Some medical demand is inelastic to price changes, but not all. In assessing the effects of public health insurance reform on welfare, I examine the role of medical demand elasticity by developing a computational general equilibrium life-cycle model of the Japanese economy. The model features individual heterogeneity in health, income, and wealth. If all medical demand is inelastic, reforming public health insurance by increasing copayments reduces welfare for all current generations. However, if some medical demand is elastic, as is empirically observed, such a reform would improve welfare for current young generations, including those with poor health and low income. Furthermore, future generations benefit from the reform and their welfare increases significantly.
Keywords: Copayment Increase; Price Elasticity of Medical Demand; Welfare Effects; Overlapping Generations
Views expressed in the paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Japan or Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies.