Distortions in Factor Markets and Structural Adjustments in the Economy

Masayuki Nakakuki, Akira Otani, and Shigenori Shiratsuka

In this paper, we carry out qualitative and quantitative analyses of impacts of factor market distortions on Japan’s economic stagnation in the 1990s, thereby showing that resolution of structural impediments is essential for the restoration of sustained economic growth. Distortions in factor markets lead the economy to exhibit inefficient resource allocations, resulting in an inward shift of the nation’s production possibility frontier and a decline in its attainable output. Our estimation results reveal that the deterioration of distortions in factor markets is attributable to 0.5 percent of the decline in GDP growth (–3.6 percent) after the bursting of the asset price bubble. This confirms that the exacerbation of structural impediments in factor markets is one of the major causes of the prolonged economic stagnation after the bursting of the asset price bubble. Moreover, given that autonomous resolution of factor market distortions through the market mechanism is hardly expected, it is important to take measures to achieve a more efficient allocation of productive resources. Without such measures, monetary and fiscal policies cannot return the economy to a sustainable growth path.

Keywords: Structural problems; Heckscher-Ohlin model; Specific factor model; Production possibility frontier; Total factor productivity (TFP)

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I. Introduction

In this paper, we carry out qualitative and quantitative analyses of the impacts of factor market distortions on Japan’s economic stagnation in the 1990s. Our analyses suggest that the resolution of the structural impediments is essential to restore sustained economic growth in Japan.

In the “lost decade” of the post-bubble period in Japan, the average economic growth rate dwindled substantially, to 1.2 percent between 1991 and 2002 from 5.0 percent in the period from 1986 to 1990. Under such circumstances, many economists conducted theoretical and empirical studies to identify significant factors hampering sustainable economic growth in Japan. In this line of research, it is often argued that major factors behind the long-lasting economic stagnation were the failure of monetary and fiscal policies, and the problem of nonperforming loans that led to malfunctioning financial intermediation triggered by the bursting of the asset price bubble. Structural impediments have been pointed out as other major factors, although their definition varies from critic to critic.

Regarding structural impediments, Maeda, Higo, and Nishizaki (2001) categorize sources behind the problems into four categories: (1) rigid corporate governance; (2) inefficiency of the nonmanufacturing sector; (3) the issue of nonperforming assets associated with the generation and bursting of the asset price bubble; and (4) the savings-investment imbalance. They argue that all of these are “factors preventing the efficient allocation of resources,” based on a detailed analysis of individual factors behind structural impediments.

In this paper, we turn our attention to macroeconomic aspects of the problem by focusing on “inefficient allocation of resources resulting from factor market distortions” itself, rather than individual factors behind the structural impediments. More precisely, we present qualitative and quantitative analyses of the impact of inefficient factor allocation induced by factor market distortions on Japan’s economy. To this end, we rely on theoretical studies in trade theory on the effects of distortions in the economy, focusing especially on factor market distortions. Many trade theory economists conducted intensive theoretical studies of the effect of distortions on the economy, including imperfect competition, externalities of production and consumption, and factor market distortions, as well as policy measures to resolve such distortions, during the 1960s and 1970s.

We first survey developments in trade theory literature, which introduced factor market distortions and shed light on the mechanism through which they affect the macroeconomy. We then extend the conventional growth accounting framework into incorporating the effect of factor market distortions. Based on this framework,

1. Regarding this issue, Kameda and Takagawa (2003) compare the distribution of return on assets (ROA) for Japanese companies with that for Western and Asian companies. They show that the ROA distribution for Japanese companies has a lower variance and a steeper kurtosis than that of foreign companies and conclude that this pattern is evidence of the lack of corporate governance in Japanese companies.


3. This paper offers an analytical framework designed only to quantify the impact of factor market distortions on the macroeconomy. For a more comprehensive explanation of trade theory, see textbooks such as Caves, Frankel, and Jones (1996).
we show empirically the extent to which structural problems have been responsible for post-bubble economic stagnation since the 1990s. Finally, we explore how structural problems cannot be resolved autonomously through the market mechanism and discuss the policy implication.

This paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we review trade theory research conducted during the 1960s and 1970s, which studied the impact of factor market distortions on the production possibility frontier of the economy. In Section III, we examine the development of factor market distortions in Japan after the bursting of the asset price bubble, and conduct a quantitative analysis of their effects on Japan's economic stagnation. In Section IV, we summarize previous studies on the impact of factor market distortions on factor prices, and then investigate whether such distortions can be resolved autonomously through the market mechanism. In Section V, we offer a concluding discussion emphasizing implications for monetary policy.

II. Effects of Factor Market Distortions on the Production Possibility Frontier

In this section, we explore the effects of factor market distortions on the economy's production possibility frontier, based on the theoretical development in trade theory during the 1960s and 1970s. We then examine the relationship between changes in the production possibility frontier induced by factor market distortions and total factor productivity (TFP).

The effects of various types of distortions on the economy were intensively studied in trade theory during the period from the 1960s through the 1970s. The distortions examined in these studies were imperfect competition, externalities of production and consumption, and factor market distortions. Policy measures to resolve such distortions were also studied in this line of research.

Among the aforementioned distortions, this paper focuses on the factor market distortions. Major distortions in factor markets, addressed in the previous studies, are (1) factor immobility and (2) intersectoral differentials in factors' marginal productivity (factor price). The existence of such factor market distortions modifies the theoretical conclusions derived under the assumption of perfect factor markets.

4. Trade theory research has examined many issues related to economic distortions including factor market distortions. For example, Bhagwati (1971) studies the measures to resolve distortions, and demonstrates that an optimal policy is one that directly attacks the source of each distortion. That is, the optimal policy for the case of wage differentials is a factor tax-cum-subsidy. Moreover, some economists studied the relationship between economic distortions and immiserizing growth. Immiserizing growth denotes a situation where growth in a large country due to technological progress leads to sufficiently acute deterioration in its terms of trade, which imposes a loss of real income outweighing the primary gain in real income due to its growth (Bhagwati [1958]). Bhagwati (1968), however, demonstrates that even in a small country with economic distortions, immiserizing growth can occur, although it cannot influence world goods' prices.

5. Harberger (1962) addresses intersectoral factor price differentials by analyzing the effect of a corporate income tax on factor prices and income distribution. Johnson and Mieszkowski (1970) study the impact on factor prices of a wage increase in one sector relative to others. Furthermore, Johnson (1966) demonstrates that factor price differentials influence the shape of the production possibility frontier of the economy. Jones (1971b) synthesizes these studies to theoretically show that factor price differentials influence factor prices and the production possibility frontier. For the details of Jones (1971b), see Section II.B.
Below, we employ the Heckscher-Ohlin model (hereafter referred to as the H-O model), in which a perfect factor market and efficient resource allocation are assumed, as a benchmark case to show how a distortion-free economy adjusts to changes in relative prices. We then introduce factor immobility and intersectoral differentials in factors’ marginal productivity into the H-O model to explore how factor market distortions change the shape of the production possibility frontier and influence economic adjustments in response to changes in relative prices.

In the discussion below, the economy we assume consists of two sectors, an M-commodity sector and an N-commodity sector. We also assume that both sectors use capital and labor to produce each commodity under perfect competition.

A. Perfect Factor Markets
The H-O model assumes perfect factor markets and complete factor mobility. Thus, it can be regarded as a long-term economic situation.

In the H-O model, the economy’s production possibility frontier—the locus of efficient production points—is smoothly concave. If the relative price of M and N changes, the combination of output of M and N moves along the production possibility frontier. The production expands with a relative price increase and falls with a relative price decline, since capital and labor move to a sector with increasing relative prices from a sector with declining relative prices.

B. Factor Market Distortions
1. Factor immobility
In contrast to the H-O model’s assumption of perfect factor mobility of both capital and labor, let us assume labor moves freely between the two sectors, while capital is a factor specific to each sector. That is, capital is fixed in a distinctive sector in the short term but can move between the two sectors over time. This model is called the specific factor model (Jones [1971a]).

Suppose that factor endowment is identical in the H-O model and the specific factor model. Then, the maximum output of the two commodities in the specific factor model is less than that in the H-O model, since the specific factor model assumes factor immobility. This implies that the economy’s production possibility frontier of the specific factor model is located inside the H-O model.

Formally, the H-O model’s production possibility frontier is the envelope of the specific factor model (Figure 1). While the H-O model represents a long-term economic situation, the specific factor model can be regarded as a shorter-term economic situation where labor, but not capital, moves freely between the sectors.

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6. The H-O model was proposed by Heckscher (1949) and Ohlin (1933) and named after these prominent economists.
7. We also assume that each production function exhibits constant return to scale and is homogenous of degree one, and that each good is produced in a distinctive production process, i.e., no joint production.
8. Production decisions under the H-O model can be interpreted as the following optimization problem: output maximization under the constraint of constant relative prices. Meanwhile, in the specific factor model, production is determined by output maximization under two constraints: (1) constant relative prices and (2) constant capital endowment in each sector. Thus, the envelope theorem proves that the H-O model’s production possibility frontier is the specific factor model’s envelope.
When relative prices between two commodities change, capital and labor move to the sector with increased relative prices in the H-O model, but only labor can move in the specific factor model. Thus, the change in the output of each commodity in response to a given change in a relative price in the specific factor model is less than that in the H-O model.

Figure 1 shows the above point as well. We can see from the figure that efficient allocation is achieved at point $A$ under the current relative price. If the relative price of commodity $M$ to $N$ increases, then the economy shifts from point $A$ to point $C$ in the H-O model, while in the short term it merely shifts to point $B$ in the specific factor model.\(^9\)

2. **Intersectoral differentials in factors' marginal productivity**

We regard the differentials in factors’ marginal productivity across sectors as an indicator of the degree of factor market distortions, including the aforementioned factor immobility. When factor markets are perfect and the quality of productive factors is the same across sectors, factors’ marginal productivity is equalized across sectors. Moreover, when factor markets are imperfect due to reasons such as regulations, differences in the bargaining power of labor unions across sectors, or factor immobility, marginal productivity is not equalized across sectors.\(^{10}\)

We summarize the effect of factor price differentials on the production possibility frontier, based on Johnson (1966) and Jones (1971b). They analyze how the shape of the production possibility frontier is influenced by intersectoral differentials in factor prices caused by regulations or labor unions.

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\(^9\) Note that in the case of perfect factor immobility, the production possibility frontier can be drawn as a rectangle with point $A$ as one of the apexes (the Leontief production function). In this case, even if the relative price of each commodity changes, the output of each commodity remains constant.

\(^{10}\) See Section IV on this point.
Figure 2 depicts the Edgeworth box diagram for the two-commodity (commodities $M$ and $N$) case and the two-factor (labor and capital) case. In the construction of this diagram, the lengths of the vertical and horizontal axes correspond to labor and capital endowments, respectively. $M$ is assumed to be the capital-intensive sector and $N$ the labor-intensive one. $MM$ and $NN$ are isoquants. The distance from $O_M$ ($O_N$) to $MM$ ($NN$) corresponds to the output of $M$ ($N$). Tangency occurs at point $A$: relative factor prices for labor and capital are equal between the two sectors $M$ and $N$, and the $MM$ and $NN$ curves are tangent to one another. Efficient allocations are achieved on the locus of tangencies, or the contract curve $O_MAO_N$.

If factor prices differ between two sectors due to regulations or other reasons, then short-term equilibrium is achieved at point $B$, the intersection, not tangency, of the $M'M'$ and $NN$ curves. The output of $N$ at point $B$ equals that at point $A$, since both points are on the same isoquant $NN$. The output of $M$ at point $A$ is less than that at point $B$, because the $M'M'$ curve is closer in distance to $O_M$ than the $MM$ curve. This indicates that the intersectoral factor price differentials induce an inward shift in the production possibility frontier.

Let us examine closely the shape of the production possibility frontier under the intersectoral factor price differentials. When either $M$ or $N$ is being solely produced,

11. In this paper, capital-intensive commodity and labor-intensive commodity are defined as follows. Let us denote capital and labor input necessary to produce one unit of commodity $M$ as $a_{KM}$ and $a_{LM}$, respectively (the same is applicable to commodity $N$). Accordingly, $a_{KM}/a_{LM} > a_{KN}/a_{LN}$ means commodity $M$ is capital-intensive and commodity $N$ is labor-intensive. That is, when capital input necessary to produce one unit of one commodity exceeds that needed to produce the other, the commodity is capital-intensive. In addition, when labor input necessary to produce one unit of one commodity exceeds that needed to produce the other, the commodity is labor-intensive.

12. The contract curve is above the diagonal $O_MO_N$, since commodity $M$ is capital-intensive and commodity $N$ is labor-intensive.
the output is the same regardless of whether factor prices differ or not between the sectors. Therefore, as Figure 3 shows, if factor price differentials exist, the production possibility frontier becomes less concave, compared with that of the H-O model, or, in a more extreme case, it becomes convex rather than concave to the origin.\textsuperscript{13}

**Figure 3 Changes in the Production Possibility Frontier Due to Intersectoral Factor Price Differentials**

13. Johnson (1966) simulates the effect of factor price differentials on the shape of the production possibility frontier. Jones (1971b) theoretically demonstrates these changes. He shows that in the extreme case where factor price differentials are so large that the labor share of capital-intensive $M$ is higher than that of labor-intensive $N$, production of the commodity with the increased relative price falls while production of the commodity with the decreased relative prices expands. In other words, the production possibility frontier becomes convex to the origin. Furthermore, he clarifies that in the case where factor price differentials are not so large that the labor share of capital-intensive $M$ is smaller than that of labor-intensive $N$, production of the goods with rising (falling) relative prices increases (decreases) more than indicated by the H-O model. It implies that in this case, the concavity of the production possibility frontier is smaller than that in the case with perfect factor markets (the H-O model).
C. Implications for TFP Measurement
The aforementioned argument that factor market distortions induce an inward shift in the production possibility frontier has an important implication for the measurement of TFP in growth accounting.

The conventional framework of growth accounting assumes perfect factor markets, and regards differences between realized economic growth and the contribution of growth in productive factors as TFP. Thus, if factor market distortions actually exist, they are most likely to overestimate the contribution of productive factors. In such cases, estimated TFP is the sum of the true effect of technological progress and the negative effect of factor market distortions on economic growth.14

For example, Hayashi and Prescott (2002) implicitly assume perfect factor markets and calibrate the Japanese economy using a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function. Their estimation results show that a decline in working hours and TFP growth can account for Japan's long-lasting stagnation in the 1990s. They conjecture that the decline in TFP growth results from a policy that subsidizes inefficient firms and declining sectors.

The conventional growth accounting framework, however, cannot offer a “true” quantitative account for the slowdown in technological progress and the aggravation of structural problems, thereby overstating the decline in TFP growth. In exploring the causes of Japan’s economic stagnation in the 1990s and after and implementing necessary economic policies, it is important to gauge to what extent structural problems are responsible for the economic stagnation.

Below, we extend the conventional framework of growth accounting to incorporate the effects of structural impediments in the form of factor immobility as well as factor price differentials. Then, we show the estimation results on Japan's economic stagnation in the 1990s and after, based on this framework.

III. Empirical Analysis of Factor Market Distortions and Their Effects

In this section, we first examine changes in factor immobility and intersectoral differentials of factors’ marginal productivity after the bursting of the asset price bubble. In addition, we extend a conventional growth accounting framework to incorporate the negative effects of factor market distortions. We then employ an extended growth accounting framework to estimate the impacts of such distortions on Japan’s economic stagnation.

A. Factor Market Distortions in Japan
In this subsection, we use Japan’s data to examine changes in intersectoral factor mobility and differentials in factors’ marginal productivity after the bursting of the asset price bubble.

14. Therefore, in this framework of analysis, if TFP is narrowly interpreted to represent only technological progress, it underestimates the contribution of technological progress to economic growth.
1. Factor immobility
Miyagawa (2003) analyzes intersectoral labor mobility based on the measure proposed by Lilien (1982) (Lilien’s index),\(^{15}\) and shows that labor mobility has continued to decline after a temporary increase in the early 1990s (Figure 4).\(^{16}\) We also compute Lilien’s index for capital mobility and show that it has continued to decline since the early 1990s (Figure 5). As shown in these figures, factor immobility, particularly in capital, has worsened and productive factors have become locked in following the bursting of the asset price bubble.

2. Intersectoral differentials in factors’ marginal productivity
Next, we examine the intersectoral differentials in factors’ marginal productivity.\(^{17}\)
Suppose that the production function of each sector is homogeneous of degree one and defined by the equation

\[ Y_i = A_i F_i(K_i, L_i), \]

Figure 4 Labor Mobility

\[ \sigma_i = \left[ \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left( \frac{\Delta L_i}{L_i} - \frac{\Delta L}{L} \right) \right]^{1/2}. \]

Here, \(S_i)\) and \(L\) denote the share of labor input used in sector \(i\) and the total labor input in the economy, respectively. Thus, \(\sigma_i\) indicates the extent to which changes in labor input used in individual sectors diverge from changes in the total labor input in the economy. Note that Lilien’s index has a limitation in that it only shows the extent of relative divergence of changes in labor input shares used in individual sectors compared with that of the economy. Thus, it may not be a useful index in the presence of shocks whose effects differ from period to period.

\(^{15}\) Lilien’s index is defined as follows:

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\(^{16}\) Labor mobility during the bubble period and during the post-bubble period are almost the same. Their effects on the economy are, however, completely different. That is, during the post-bubble period, the nonmanufacturing industry, whose productivity is relatively low, increases employment. Therefore, it follows that the labor allocation during the post-bubble period became less efficient than during the bubble period. This point will be discussed in detail later in this paper.

\(^{17}\) The following measurement approach of intersectoral factor price differentials is based on Johnson (1966). Johnson (1966) assumes the production functions for each sector to be Cobb-Douglas functions, while this paper assumes that they are more general functions which are homogeneous of degree one.
where the subscript $i$ denotes sector, and $Y$, $A$, $K$, and $L$ represent output, TFP, capital stock, and labor input, respectively. Dividing the above equation by labor input yields labor productivity ($y = Y/L$), which can be expressed by the capital-labor ratio ($k = K/L$) as follows:

$$y_i = A_i f_i(k_i),$$

where $f_i(k_i)$ is $F_i(K_i/L_i, 1)$. Since the ratio of wages ($w_i$) to the rate of return on capital ($r_i$) in sector $i$ is equal to the ratio of labor's marginal productivity to capital's marginal productivity, the following equation holds:

$$\frac{w_i}{r_i} = \frac{f_i(k_i) - f_i'(k_i)k_i}{f_i''(k_i)}. \tag{1}$$

The labor share in sector $i (\alpha_i)$ equals $1 - f_i'(k_i)k_i/f_i(k_i)$, and the capital share $(1 - \alpha_i)$ equals $f_i''(k_i)k_i/f_i(k_i)$. Using these, equation (1) can be transformed as follows:

$$w_i/r_i = a_i k_i, \tag{2}$$

where $a_i$ corresponds to $\alpha_i/(1 - \alpha_i)$. Under perfect factor markets, the ratios of wages to the rate of return on capital are identical in all sectors. In the discussion below, we

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18. In the following discussion, it is assumed that Inada's condition holds, i.e., if $k_i \to 0, f'(k_i) \to \infty$ and if $k_i \to \infty, f''(k_i) \to 0$. 

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Figure 5  Capital Mobility

Note: Compiled on the basis of capital stock by sector using the JIP database.
assume that the ratio of wages to the rate of return on capital for sector \( i \) is \( 1/\gamma \), times that of the base sector (\( i = 1, \gamma = 1 \)). In this case, the ratio of relative factor prices in sector \( i \) to the base sector can be expressed as follows:

\[
\frac{a_i}{k_i} = \frac{\gamma a_i k_i}{1}
\]

\( \gamma = 1 \) implies that the marginal condition holds between these sectors. If \( \gamma \) exceeds unity, then sector \( i \) has a lower capital-labor ratio than the base sector. That is, labor input is too large and/or capital stock is too low. Conversely, if \( \gamma \) is less than unity, it means that the capital-labor ratio of sector \( i \) is too high.

Figure 6 compares the estimates of \( \gamma \) for each sector between the bubble period and the post-bubble period. In this figure, we employ the electrical machinery industry as the base sector to compute \( \gamma \), based on our presumption that this industry is the most

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19. In this paper, the bubble period is defined as the period between 1986, following the Plaza Accord (1985), and 1991, when land prices peaked. The post-bubble period is defined as the years after that.
efficient among all industries in Japan. It should be noted, however, that basic results are generally unaffected by changes in the definition of the base sector.\textsuperscript{20}

We can see from the figure that the estimates of \( \gamma \) for the manufacturing industry, except food products and beverages, remain almost unchanged. In contrast, those for many sectors in the nonmanufacturing industry, such as agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, construction, wholesale and retail trade, finance and insurance, and service activities, are much higher than unity. Moreover, their deviations from unity increase in the post-bubble period. This observation implies that the capital-labor ratios for these sectors remain considerably below the optimum level that the marginal condition indicates (either capital accumulation has been too small or labor input has been too large).

Significant rises in the estimates of \( \gamma \) for food products and beverages and some sectors in the nonmanufacturing industry in the post-bubble period seem to be related to regulations. In fact, these sectors are still protected by many regulations, i.e., import restrictions in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries and food products and beverages, and entry restrictions and other anti-competitive policies in the nonmanufacturing industry. As a result of such regulations, the rates of return on capital of these sectors are higher and the capital-labor ratios of these sectors are lower (estimates of \( \gamma \) are higher) than those of many sectors in the manufacturing industry.\textsuperscript{21} In contrast, advances in deregulation and globalization enhance domestic and international competitive pressures in the manufacturing industry.

\section*{B. Empirical Analysis of the Effects of Distortions}

\subsection*{1. Previous research}

As mentioned in the preceding subsection, most empirical studies on Japan’s economic stagnation since the early 1990s are generally based on the assumption of perfect factor markets, and ignore the effect of worsening factor market distortions. To cope with this problem, Miyagawa (2003) employs Syrquin’s (1986) methodology to decompose labor productivity into three factors: capital accumulation, TFP, and intersectoral labor immobility.

Suppose there are \( n \) sectors in the economy. Then labor productivity, \( y (= Y/L) \), is expressed as follows:

\[ y = \sum_{i=1}^{n} y_i S_i, \]

\textsuperscript{82}

20. We examined the robustness of our estimates of \( \gamma \) against the two alternative definitions of the base sector. The first alternative definition is the time trend of \( a_k \) for the electrical machinery industry. Estimates of \( a_k \) for each industry generally move upward and downward around the linear trend. This reflects the trend component of capital that deepens over time and the temporal component of short-term shocks to each industry. Thus, the time trend of \( a_k \) for the electrical machinery industry reflects the efficient state of capital that deepens after removing the effects of temporal shocks. When we employ the estimates of \( \gamma \) based on this definition of the base sector, however, the results shown in Figure 6 remain almost unchanged.

Another alternative definition is the average of all industries for each year. It should be noted that the degree of distortion in the base sector varies over time when we employ this definition. In particular, considering the fact that distortion in the nonmanufacturing industry worsens in the 1990s, it is most likely to underestimate the worsening of distortions in that industry.

21. As discussed later, the fact that estimates of \( \gamma \) in food products and beverages and some sectors in the non-manufacturing industry show no sign of improvement may reflect the fact that the factor market distortions cannot be resolved autonomously.
where $S_i$ denotes the share of labor input in sector $i$. Transforming the above equation into the growth rate yields equation (4) below:

$$\frac{\Delta y}{y} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{\Delta y_i}{y_i} S_i + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{y_i}{y} \Delta S_i$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{Y_i}{Y} \frac{\Delta y_i}{y_i} + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{y_i}{y} \Delta S_i$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{Y_i}{Y} \left(1 - \alpha \right) \frac{\Delta k_i}{k_i} + \frac{\Delta A_i}{A_i} \right) + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{y_i}{y} \Delta S_i$$

where $k$, $A$, and $\alpha$ represent the capital-labor ratio, TFP, and labor share, respectively. This equation shows that changes in labor productivity of the economy depend not only on changes in the accumulation of capital (where labor input is fixed in each sector) and TFP in each sector, but also on changes in the labor input share among sectors. It also implies that a shift of labor reallocation to higher labor productivity sectors raises aggregate labor productivity.

Miyagawa (2003) decomposes labor productivity based on equation (4) to show that the decline in aggregate labor productivity growth in Japan in the 1990s is attributable not only to lower TFP growth in individual sectors, but also to the deterioration of labor mobility (Table 1).

### 2. Effect of factor market distortions on GDP growth

In addition to decreased labor mobility, noted by Miyagawa (2003), misallocation of productive factors is also likely to be another cause of long-lasting stagnation in Japan. In fact, any misallocation of productive factors induces intersectoral differentials in factors’ marginal productivity, thereby causing an inward shift of the production possibility frontier and lowering labor productivity.

Next, we consider incorporating the effects of intersectoral differentials of the marginal productivity of capital as well as the decline in labor mobility within a growth accounting framework. In doing so, although Miyagawa (2003) uses the number of workers as labor input, we alternatively use a product of the number of workers and their average work hours as labor input for greater accuracy. Thus, in our analysis below, $S_i$ in equation (4) indicates the share of labor input in sector $i$ on a man-hour basis.

### Table 1 Breakdown of Labor Productivity Growth (All Industries)

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labor productivity growth</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td>2.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital accumulation</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFP</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor reallocation</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
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22. In deriving equation (4), the production functions for individual sectors are assumed to be homogeneous of degree one as discussed in Section III.A.
In the discussion below, we first present a conventional formulation of GDP growth decomposition incorporating no distortions in factor markets. Then we offer an extended formulation with distortions in factor markets. By comparing these two formulations, we can clearly see the influence of factor market distortions on GDP growth decomposition as well as TFP, with or without factor market distortions.

GDP ($Y$) is expressed using labor input of the economy, labor input share of each sector, and labor productivity of each sector, as follows:

$$Y = \sum_{i=1}^{n} Y_i = \sum_{i=1}^{n} LS_i A_i f_i(k_i),$$  \hspace{1cm} (5)

where $Y_i$ and $L_i$ denote real output of sector $i$ and labor input of the economy, respectively. In addition, the production functions of each sector are assumed to be homogeneous of degree one. Transforming equation (5) into a growth rate form yields equation (6) below:

$$\frac{\Delta Y}{Y} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{Y_i}{Y} \frac{\Delta A_i}{A_i} + \frac{\Delta L}{L} + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{LS_i A_i f_i(k_i)}{Y} \frac{\Delta S_i}{S_i} + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{LS_i A_i f_i'(k_i)k_i}{Y}\frac{\Delta k_i}{k_i}. \hspace{1cm} (6)$$

The capital-labor ratio for the economy, $k$, is expressed as the labor input share weighted average of capital-labor ratios of an individual sector. The sum of labor input shares of every sector is equal, by definition, to unity. Therefore, equations (7) and (8) are derived as

$$k = \sum_{i=1}^{n} S_i k_i, \hspace{1cm} (7)$$

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} S_i = 1. \hspace{1cm} (8)$$

Since wages ($w$) and the rate of return on capital ($r$) are identical in all sectors where there are perfect factor markets, equations (9) and (10) hold.

$$f_i'(k) = r, \hspace{1cm} (9)$$

$$f_i(k) - k f_i'(k) = w. \hspace{1cm} (10)$$

Substituting equations obtained through total differentiation of equations (7) and (8), and equations (9) and (10) into equation (6), yields the following equation that breaks down the GDP growth rate, in the case of a perfect factor market:

$$\frac{\Delta Y}{Y} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{Y_i}{Y} \frac{\Delta A_i}{A_i} + \frac{\Delta L}{L} + (1 - \alpha)\frac{\Delta k}{k}, \hspace{1cm} (11)$$

where $\alpha$ denotes the labor share of the economy. Equation (11) shows that the GDP growth rate can be divided into TFP growth effects of each sector, and an increase in labor input and capital stock of the economy if the factor markets are perfect.
Next, we break down the GDP growth rate where factor markets are distorted. Suppose the ratio of wages to return on capital of sector $i$ is $1/\gamma$, times as high as that of the base sector as in Section III.A. In this case, equations (9) and (10) do not hold but equation (3) holds. From equations (3) and (7), the capital-labor ratio of sector $i$ can be expressed by $k$, $\gamma$, and $S$ as follows:

$$k_i = k \left[ \sum_{m=1}^{n} S_m \frac{\gamma d_i}{\gamma_m d_m} \right].$$ (12)

Here, $\gamma_i = 1$ holds by definition. Equation (12) indicates that, given labor shares in each sector, the capital-labor ratio of each sector is determined by the capital-labor ratio of the base sector as in Section III.A. In this case, equations (9) and (10) do not hold.

Suppose the ratio of wages to return on capital of sector $i$ is $1/\gamma_i$, but equation (3) holds. From equations (3) and (7), the capital-labor ratio of sector $i$ can be expressed by $k$, $\gamma$, and $S$ as follows:

$$k_i = k \left[ \sum_{m=1}^{n} S_m \frac{\gamma d_i}{\gamma_m d_m} \right].$$ (12)

Substitution of equation (13) into equation (6) yields the following equation showing the breakdown of the GDP growth rate where factor markets are distorted:

$$\frac{\Delta Y}{Y} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{Y_i}{Y} \frac{\Delta A_i}{A_i} + \frac{\Delta L/L}{1-\alpha} \frac{\Delta k}{k} - \sum_{j=1}^{n} \frac{Y_j}{Y} (1-\alpha) \left\{ \frac{\Delta \gamma_j}{\gamma_j} - \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{S_j}{\gamma_j d_j} \sum_{m=1}^{n} \frac{\gamma_m d_m}{\gamma_m A_m} \frac{\Delta \gamma_m}{\gamma_m} \right\}$$

$$- \sum_{j=1}^{n} \frac{Y_j}{Y} (1-\alpha) \left\{ \frac{\Delta S_j}{S_j} - \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{S_j}{\gamma_j d_j} \sum_{m=1}^{n} \frac{S_m}{\gamma_m A_m} \frac{\Delta S_m}{S_m} \right\}.$$

23. The first term on the right-hand side of equation (13) indicates the effect of capital accumulation when $\gamma$ remains unchanged, that is, when structural impediments measured by intersectoral factor price differentials remain unchanged. The second term represents the sum of the direct effect of change of sector $i$’s own $\gamma$ on capital allocation and the indirect effects of changes in $\gamma$ in sectors other than sector $i$ on capital allocation, where the economy’s capital-labor ratio is constant. Finally, the third term shows the indirect effect of changes in labor input shares in individual sectors on the capital-labor ratio. Intuitively, since a rise in sector $i$’s $\gamma$ indicates a growing capital stock shortage in this sector, it works to lower the actual effect of capital accumulation. On the other hand, a higher $\gamma$ in sectors other than sector $i$ indicates a growing capital stock shortage for $i$, and works to increase $i$’s capital as $k$ is held constant.

24. In this paper, we conduct quantitative analyses using sectoral data on the effect of factor market distortions on GDP. Derivation of this equation requires the assumption of perfect competition in each sector. On the other hand, Basu and Fernald (2002) focus on the negative effect of imperfect competition on economic growth. They break down the GDP growth rate using the markup ratios of each sector, which indicate the degree of imperfect competition, and conduct quantitative analysis of the U.S. economy using industrial data from 1959 to 1989. Their estimation results show that the negative effect of imperfect competition is not so large for the measured period. In this line of research, Kawamoto (2004) employs the JIP database and shows that estimates of TFP growth are highly sensitive to adjustment of reallocation across industries and utilization of labor and capital.
The first to third terms on the right-hand side of equation (14) are identical to equation (11) without any distortion, while the fourth and fifth terms show the effect of factor market distortions. The fourth term represents the impact of intersectoral capital allocation induced by changes in $\gamma$ when the capital-labor ratio for the economy is held constant. The fifth term indicates the effect of changes in labor input share.\textsuperscript{25}

Comparing TFP growth rates in equations (11) and (14), we see that the TFP growth rate in equation (11) equals the sum of the TFP growth rate and the effect of factor market distortions in equation (14). This relationship indicates that the TFP growth rate estimated under the assumption of perfect factor markets is not the "true" TFP growth rate, because it ignores the negative effects of factor market distortions.

C. Breakdown of the GDP Growth Rate of Japan's Economy
Table 2 summarizes the results of the breakdown of Japan's GDP growth rate based on equation (14).\textsuperscript{26,27} In this analysis, changes in labor input are broken down into changes in number of workers and their average work hours. On the one hand, during the bubble period (1986–91), the GDP growth rate increases remarkably, reflecting the alleviation of factor market distortions as well as higher TFP and capital stock, regardless of the negative effect of fewer work hours. On the other hand, during the post-bubble period (1992–98), the GDP growth rate decelerates mainly due to a decline in the positive contributions of both accumulations in capital and TFP.

Table 2  Effect of Factor Market Distortions on the GDP Growth Rate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>1980–85</th>
<th>1986–91 (bubble period) (a)</th>
<th>1992–98 (post-bubble period) (b)</th>
<th>(b) – (a)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth</td>
<td>3.96</td>
<td>4.82</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>–3.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFP</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>–1.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital accumulation</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>–1.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of workers</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>–0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work hours</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>–1.85</td>
<td>–1.12</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distortions</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>–0.03</td>
<td>–0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative marginal productivity</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>–0.15</td>
<td>–0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor input share</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>–0.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{25} The effect of changes in labor input share consists of two parts. One is the indirect effect of changes in labor input on the GDP growth rate through changes in the capital-labor ratio of individual sectors. The other is the direct effect of changes in labor input share among high and low labor productivity sectors on the GDP growth rate.

\textsuperscript{26} The following data are used in breaking down the GDP growth rate. $Y$: real GDP, $L$: products of the number of workers and their average work hours, $\alpha$: nominal employee compensation divided by nominal domestic factor income, and $K$: products of real capital stock and capacity utilization. (The source for $Y$, $L$, and $\alpha$ is the Cabinet Office, National Accounts; the source for $K$ is the JIP database.) For details of the JIP database, see Fukao et al. (2003). Since data for capital stock and capacity utilization are released only up to 1998 in the JIP database, the estimation is conducted using data up to 1998.

\textsuperscript{27} In breaking down the GDP growth rate, the qualities of labor input are assumed to be identical among every sector. It follows that labor reallocation from low labor productivity sectors to high labor productivity sectors results in increased labor productivity for the economy. In reality, however, the quality of labor input and expertise necessary for production activities varies among firms and sectors. Thus, the shift of labor allocation to sectors that require different expertise could lead to wasted human capital and a decrease in labor productivity. Given such limitations, careful consideration may be needed to interpret the results of this empirical analysis.
Moreover, the positive effect of the changes in labor input share declines and the effect of intersectoral differentials in factors’ marginal productivity turns negative.

Table 2 also demonstrates that the worsening of the factor market distortions lowers the GDP growth rate following the bursting of the asset price bubble. From the bubble period to the post-bubble period, the contribution of the changes in distortions in factor markets is estimated at −0.5 percent of the total decline in GDP growth of −3.6 percent. Thus, the worsening of factor market distortions can account for one-seventh of the decline in the GDP growth rate from the bubble period to the post-bubble period.

We further break down the effects of the changes in factor market distortions according to the contribution of the manufacturing and nonmanufacturing industries in Table 3. Focusing first on the effect of changes in labor input share, the total effect lowers the GDP growth rate, because the negative effect in the manufacturing industry exceeds the positive effect in the nonmanufacturing industry. The negative effect in the manufacturing industry reflects the lower labor input share in sectors with high labor productivity. In contrast, the positive effect in the nonmanufacturing industry reflects the higher labor input share in sectors with a high capital-labor ratio, particularly construction and real estate. The total effect of changes in labor input share becomes negative, because labor productivity in the nonmanufacturing industry is lower than that in the manufacturing industry and the labor input increases in some sectors in the nonmanufacturing industry with particularly low labor productivity, such as construction.

The effect of changes in intersectoral differentials in factors’ marginal productivity reduces the GDP growth rate, especially in the nonmanufacturing industry. As Figure 6 shows, a negative effect arises because estimates of $\gamma$ in the nonmanufacturing industry worsen considerably following the bursting of the asset price bubble, while that for many sectors in the manufacturing industry remain unchanged.

There is less flexibility in factor markets in the midst of a shift toward a service-oriented economy, as shown in Figure 6. Resource misallocation worsens especially in the nonmanufacturing industry and the labor input share increases in low labor productivity sectors such as construction. Such deterioration caused by structural problems significantly lowers the GDP growth rate of Japan’s economy.

### Table 3 Contribution of the Manufacturing and Nonmanufacturing Industries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Decline in the GDP growth rate due to structural problems</th>
<th>Relative marginal productivity</th>
<th>Labor input share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>−0.26</td>
<td>−0.21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>−0.05</td>
<td>−0.38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonmanufacturing</td>
<td>−0.21</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

28. Table 2 also shows that the contributions of changes in distortion are positive both in the period of 1980–85 and that of 1986–91. This implies the reduction of distortion in factor markets in these periods.

29. This result implies that aggressive public investment during the post-bubble period might result in increased labor employment in construction and therefore public investment might exacerbate structural problems in the Japanese economy. See Maeda, Higo, and Nishizaki (2001) for this argument.
IV. Persistence of Factor Market Distortions

In previous sections, we showed an inward shift of the production possibility frontier induced by factor market distortions and offered a quantitative analysis of their effect on the GDP growth rate, from the standpoint of an investigation of their short-term effects.

Another important issue regarding structural problems related to the form of factor market distortions is whether they can be resolved autonomously through the market mechanism. If they cannot be resolved autonomously and the misallocation of productive factors persists over the long term, a temporal increase in effective demand stemming from monetary and fiscal policies alone will be unable to return the economy to a sustainable growth path. Thus, economic stagnation will continue so long as policy measures are not taken to directly address the structural problems.

Below, we examine this issue, using trade theory introduced in Section II, from the viewpoint of changes in factor prices influencing factor reallocations across sectors, to demonstrate that factor market distortions cannot be resolved autonomously. We consider the question of whether factor immobility can be rectified autonomously by comparing changes in factor prices under perfect factor mobility (the H-O model) with those under imperfect factor mobility (the specific factor model).

In the discussion below, commodity M is assumed to be capital-intensive and commodity N labor-intensive.

A. Factor Immobility and Changes in Factor Prices

The relationship between commodity prices and factor prices in the specific factor model converges to the H-O model, if factor immobility is rectified, since the H-O model assumes no factor market distortions. If some factor owners lose by fixing factor market distortions, they have an incentive to resist resolving structural impediments behind factor market distortions. As a result, factor market distortions cannot be resolved through the market mechanism.

Below, we derive the relationships between changes in commodity prices and factor prices under the H-O model and the specific factor model. Then we compare them to examine the question of whether the factor immobility can be rectified autonomously.

1. Changes in factor prices under the H-O model

Under the H-O model with perfect factor markets, the following simple relationship can be derived regarding the effect of relative prices of commodities on factor prices:

\[ \hat{r} > \hat{P}_M > \hat{P}_N > \hat{w}, \quad (15) \]

where \( \hat{r} \) and \( \hat{w} \) denote the rate of return on capital and wages, and \( \hat{\cdot} \) represents relative changes in variables. Equation (15) shows that an increase in a commodity price
raises the price of the factor that is intensively used to produce the commodity (the Stolper-Samuelson theorem) and that factor price changes are magnified reflections of commodity price changes (the magnification effect).\textsuperscript{31}

The intuition that equation (15) holds with respect to the relationship between changes in commodity prices and changes in factor prices is as follows. In the case of no factor mobility between sectors, an increase in the price of $M$ raises wages and the rate of return on capital in sector $M$. It follows that labor and capital are reallocated from sector $N$ to sector $M$. Since sector $M$ is capital-intensive, however, the amount of capital that sector $M$ wishes to acquire exceeds the amount that sector $N$ is willing to yield. Excess demand for capital in the economy as a whole therefore raises the rate of return on capital. Similar reasoning applies to labor, and this leads to reduced wages.

Let us explain the details of the mechanism of the magnification effect. Since perfect competition is assumed, income from the production of commodities is fully paid to workers and capital owners with zero excess profit. Thus, the following equations relate to prices in sectors $M$ and $N$:

$$a_{LM}w + a_{KM}r = P_M,$$  \hspace{1cm} (16)

$$a_{LN}w + a_{KN}r = P_N,$$  \hspace{1cm} (17)

where $a_{ij}$ denotes the quantity of productive factor $i$ that is necessary to produce one unit of commodity $j$.

The total differential of equation (16) can be written as the following equation (18):

$$a_{LM}dw + a_{KM}dr + wda_{LM} + rda_{KM} = dP_M.$$  \hspace{1cm} (18)

Since the assumption of perfect competition implies that the slope of a tangent line to the isoquant equals the ratio of factor prices, i.e., $wda_{LM} + rda_{KM} = 0$ holds, equation (18) can be expressed as equation (19),

$$\theta_{LM}\dot{w} + \theta_{KM}\dot{r} = \dot{P}_M,$$  \hspace{1cm} (19)

where $\theta_i$ represents the distribution share for factor $i$ in the $j$ sector. Further, a similar relationship holds for $N$ as well, and thus the following equation (20) can be obtained:

$$\theta_{LN}\dot{w} + \theta_{KN}\dot{r} = \dot{P}_N.$$  \hspace{1cm} (20)

We subtract equation (19) from (20) and make use of the fact that the sum of labor share and capital share in the same sector equals unity to obtain

$$(\theta_{LN} - \theta_{LM}) (\dot{r} - \dot{w}) = \dot{P}_M - \dot{P}_N.$$  \hspace{1cm} (21)

\textsuperscript{31} See Jones (1965) for this point.
Because $M$ is capital-intensive and $N$ is labor-intensive, $0 < \theta_{LM} - \theta_{MN} < 1$ holds. Thus, equation (21) shows that relative changes in factor prices exceed those in goods prices, that is, the magnification effect of commodity prices on factor prices. Note that equation (21) shows that relative sizes of labor share in each sector influence the relationship of changes in commodity prices and factor prices.

2. Changes in factor prices under the specific factor model

The effect of changes in commodity prices on factor prices under the specific factor model is modified from equation (15), which is obtained under the H-O model, to the following equation (22),

$$\hat{r}_M > \hat{P}_M > \hat{w} > \hat{P}_N > \hat{r}_N,$$  \hspace{1cm} (22)

where $r_M$ and $r_N$ are the rates of return for specific factors in sectors $M$ and $N$, respectively. Equation (22) shows two points: (1) the rates of return on specific factors are most radically influenced by changes in commodity prices; and (2) changes in wage rates stay between price changes in two commodities. That is, the return on the mobile factor (labor) rises relative to the price of $N$, and falls relative to the price of $M$.

Figure 7 provides an intuitive explanation as to why equation (22) holds under the specific factor model. In the construction of Figure 7, the commodity $N$ is used as numéraire, and vertical and horizontal axes represent nominal wages and labor inputs, respectively. The length of the horizontal axis shows the total labor supply, with the distance from $O_M$ indicating the labor input in sector $M$ and the distance from $O_N$ that in sector $N$. $VMPL_M(P_M^0)$ is the value of labor’s marginal product in sector $M$ with the price of $M$ being $P_M^0$. When the price of commodity $M$ is $P_M^1$, nominal wages are determined by $\hat{w}$, the intersection of $VMPL_M(P_M^0)$ and $VMPL_M(P_M^1)$.

**Figure 7 Changes in Factor Prices under the Specific Factor Model**
Suppose the price of commodity $M$ rises to $P_M^1$. Then, $VMPL_M(P_M^0)$ shifts upward to $VMPL_M(P_M^1)$ by the margin of the rise in price, leading to increased wages of $w^1$. Note that since $VMPL_N$ remains constant, the new equilibrium for wages does not rise as much as the price of $M$. Therefore, it rises relative to the price of $N$ but falls relative to the price of $M$.

Further, the rate of return on the specific factor is shown by the triangular region between the wage line and the respective value of labor's marginal product curves. As mentioned earlier, since wages do not rise as much as the price of commodity $M$, the rate of return on the specific factor for sector $M$ rises more than the price of commodity $M$. On the other hand, the rate of return on the specific factor for sector $N$ declines because $VMPL_N$ is constant and wages rise.

Next, let us give a formal explanation of why equation (22) holds. Perfect competition in commodity markets is assumed even in the specific factor model as in the H-O model. As a result, the following equations hold for $M$ and $N$ prices:

\[ a_{LM}w + a_{KM}r_M = P_M, \tag{23} \]
\[ a_{LN}w + a_{KN}r_N = P_N. \tag{24} \]

The difference between the above equations and equations (16) and (17) in the H-O model is that the rates of return on capital in both sectors do not coincide with each other. Using the total differentials of equations (23) and (24) as well as the property that perfect competition featuring the slope of a tangent line to the isoquant equals the ratio of factor prices, we obtain the following equations, which are dual to equations (19) and (20) in the H-O model:

\[ \theta_{LM} \dot{w} + \theta_{KM} \dot{r}_M = \dot{P}_M, \tag{25} \]
\[ \theta_{LN} \dot{w} + \theta_{KN} \dot{r}_N = \dot{P}_N. \tag{26} \]

Since labor is fully employed, then

\[ L = a_{LM}M + a_{LN}N = \frac{a_{LM}}{a_{KM}} K_M + \frac{a_{LN}}{a_{KN}} K_N, \tag{27} \]

also holds. Here, $M$ and $N$ denote the quantities of the production of $M$ and $N$, and $K_M$ and $K_N$ are the specific factors used in sectors $M$ and $N$. Note that we use two relationships, $M = K_M/a_{KM}$ and $N = K_N/a_{KN}$, to yield the right-hand side of equation (27).

By totally differentiating equation (27) and using the assumption that the labor and capital endowment is constant, equation (27) can be rearranged as follows:

\[ \lambda_{LM}(a_{LM} - \dot{a}_{KM}) + \lambda_{LN}(a_{LN} - \dot{a}_{KN}) = 0, \tag{28} \]

where $\lambda_i$ represents the share of factor $i$ used in sector $j$. 

Let us denote the elasticity of labor's marginal product curve in sector $M$ as $\gamma_{LM}$. Then, $\gamma_{LM}$ can be expressed as follows:

$$\gamma_{LM} = -\frac{\hat{a}_{LM} - \hat{a}_{EM}}{\hat{w} - \hat{P}_M}.$$ 

$\gamma_{LN}$, the elasticity of labor's marginal product curve in sector $N$, is similarly defined. We substitute these equations for equation (28) and rearrange it to derive the following equation linking changes in wages with changes in commodity prices:

$$\frac{\lambda_{LM}\gamma_{LM}}{\lambda_{LM}\gamma_{LM} + \lambda_{LN}\gamma_{LN}}\hat{P}_M + \frac{\lambda_{LN}\gamma_{LN}}{\lambda_{LM}\gamma_{LM} + \lambda_{LN}\gamma_{LN}}\hat{P}_N = \hat{w}.$$ 

Equation (29) implies that $\hat{P}_M > \hat{w} > \hat{P}_N$ holds when the price of $M$ rises more than the price of $N$. Furthermore, since the assumption of perfect competition means changes in commodity prices are equal to the weighted average of factor price changes, equation (29) also demonstrates the validity of equation (22).

### B. Possibility of Autonomous Resolution of Factor Immobility

When capital does not move between sectors (the specific factor model), factor price changes induced by changes in the relative price of commodity $M$ are shown as equation (22), i.e., as $\hat{r}_M > \hat{P}_M > \hat{w} > \hat{P}_N > \hat{r}_N$. On the other hand, in the case of perfect capital mobility in the long term (the H-O model), the relationship is $\hat{r} > \hat{P}_M > \hat{P}_N > \hat{w}$, as shown in equation (15). Is the adjustment mechanism from the short term to the long term compatible with the above factor price changes in the specific factor model and the H-O model?

When capital is immobile, the rate of return on capital in sector $M$ rises relative to sector $N$. Where capital is mobile, the capital of sector $N$ moves to sector $M$ in response to the difference in rates of return on capital. Since commodity $M$ is capital-intensive, the increase in demand for labor induced by the shift of capital to sector $M$ falls short of the decrease in demand for labor associated with the outflow of capital in sector $N$. Excess labor supply in the economy therefore lowers wages. Further, since commodity prices remain constant after the initial change, the rate of return on capital rises in both sectors due to decreased wages. Because commodity $N$ is labor-intensive, however, the rate of return on capital in sector $N$ rises more than it does in sector $M$ and the rate of return on capital for both sectors finally converges. Thus, $\hat{r} > \hat{P}_M > \hat{P}_N > \hat{w}$, shown in equation (15), holds.

To sum up, when commodity $M$ is capital-intensive, workers gain in terms of the price of commodity $N$ if capital does not move at all. As capital moves over time, however, wages decline in terms of the price of $M$ as well as the price of $N$. On the other hand, the owners of capital gain as a result of capital reallocation.

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32. Conversely, when $M$ is labor-intensive, the owners of the specific factor in sector $M$ gain if capital does not move at all, but lose if capital moves. The owners of the specific factor in sector $N$ lose regardless of capital reallocation and lose more as the capital moves. Meanwhile, workers certainly gain as a result of capital reallocation.
When the relative price of a commodity changes, owners of one factor, who gain temporarily as a result of capital immobility, at least suffer losses due to capital reallocation over time (Mussa [1974] and Neary [1978]). It follows that the factor owners, in due course, have an incentive to resist the shift of capital induced by changes in the relative price of a commodity. Table 4 summarizes these relationships. Hence, it suggests that factor market distortions in the form of factor immobility cannot be resolved autonomously through the market mechanism.33

One of the major causes of Japan’s long-term stagnation since the early 1990s was forbearance lending to inefficient firms that finally damaged the soundness and efficiency of Japan’s economy (Sekine, Kobayashi, and Saita [2003] and Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap [2003]). Continued forbearance lending that permits “zombie” firms to exist indicates the existence of incentives to resist factor reallocation, even though economic adjustment is necessary for the economy to return to its long-term sustainable growth path.

Table 4  Factor Price Changes from Short Term to Long Term Due to Change in Goods Prices ($\hat{P}_m > \hat{P}_n$ Case)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$M$ goods as capital-intensive goods</th>
<th>$M$ goods as labor-intensive goods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$K_M$</td>
<td>Better off</td>
<td>Worse off</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$K_N$</td>
<td>Better off</td>
<td>Worse off</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$L$</td>
<td>Worse off</td>
<td>Better off</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The shaded areas indicate productive factors whose prices fall due to capital reallocation.

V. Concluding Remarks

In this paper, we focused on resource misallocation induced by factor market distortions such as factor immobility and intersectoral differentials in factors’ marginal productivity, as one of the structural problems faced by Japan’s economy. We also conducted qualitative and quantitative analysis of the effect of factor market distortions on the economy.

Distortions in factor markets lead the economy to exhibit inefficient resource allocations, resulting in an inward shift of the nation’s production possibility frontier and a decline in its attainable output. Under such circumstances, a conventional growth accounting framework that assumes perfect factor markets overestimates the decline in TFP growth. In fact, our empirical results showed that the misallocation of productive factors particularly affected nonmanufacturing sectors after the asset price bubble burst.

33. This paper examines the possibility of autonomous resolution of such distortions by applying trade theory research to extend classical trade theory with the assumption of perfect factor markets to incorporate factor market distortions. Some researchers, however, investigate this issue from a political economy perspective associated with the introduction of regulations. For example, Krueger (1974) analyzes rent-seeking activity to get an export or import quota. She shows that real resources are expended to obtain import or export licenses, since monopoly profits can be obtained from them, and concludes that resource allocation can be distorted by such activities. Furthermore, Grossman and Helpman (1994) develop a model in which interest groups lobby and contribute to politicians’ election campaigns to influence government policies and gain rent from them. They then show the emergence of an equilibrium in which anti-competitive policies are enacted, and resource misallocation is not resolved.
We broke down Japan’s GDP growth rate, paying attention to the effect of factor market distortions, to find that about 0.5 percent of the decline in the GDP growth rate (–3.6 percent) since the bursting of the asset price bubble is attributable to the deterioration of such distortions. This implies that worsening of structural problems in the form of factor market distortions is deemed one of the major causes behind the decade-long economic stagnation.

It should be noted that the aforementioned distortions and resultant misallocation of productive resources cannot be resolved autonomously, because some economic agents suffer losses when the factor market distortions are resolved. Therefore, economic stagnation will continue so long as policy measures are not taken to directly address structural problems.

The above point suggests an important implication for estimation methods for the potential growth rate. That is, when factor market distortions cannot be resolved autonomously and the resulting resource misallocation persists for a long period of time, the production function approach is likely to overestimate potential GDP. Broadly speaking, there are two conventional methods: the production function approach and the filtering approach. The former method computes attainable maximum GDP based on specific assumptions of an aggregate production function, such as the Cobb-Douglas function. The latter method extracts the trend output as the equilibrium level of output (potential GDP) from actual GDP data, assuming that the economy fluctuates around its long-term equilibrium. In other words, the production function approach does not account for the factor market distortions, while the filtering approach assumes that the real economy is in the neighborhood of short-term equilibrium that entails some distortions.

Let us conclude this paper by examining the monetary policy implications from the perspective of the relationship between potential output and inflationary/deflationary pressures. Figure 8 shows potential output, the potential growth rate, and the resulting output gap, all of which are estimated by the two types of filters: the Hodrick-Prescott filter (the HP filter) and the Hirose-Kamada filter (the HK filter). The latter filter combines the HP filter with the relationship between potential GDP and the Phillips curve.

Figure 8 shows that the growth path of potential output has declined noticeably since the early 1990s. It also demonstrates that the potential growth rate estimated by both filtering methods declines to around 1 percent in the latter half of the 1990s from the level of over 4 percent in the latter half of the 1980s. Moreover, the HK-filtered potential growth rate has declined further to about 0.4 percent in recent years. Both of the two series of output gaps obtained by the HP filter and the HK filter have recently turned positive, reflecting the gradual slowdown of deflationary pressure in Japan.

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34. For the various issues concerning the potential growth rate, see Bank of Japan (2003).
35. Hirose and Kamada (2003) build on the HP filter and present a new methodology for estimating potential GDP by simultaneous estimation of potential GDP and the Phillips curve. This new method enables the estimation of potential GDP that is not only the trend of actual GDP but also the non-accelerating inflation level of output (NAILO).
36. As mentioned earlier, the filtering approach has the advantage that it can estimate the potential output, taking account of the presence of distortions. Thus, it can be concluded that, based on our analysis, the worsening of distortions lies behind this downward shift of potential GDP estimated by both filtering methods.
Figure 8 Potential Output

[1] Potential Output

¥ billions, in log

Real GDP
HK-filtered trend
HP-filtered trend

1980 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000 01 02 03

[2] Potential Growth Rate

Changes from a quarter earlier, percent

Real GDP
HK-filtered trend
HP-filtered trend

1980 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000 01 02 03

[3] Output Gap

Percent

HK-filtered trend
HP-filtered trend

1980 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000 01 02 03

Note: Real GDP and core CPI (CPI excluding perishables) used for estimation were seasonally adjusted based on the following specifications using X-12-ARIMA.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample period</th>
<th>Real GDP</th>
<th>Core CPI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time-series model</th>
<th>Real GDP</th>
<th>Core CPI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(2 1 0) (0 1 1)</td>
<td>(0 1 1) (0 1 1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Real GDP</th>
<th>Core CPI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The impact of temporary changes in demand at the time of the introduction of the consumption tax and the tax rate increase were adjusted using the dummy variables.</td>
<td>The impact of the introduction of the consumption tax and the tax rate increase were adjusted by the level shifts.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Okina and Shiratsuka (2003) point out, cross-sectional resource misallocation induces intertemporal resource misallocation, and then amplifies a negative impact on the economy. In the situation where inefficient firms survive and the economy’s production possibility frontier continues shrinking over the long term, not only does the trend growth rate fall but also downward pressure on asset prices continues to influence the economy. The relative prices of asset prices to general prices means intertemporal relative prices. Therefore, the economic situation where asset prices decline drastically while general prices remain relatively stable can be interpreted as one where downward pressure on the prices of future goods works to affect intertemporal resource allocation (Figure 9). It follows that downward pressure on the trend growth rate strengthens as capital accumulation in high productivity sectors declines. Cross-sectional and intertemporal resource misallocation interacts to amplify the negative impacts of structural factors on the economy as a whole.

The above observation implies that structural factors are more important than the other cyclical factors in causing the economy to plunge into a deflationary economic situation. It also shows that elimination of structural factors themselves is a more effective policy response than measures taken over a long period of time that offset cyclical factors. In other words, monetary policy is no panacea for an economic

**Figure 9 Asset Prices and General Prices**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Core CPI</th>
<th>Land prices</th>
<th>Stock prices</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>120</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>110</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Core CPI (CPI excluding perishables) is seasonally adjusted by X-12-ARIMA utilizing ARIMA (0 1 1) and (0 1 1) models, where the impact of introducing the consumption tax (April 1989) and the tax rate increase (April 1997) were adjusted by level shifts.

downturn beyond boom-and-bust cycles and no substitute for policies designed to resolve structural problems that exist on the supply side (Yamaguchi [1999] and Shirakawa [2000]).

The basic policy response to structural problems is to attack directly their sources by transferring real resources between the agents gaining and those losing from the structural reform (Bhagwati [1971]). It should be noted that to support the structural reform, other policy measures including deregulation should be taken to reduce adjustment costs. That is, it is important to implement effective policies that directly influence adjustment costs by reforming the economic structure itself so that adjustment costs rise with the acceleration of structural reform. In this way, the economy can promptly return to its long-term equilibrium as a result of rational decisions by economic agents.

Needless to say, when policy is implemented to eliminate structural problems, temporal but large negative shocks are inevitable. Thus, the combination of policy measures to establish a safety net as well as boost effective demand is of great importance to ameliorate economic distress in the short term. Even in such a case, however, the sequencing of policy measure implementation is also important from the standpoint of making use of limited effective policy tools, while not hindering incentives for structural reform.

37. For more on this point, see Footnote 4. Note that Grossman and Helpman (1994), introduced in Footnote 33, show that instead of the transfer of funds among economic agents, anti-competitive policies tend to be enacted due to political lobbying. Thus, the need to reform the relation between interest groups and politicians is one of the most important issues in enabling the transfer of funds among economic agents.

38. For example, Mussa (1978) builds a dynamic model in which capital is fixed in respective sectors in the short run, while it moves flexibly among sectors in the long run. He then shows the dynamic path for the economy from the short term to the long term when some real resources are needed for intersectoral capital reallocation. He concludes that when the expectations of capital owners concerning future rental rates are rational, the economy’s dynamic path is optimal in the sense that it maximizes the present discounted value of the economy’s final output. This conclusion implies that since the actual dynamic path diverges from the optimal path when expectations are irrational, any convergence speed differing from the optimal speed is not desirable. Moreover, since convergence speed is also dependent on real resources used in capital movement, it is necessary to reduce adjustment costs to accelerate structural reforms and realize the economy’s prompt return to its long-run equilibrium.
References


