In this paper, we explore whether markets can create endogenously good collateral in a crisis by analyzing a simple exchange economy where a country-specific catastrophic shock is shared between two countries. To see this possibility, we examine whether the equilibrium achieved by the time-0 complete markets with solvency constraints can be recovered in the dynamically complete markets with collateral constraints. This paper demonstrates that it is possible to recover the time-0 equilibrium outcome in a sequential manner when pricing errors occur randomly in evaluating Lucas trees at a catastrophic event. Such stochastic components may be interpreted as a policy initiative to create good collateral and yield constrained efficient outcomes at crisis periods.
Keywords: Solvency Constraints; Collateral Constraints; Dynamic Optimal Contract; Catastrophic Shocks
Views expressed in the paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Japan or Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies.