

#### Monetary Policy after the Financial Crisis

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### Outline



- The causes of the financial crisis and the role of monetary policy
- Lessons for monetary policy

The relation between monetary policy (MP) and financial-stability policy (FSP)

# The financial crisis was not caused by monetary policy



#### Main causes of the crisis:

- Macro conditions: Global imbalances, global saving glut and investment shortage, low world interest rates, underestimation of risks, very low risk premia
- Distorted incentives to excessiv leverage and lack of due diligens: lax regulation and supervision, securitization, myopic and asymmetric remuneration contracts
- Information problems: Hidden risk in complex securities, underestimation of correlated systemic risks
- These causes had little or nothing to do with monetary policy!

# The financial crisis was not caused by monetary policy



- Loose Fed policy after 2001 justified by fear of Japanese-style deflation and liquidity trap
- Modest effects of policy rates on house prices and credit growth; substantially higher interest rates needed to stop house prices: recession, deflation and eventually liquidity trap?
- No impact on problems of distorted incentives, reg and sup, information



## Lessons for monetary policy?

- Price stability not enough to achieve financial stability
- Interest rate not enough to achieve financial stability: Separate financial-stability policy needed
- Let financial conditions and asset prices remain indicators, not targets, of monetary policy: Incorporate effects in forecasts of inflation and resource utilization at any horizon



## Lessons for monetary policy?

- Flexible inflation targeting, "forecast targeting": Set policy rate path so forecast of inflation and RU best stabilizes inflation and RU, using all relevant info, including financial conditions
- In 2nd best situation w/ imperfect financial-stability policy, *if* policy-rate path affects financial stability, take into account (probably very rare event)
- Normally policy-rate neglible impact on financial stability and strong impact on inflation and RU (unfavorable tradeoff!)

# **Relation monetary policy and financial-stability policy?**



- Distinguish economic policies acoording to
  - Objectives
  - Instruments
  - Authority(ies) controlling instruments and responsible for achieving objectives
- Fiscal policy and monetary policy distinct and different, but interaction
- Financial-stability policy and monetary policy distinct and different, but interaction



## **Monetary policy (MP)**

- Objective
  - Flexible inflation targeting:
    Stabilise inflation around inflation target *and* resource utilisation around normal level
- Instruments
  - Normal: Policy rate, policy-rate path, communication
  - Crisis: Fixed-rate lending at longer maturities, asset purchases (quantitative easing), ...
- Authority
  - Central bank



# **Financial-stability policy (FSP)**

- Objective
  - Financial stability (financial system fullfils main functions w/o disturbances with significant social costs)
  - Instruments:
    - Normal: Supervision, regulation, FS reports
    - Crisis: Lending of last resort, variable-rate lending longer maturities (credit easing), guarantees, bank resolution, capital injections, asset purchases,...
  - Authority(ies): FSA, CB, MoF, ...(varies across countries). Good case for CB for macroprudential supervision and regulation



#### MP and FSP different and distinct

- Interaction
  - FSP affects inflation and resource utilisation via financial markets and transmission mechanisms (spreads, lending)
  - MP affects resource utilisation, asset prices, balance sheets, leverage, credit losses
- Distinction and difference to be taken into account

### Conclusions



- Flexible inflation targeting remains best-practice MP (but take financial conditions into account!)
- *If* policy-rate path affects FS, take into account
- MP cannot ensure FS; a separate FSP is required
- FS as additional objective for *monetary policy* makes no sense
- FS as additional objective for *central bank* makes sense, *if* additional instruments
- Conduct MP taking effects of FSP into account
- Conduct FSP taking effects of MP into account