5.6)</td>
<td>62.8 (5.6)</td>
<td>76.5 (5.6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note**: Numbers in parentheses show the standard errors for parameters. Estimates for 1968 SNA are based on 1126 unbalanced observations, while estimates for 1993 SNA are based on 517 balanced observations. The balanced observations indicate that all the regions have the same number of observations, while the unbalanced observations indicate that at least one region does not have the same number of observations.
Table 9: Comparisons of individual insurance and smoothing effects in Tables 5–8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5</th>
<th>Number of Regions</th>
<th>Capital Markets $100\beta_k$</th>
<th>National Government $100\beta_T$</th>
<th>Credit Markets $100\beta_C$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$Y_1$ NDP</td>
<td>$Y_2$ Prefectural income (market-price)</td>
<td>$Y_3$ Prefectural disposable income</td>
<td>$C$ Total consumption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968 SNA (1975–1999)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>61.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 SNA (1990–2001)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>55.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 6</td>
<td>$Y_1$ GDP</td>
<td>$Y_2$ Prefectural income (market-price)</td>
<td>$Y_3$ Prefectural disposable income</td>
<td>$C$ Total consumption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968 SNA (1975–1999)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>64.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 7</td>
<td>$Y_1$ GDP</td>
<td>$Y_2$ GNP Prefectural disposable income</td>
<td>$Y_3$ Prefectural disposable income</td>
<td>$C$ Total consumption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968 SNA (1975–1999)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>65.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 SNA (1990–2001)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>59.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 8</td>
<td>$Y_1$ GDP</td>
<td>$Y_2$ Personal income</td>
<td>$Y_3$ Personal disposable income</td>
<td>$C$ Private consumption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968 SNA (1975–1999)</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 SNA (1990–2001)</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Individual insurance and smoothing effects are estimated from the WLS2 in Tables 5–8 by the subsequent equations: $\beta_T = \beta_{K+T} - \beta_K$, $\beta_C = \beta_{K+T+C} - \beta_{K+T}$. 

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Figure 1: Comparison of income data

A. Benchmark Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prefectural disposable income ($Y_3$)</th>
<th>$NFITOP$</th>
<th>$PFI$</th>
<th>$NIT$</th>
<th>$ONT$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Market-price prefectural income ($Y_2$)</td>
<td>$NFITOP$</td>
<td>$PFI$</td>
<td>$NIT$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefectural NDP ($Y_1$)</td>
<td>$PFI$</td>
<td>$NIT$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefectural GDP (For reference purpose only)</td>
<td>$PFI$</td>
<td>$NIT$</td>
<td>$CFC$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PFI: prefectural factor income  
$NIT$: net indirect tax  
$CFC$: consumption of fixed capital  
$NFITOP$: net factor income transferred from outside the prefecture  
$ONT$: other net transfer

B. Data based on GDP and market-price prefectural income (Following ASY (1996))

C. Data based on Gross market-price data (Following KSY (2003))

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prefectural disposable income ($Y_3$)</th>
<th>$NFITOP$</th>
<th>$PFI$</th>
<th>$NIT$</th>
<th>$ONT$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Market-price prefectural income ($Y_2$)</td>
<td>$NFITOP$</td>
<td>$PFI$</td>
<td>$NIT$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefectural GDP ($Y_1$)</td>
<td>$PFI$</td>
<td>$NIT$</td>
<td>$CFC$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 2: Estimations with net market-price basis data

[1] 1968 SNA

Note: We use prefectural NDP data for $Y_1$, market-price prefectural income data for $Y_2$, and prefectural disposable income for $Y_3$.


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Figure 3: Standard deviations of net market-price basis data

[1] 1968 SNA


Note: NDP, fcINC, DINC, and CONS denote net domestic product, factor-cost prefectural income, prefectural disposable income, and total consumption, respectively.
Figure 4: Estimations with GDP and market-price prefectural income data

[1] 1968 SNA


Note: We use prefectural GDP data for $Y_1$, market-price prefectural income data for $Y_2$, and prefectural disposable income for $Y_3$. 

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Figure 5: Estimations based on gross market-price basis data

[1] 1968 SNA


Note: We use prefectural GDP data for $Y_1$, prefectural GNP data for $Y_2$, and prefectural disposable income for $Y_3$. 